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Abstract 
 
The Malaysian government has recently decided to consider nuclear 
energy as an option for electricity generation post-2030. In this light, 
Malaysia needs to develop a National Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy to 
ensure the sustainability of its nuclear power programme. Due to the 
nature of dual use nuclear technology, this policy debate touches a very 
sensitive political topic in the context of the ongoing ‘war on terror’. To 
prevent newcomer states from misusing sensitive technology facilities 
such as the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear materials, the 
international system employs multilateral nuclear arrangements (MNA). 
However, the MNA has come under criticism, especially from the 
developing countries, since it contradicts their rights for peaceful use of 
nuclear technology, as stipulated under Article IV of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Without a doubt, the 
central issue in the implementation of MNA is about trust and 
trustworthiness.  Through a historical analysis and policy study, this 
thesis identifies the factors that influence nuclear cooperation in the 
framework of multilateralism. It also explores Malaysia’s participation in 
the MNA, contributes to the debate on the most appropriate option for its 
nuclear fuel cycle and provides information for developing Malaysia’s 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. The arguments made in this thesis are based 
on consultations and analysis of a range of primary documents (white 
papers, acts, reports and formal interviews, etc.) and secondary 
materials (presentations by policy-makers and analysts, a wide-range of 
secondary literature). These materials have been crosschecked against 
a limited number of unstructured interviews with policymakers, analysts 
and Malaysian Government officials. The thesis is also underpinned by 
information from relevant academic, media and historical literature. The 
study concludes that the MNA is the best choice through which Malaysia 
xvii 
 
can secure a fuel supply and maintain the sustainability of its national 
nuclear power program. 
1 
 
Part 1: The Approach 
Chapter 1 
Towards an Understanding of Malaysian Policy on 
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 
1.1  Research Contribution 
 
When Malaysia decided to pursue the development of a civil nuclear 
energy capability, one of the important components to be considered 
was a nuclear fuel cycle policy. This policy would help Malaysia:  
i. to guarantee the security of nuclear fuel supply and sustainability 
of its environment when Malaysia is ready to develop a nuclear 
power programme;  
ii. to identify technologies that are available and accessible for 
Malaysia; and 
iii. to strategize and position Malaysia among nuclear powers to be 
‘up-to-date’ on developments in nuclear technology and in nuclear 
management. 
This thesis, which is the first and only academic study on Malaysia’s 
policy on the nuclear fuel cycle, was carried out to outline strategies that 
would protect Malaysia’s right to access nuclear technology. This right is 
stipulated under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapon (NPT). The focus of this thesis is to identify available options 
that would benefit Malaysia in the peaceful acquisition of a civil nuclear 
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capability without being seen as a threat regionally or globally. For this 
reason, this study also thoroughly examines the system and mechanism 
of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel cycle (MNA). Such an 
analysis, I argue, can assist the development of Malaysia’s own nuclear 
fuel cycle policy. 
 
The nuclear fuel cycle may be broadly defined as the set of processes 
and operations needed to manufacture nuclear fuel, its irradiation in 
nuclear power reactors and storage, reprocessing, recycling or waste 
disposal (IAEA TECDOC 1613, 2009). Thus, stages in nuclear power 
system include facilities that mine and mill uranium ore, facilities that 
enrich uranium to create fuel, fuel fabrication facilities, reactors that burn 
that fuel to generate electricity, possibly facilities to reprocess the spent 
fuel, and waste storage sites (the Nuclear Energy Study Group of the 
American Physical Society Panel, 2005). There are two types of fuel 
cycle, namely an open nuclear fuel cycle and a closed nuclear fuel 
cycle. During an open nuclear fuel cycle, either used fuel is not 
reprocessed or the cycle does not involve the uranium enrichment 
process. Advantages of having a closed fuel cycle for a country with no 
uranium mines come from reprocessing: the chemical process of 
separating plutonium and uranium out of used nuclear fuel, which 
creates reusable nuclear materials. This is a strategy for some countries 
to secure a fuel supply because reprocessing extends the life of 
available uranium, and in some countries that declared they have a 
closed fuel cycle such as the United States (U.S.) (enrichment facility), 
Russia (enrichment and reprocessing facility) and China (enrichment 
facility), it is seen as a very efficient use of energy. For example, one 
gram of recycled plutonium can produce the same amount of electricity 
as one ton of oil (Eureka County, 2011). Another advantage is that the 
large amount of used fuel produced by nuclear reactors is significantly 
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reduced through the reprocessing technology. After reprocessing, only 
about three percent of the original quantity of nuclear material remains 
unusable, high-level waste (Eureka County, 2011). 
 
A closed nuclear fuel cycle would give Malaysia, a country with no 
uranium reserves, an advantage because a capability to reprocess 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) would secure Malaysia’s nuclear fuel supply if 
there is shortage of nuclear fuel from the supply side. 
   
1.1.1 Research Problem and Puzzle 
 
When Malaysia decided to develop nuclear power as an alternative for 
its electricity generation after 2020, a need emerged to choose the best 
option for the country in terms of nuclear fuel cycle. This decision will 
determine whether nuclear suppliers will support Malaysia’s desire for 
nuclear energy without imposing any additional conditions, as has 
happened with some countries, such as Iran.  
 
In civilian nuclear activities, such as nuclear power programme, the 
main concern is about SNF, which involves the most difficult and 
controversial field of nuclear power policy. These issues include not only 
environment and health, but also security since separated plutonium 
and/or depleted uranium from the SNF could be misused as a nuclear 
weapon (Högselius, 2009). These materials are produced from two 
stages in the nuclear fuel cycle namely, uranium enrichment and the 
reprocessing of SNF. While this study was carried out, Malaysia had no 
uranium reserves that potentially could be explored for the nuclear 
power industry. Thus, if the country is ready for its nuclear power 
program in the future, Malaysia’s fuel is fully dependant on foreign 
supply. In this regard, enrichment and reprocessing technology seems 
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to be a promising measure that could benefit Malaysia. Enrichment 
technology would not only be advantageous from the perspective of fuel 
supply but also could help sustain the environment since the technology 
can lessen the volume, radiotoxicity and decay heat of the final High-
Level Waste (HLW). Subsequently, the final repository volume is 
reduced, which also decreases the cost and area for waste disposal 
(Rodríguez-Penalonga & Soria, 2017; see also Widder, 2010). 
 
Malaysia, as a signatory state to the NPT, has a legal right to develop a 
complete nuclear fuel cycle, subject to IAEA’s guidelines and 
inspections. This is clearly guaranteed in the Article IV of the NPT, 
which states that all non-nuclear weapon countries (NNWS) that sign 
the treaty, are given an inalienable right to develop research, produce 
and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. 
These countries also have the right to participate in the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, the 
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies can increase the 
risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons (Goldschmidt, 2003). The 
NNWS’s right, as specified in the NPT, has raised concerns from many 
countries, in particular developed countries, primarily due to the 
possibility of dual use of nuclear technology. This means that its 
diffusion has become a very sensitive political question in the context of 
the ongoing ‘war on terror’. From the standpoint of nuclear non-
proliferation, enrichment and reprocessing technology is a sensitive 
technology that is subject to strict international control. If not controlled, 
these technologies could be used to produce nuclear weapon-grade 
materials, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated 
plutonium. 
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Although the NPT is a treaty that was created to govern nuclear 
activities, Article IV of the treaty represents a loophole in controlling the 
development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear political analysts believe that 
with such knowledge, a state could revoke its non-proliferation 
commitments and give them an open opportunity to develop nuclear 
weapons (Shenasaei & Shirvani, 2014). It is undeniable that the NPT is 
a successful security regime, but at the same time it is vulnerable. A 
member state could spend many years taking advantage of its Article IV 
rights, and then, as it passes the threshold needed to create a nuclear 
weapon, the state can withdraw and evade its Article II obligations ‘not 
to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices’ (Burke, 2017). This was demonstrated when North 
Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the NPT. This 
decision poses questions about the North Korea’s status within the NPT, 
the adequacy of the NPT’s provisions for treaty withdrawal and the 
ability of existing international institutions to govern treaty obligations 
related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (Carrel-Billiard & 
Wing, 2010). Thus, the legal ability to acquire enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities by a Member State of the NPT, is a decision that 
carries with it a high degree of risk. 
 
On the other hand, the three other nuclear states – namely Israel, India 
and Pakistan - are excluded from joining the NPT as NWS because that 
category is limited to those states which manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967. Consequently, they are not 
bound legally by NPT obligations, being neither NNWS nor NWS. This 
also means that these states can produce fissile material without being 
a part of the IAEA safeguards system (Burke, 2017). 
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Having an enrichment or a reprocessing capability would increase the 
interest among state leaders inclined to develop nuclear weapons and, 
in the worst-case scenario, the technology and its products could be 
targeted by terrorists or other non-state actors (McGoldrick, 2011). This 
concern was intensified after incidents such as the nuclear test by India 
in 1974, which eventually led to the discovery of A.Q. Khan’s illegitimate 
network that supplied sensitive nuclear technologies and equipment to 
so-called ‘rogue states’, and allegations that North Korea offered 
sensitive nuclear technology to other states. For these reasons, major 
nuclear suppliers exercise substantial restrictions in the transfer of 
sensitive nuclear technologies to countries that lack or do not have such 
capabilities (McGoldrick, 2011).  
  
During preliminary stage of nuclear power program, this should not be 
an issue because undertaking fuel preparation for reactors with less 
than four units would not be economical for newcomers like Malaysia 
(Symon, 2008). However, this might change if Malaysia’s nuclear power 
develops on a much larger scale. Malaysia may want to have this 
capability to achieve the effect of the economy of scale and less 
dependency from foreign resources, considering the country has no 
source of uranium. This interest may also occur in other developing 
countries interested in developing a nuclear power program. Hence, 
multilateral approaches should be the method of choice for countries 
hoping to develop a commercial nuclear power industry, and especially 
so when the intention is to develop enrichment and reprocessing 
facilities. MNA is also a solution for managing global nuclear fuel cycles 
to make available the benefits of peaceful applications to all countries on 
an equitable and non-discriminatory basis (Yudin, 2011). However, MNA 
is facing criticism especially among developing countries. They 
demanded for every Member State of the NPT to have same right to 
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access any nuclear technology as long it is for peaceful use. Developing 
countries also fear that if they engage in this kind of approach, the 
nuclear fuel supply could be disrupted for political reasons; or it could 
serve as a red herring for denying their rights to construct and operate 
fuel cycle facilities domestically (Goldschmidt, 2010). Another factor that 
makes some countries not confident in MNA is that the effectiveness 
and reliability of the MNA is still at the exploration stage, both in political 
and technical aspects.  That is why, among other core concerns that 
have been raised by many states, including Malaysia, the MNA should 
not form a monopoly of suppliers. The right of states to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes must be respected and this initiative must 
be non-discriminatory, transparent and inclusive (Yudin, 2010).  On the 
other side of the debate, nuclear supplier states fear that this provision 
could be misused for nuclear weapon development purposes. So, 
nuclear suppliers could be more confident that by accepting the MNA, a 
country like Malaysia would gain a level of trustworthiness because the 
state demonstrated their genuine intent to develop only civil applications 
of nuclear technology. In fact, this leaves no choice for a country like 
Malaysia because nuclear supplier states have the right to not transfer 
any technology that they consider may be misused to develop weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). If newcomers decide not to take the deal, it 
would be a major drawback to a country like Malaysia.  
 
The research puzzle for this study is, accordingly, to explore the best 
option for Malaysia’s nuclear fuel cycle. The shape and substance of 
this decision will determine trust and trustworthiness of the international 
community in supporting Malaysia’s nuclear power program, which 
could contribute to the country’s economic and security systems.  
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Given scenarios that were mentioned above, Malaysia has only one 
option, which is an open nuclear fuel cycle implemented through a 
multilateral arrangement such as MNA. If Malaysia still maintained its 
decision to go for a closed fuel cycle, it may be suspected of having an 
interest in developing nuclear weapons. This is what Iran encountered 
when it announced the interest in developing reprocessing facilities for 
peaceful use, to secure its nuclear fuel supply.  
 
However, to enjoy the benefits of multilateralism, Malaysia needs to 
consider the long-term effects, especially if any crisis were to occur. As 
suggested by Newman, a crisis in multilateral organisation/institutions 
may happen if: 
 
 The attitude of a powerful country turns against a multilateral 
organisation/institution for ideological reasons, for example, a 
change of government, and such a country refuses to give 
diplomatic and material support. 
 The constitutive principles upon which the organisation or regime 
was founded and operates are challenged by changing norms or the 
breakdown of norms. For example, the growing prominence of 
terrorist organisations and the perceived threats of weapons of 
mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or ‘aggressive country’ 
might change the constitutive principles (Newman, 2007). 
 
A decision for selecting MNA as a mechanism for securing fuel supply 
would also be in line with the international tendency towards nuclear 
cooperation. For example, during the IAEA General Conference in 
September 2003, the IAEA Director General shared his view that 
international cooperation, in the context of the design and operation of 
the nuclear fuel cycle, was an important issue that has been discussed 
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over the years. He suggested that MNA should be given serious 
consideration in the effort to cope with the ever-increasing challenges of 
non-proliferation, safety, security and technology (ElBaradei, 2003).  
 
These efforts should include limiting the use of weapon-grade materials 
such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium in civilian nuclear 
programmes, by permitting it only under multilateral control. Any 
exploration of this option has to be governed by the appropriate rules of 
transparency, control and, above all, assurance of supply of nuclear fuel 
cycle services (ElBaradei, 2003). Igor Shuvalov, in his statement during 
the G8 meeting 2006, cited that energy security "should be based on 
market mechanisms that will open a lengthy cycle of investments, and 
prevent a negative impact by possible political decisions" (Sunderland, 
2006).  
 
As a growing country that needs to keep its energy options open, 
Malaysia needs to constantly follow-up and maintain its keen interest in 
the development of MNA. In this context, Malaysia should hold its 
national position that any proposals should be a potential mechanism to 
improve supply assurances of fuel material, technology and services, 
and not serve as a mechanism for controlling the nuclear fuel market. In 
this regard, this study was undertaken to provide an analysis on the 
factors that influence nuclear cooperation surrounding the nexus of 
multilateralism that could be used to explore Malaysia’s participation in 
the MNA, to select an option for its nuclear fuel cycle and to assist 
Malaysia in developing its Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. 
 
Unfortunately, so far, there are few examples of the decision-making of 
developing countries that are contemplating a nuclear power 
programme which Malaysia could use as a model.  The only newcomer 
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country that has been said to be a good example for nuclear power 
programme is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). From observation, many 
proposals on MNA are from states that already have a nuclear power 
industry, such as the USA that proposed Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP), or the IAEA Standby Arrangement System (SAS) 
that was proposed by Japan. The latest proposal is the IAEA Nuclear 
Fuel Bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Furthermore, 
there is not yet an academic study, at least during this study’s 
preparation, which discusses the perspectives on MNA from developing 
countries or newcomer states, which include Malaysia, and how it would 
impact Malaysia’s nuclear power planning. Most of the studies on MNA 
take the angle of nuclear safety, security, technology and economy that 
could be gained from the proposed initiatives. Following this, most 
current proposals are targeted at the energy-security arguments for 
national fuel-cycle capabilities. Against this background, several 
proposals seek to strengthen existing market mechanisms, usually 
through (in one form or another) assurances of fuel supply or fuel-cycle 
services. These proposals are generally based on the underlying 
assumption that the current system of fuel and enrichment suppliers is 
adequately diverse, and that new suppliers are not needed (Glaser, 
2009:2). 
 
Subsequently, not much literature exists on how developing countries 
should approach challenges to nuclear programmes and their 
acceptance in MNA. In addition, whilst this research was being carried 
out, most discussions on MNA focused on the technology and the 
economy of the initiatives but none focused on the concept of 
multilateralism itself. This is bearing in mind that the implementation and 
employment of the multilateralism concept is slightly different between 
western states and Asia, especially in security cooperation. As has been 
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declared by SEA leadership, ASEAN was implemented based on an 
indigenous concept, the ‘ASEAN Way’, emerging from four key 
principles: open regionalism, cooperative security, soft regionalism and 
consensus (Acharya, 1997). This will be discussed further in Chapter 2, 
but sufficient to say here that this research was carried out through the 
prism of the principles, norms and general concepts of multilateralism 
surrounding the MNA from the perspective of ASEAN. For that reason, 
the originality of this dissertation is partly determined by the following 
aspects: 
 
i. there has been no previous study of these issues where Malaysia 
is concerned; 
ii. this dissertation analyses a broader range of issues than have 
previously been addressed; and 
iii. information obtained from Malaysia’s experiences in this study 
will be relevant to other countries that are considering MNA. 
Subsequently, this policy-oriented research is important and could offer 
a contribution to the academic knowledge of nuclear policy studies, 
especially in the ASEAN region and in Malaysia. 
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Diagram 1: Gap Analysis for Malaysia’s security of nuclear fuel and 
sustainability of its nuclear power program. Source: Constructed by the 
author. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study  
The main puzzle of this study is to identify which nuclear fuel cycle 
option fits best the needs of Malaysia. In the contemporary situation, 
cooperation through multilateral agreements appears the best way 
forward, and this thesis therefore focuses on MNA from the perspective 
of multilateralism, trust and confidence building. Hence, this policy-
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based research aims to achieve three objectives. First, to explore the 
influences of the MNA proposal on Malaysian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. 
Second, to examine the academic literature on multilateral cooperation, 
which has been accepted by the international community as a tool in 
implementing international order. Third, to identify (i) what are the 
factors that need to be considered by suppliers that would gain trust 
from recipient states to join MNA, and (ii) factors that need to be 
addressed by the recipient states to gain suppliers’ trust during the 
negotiations of nuclear cooperation.  
This research will approach MNA through the concept and principles of 
multilateralism and how trust plays a vital role in nuclear cooperation. 
Data from this research then will be utilized to investigate and analyse 
features that influence trust and trustworthiness among nuclear 
suppliers and newcomers. This information will provide the basis for 
designing Malaysia’s nuclear fuel cycle policy. Wide-ranging nuclear fuel 
cycle policy would guide Malaysia to access nuclear technology and fuel 
services within the context of the international nuclear system of 
governance. Information gathered from this study could also be used to 
examine the extent to which the policies and practices in this field 
illustrate theories of international order. 
1.3 The Key Research Questions 
As mentioned previously, this study seeks to add knowledge about the 
processes surrounding the operation of the multilateral nuclear fuel 
cycle, and to contribute to the development of Malaysia’s Policy on the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Information gained from this research also could 
provide data for nuclear power planning in Southeast Asia. This study 
aims to answer the following research questions: 
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i. What is the best option for Malaysia to guarantee the security of 
nuclear fuel supply and sustainability of its environment when 
Malaysia is ready to develop a nuclear power programme? 
ii. How can MNA ensure that nuclear fuel and its services are 
accessible at competitive market prices on an equitable and non-
discriminatory basis?  
iii. What are the key issues surrounding MNA that should be 
addressed before Malaysia designs its national nuclear fuel cycle 
policy?   
iv. What are the factors that will encourage and maintain the trust of:  
a. The international community for the implementation and 
sustainability of multilateralism of nuclear fuel cycle 
cooperation? 
b. Developing countries to participate in the multilateral 
approach to the nuclear fuel cycle cooperation? 
1.4 Research Framework and Design 
There are three stages in this study. The first stage is to understand the 
conceptualization of multilateralism underpinning MNA using analytical 
frameworks developed within the academic literature on International 
relations: namely Liberal Institutionalism, Constructivism and Neo-
functionalism.  Then, the study will examine the historical evolution of 
MNA, which is closely related to questions of nuclear security and non-
proliferation. The analysis explores factors and issues that influenced 
participation in previous MNA and compares them to the modern 
multilateral organisation in nuclear energy, such as Euratom. The study 
uses historical analysis carried out on previous MNA proposals primarily 
to explore factors and lessons learned from them. Euratom was selected 
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as a case study because it was recognised as one of the success 
stories of multilateral cooperation on nuclear energy.  
 
The second stage of this study will explore factors that influence levels 
of trust, i.e. linkages between economics, military power and regulatory 
frameworks. This section aims to explore the dynamics of how and 
under what conditions trust can be built, maintained or regained. The 
analysis will examine factors used to design a state’s foreign policy, 
previous and current economic cooperation, previous and current 
strategic partnerships, policy on nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes and previous or current nuclear cooperation. This information 
is significant for the study in order to identify the factors that nurture trust 
between a nuclear supplier country and a newcomer country. In this 
Thesis, the methodological approach deployed is chiefly that of historical 
analysis. The information garnered through this process could be used 
as a basis for the development of nuclear fuel cycle policy appropriate to 
the contemporary international environment. 
 
The third stage involves investigation of multilateral cooperation through 
Asian and, more specifically, Malaysia’s, perspective. The study focuses 
on ASEAN and its ‘ASEAN Way’ approach to diplomacy and 
policymaking. These views could help explain the interest of developing 
countries as perceived from the Asian perspective and how they 
implement their foreign policy on multilateral cooperation. This study 
supports the argument that different states and regions approach the 
challenges of international governance differently.  Data from all these 
analyses will later be used to identify factors and features on how trust 
can be developed, shaped and maintained between nuclear supplier 
states and newcomers. The information also will be used to understand 
how it can influence Malaysia’s and South East Asia (SEA) states’ 
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decision on whether to join the MNA and whether the current MNA 
initiative applies the principles of multilateralism. 
1.5 The Research Methodology 
This study focuses on two variables that are related to the 
implementation of MNA, namely multilateralism and trust. For this 
reason, the study employs a combination of two types of qualitative 
research methodology: comparative historical analysis and case study 
analysis. Comparative historical analysis was used to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of MNA by looking at lessons learned from 
previously proposed MNA regimes since 1946, and modern MNA 
regimes. MNA is, in essence, a strategy to optimize the management of 
the nuclear fuel cycle that would benefit all states without a need to 
develop new facilities, especially in case of sensitive technology such as 
enrichment or reprocessing. According to Chandler, "Historians have 
provided social scientists with little empirical data on which to base 
generalizations or hypotheses concerning the administration of great 
enterprises. Nor have the historians formulated many theories or 
generalizations of their own" (Chandler 1962: 1). The impact of 
Chandler’s study is not limited to business and management only; as 
exemplified by Rose (2008) and Wilkins (2008), Chandler’s work also 
had a strong influence in the fields of economics, sociology, business 
history, management, and political studies (Asifa, Chaudhryb & Shafic, 
2015). Knowledge of the history of any discipline is essential to an 
understanding of the origin, evolutionary process and destination of that 
particular subject (Kipping & Üsdiken, 2007). Therefore, historical 
analysis is used in this Thesis to identify motivations for the 
development of nuclear energy technology, whether it is genuinely for 
civilian purposes or as part of a military project. Historical sociologists 
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previously have produced a series of influential studies to answer some 
important questions concerning state formation, regime change, and the 
international order (Moller, 2016). 
  
Meanwhile, case studies were carried out to identify factors that 
influence nuclear cooperation, and how a state could attempt to build 
trust amongst other members of the international nuclear community; 
and to study a success story of a current multilateral organisation in 
nuclear energy, Euratom, and to compare it with other previous MNA 
proposed since 1946. 
 
1.5.1 Historical Analysis 
 
Historical analysis involves interpretation and understanding of various 
historical events, documents and processes, which aim to answer 
questions of how or why something happened the way it did (Wesleyan 
University, 2011). Comparative historical analysis often helps to derive 
lessons from previous experiences that are relevant to the concerns of 
the present (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). Hence, qualitative 
methods were chosen in this study, and the preferred method is 
historical analysis.  
 
Historical analysis is used in social research as an initial strategy for 
establishing a context or background, against which a substantive 
contemporary study may be structured (Jóhannesson, 2010). 
Correspondingly, many social scientists use this method to understand 
both the dynamics of the contemporary world and the processes that 
created it. For example, it is used in the studies of state building, 
nationalism, capitalist development and industrialization, technological 
development, warfare and revolutions, social movements, 
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democratization, imperialism, secularization, and globalization (Lange, 
2013).  
 
1.5.2  Methodology for the Historical Analysis 
 
Historical analysis is carried out using documents and other texts, such 
as official reports and newspaper articles because it offers insights into 
the reasoning behind social practices and institutional structures. 
Newspaper articles reveal the contradictions in the social and political 
struggles about the practices and political interests at stake. Analysis of 
interview transcripts and observation protocols also offer an important 
avenue to study practices and the reasoning behind them 
(Jóhannesson, 2010). There are several steps used by social scientists 
in historical analysis. Charles Busha and Stephen Harter have detailed 
six steps for conducting historical research (Busha & Harter, 1980) 
which are identify historical problem or need for certain historical 
knowledge; gather relevant information about the problem or topic; if 
applicable, design research hypothesis that tentatively explain 
relationships between historical factors; collect and organize the 
evidence and verify the authenticity and veracity of information and its 
sources; select, organize, and analyse the most pertinent collected 
evidence; and conclusion of the study. 
 
Similarly, Jóhannesson (2010) also points out six steps for conducting 
historic research. Step 1 is to identify the (controversial) issue. 
Jóhannesson stated that the first stage in historical analysis is selection 
of issues or events that is controversial among professionals or widely 
discussed. This study was selected based on the scenario that Malaysia 
is interested in developing a nuclear power programme. Among other 
matters that need to be considered as part of the national preparation 
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towards this programme, there is Malaysia‘s position on nuclear fuel 
cycle policy. The issues are widely discussed among the nuclear 
community relating to the technology itself and knowledge transfer. In 
the entire cycle, only two stages (the uranium enrichment and nuclear 
spent fuel reprocessing) pose risk of being misused/abused to produce 
highly-enriched uranium or plutonium as blasting material for nuclear 
weapons. In response to this growing concern, countries with the 
technology for uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing 
have refused to transfer these technologies to other countries that do 
not have them. This act by the technology holders contradicts what has 
been promised to the newcomer countries in the Article IV of NPT. 
Developing countries are certain that the NPT is the most fundamental 
document that prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons. 
 
Step 2 is the selection of documents. Once the issue has been 
identified, the next step is to determine the materials that are considered 
relevant to the study. Jóhannesson argues that there is no right or 
wrong way of doing it, the most important is to find what the key 
documents are.  For example, if the researcher wants to analyse 
government policy as the issue, he or she needs to find out which are 
the key documents; if the researcher wants to analyse ideas among 
professionals about the discipline, he or she needs to find the event that 
ignited such debates and discussions or information from newspapers in 
the aftermath or reports about the issue. Materials for historical 
discourse analysis can also be found from journals of professional 
organisations. For the purposes of this study, information and evidence 
were collected through library-based research from journals, articles, 
treaties, historical records, reports, databases, country reports, national 
statements, and proceedings from workshops/seminars. Information 
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was also gained from several interviews that were carried out with 
officials from Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
Step 3 is the analysis of the documents that are selected for the study. 
After identifying the documents and materials for research and analysis, 
the next stage is the actual analysis of the documents. At this point, the 
researcher should formulate questions to guide the search for additional 
or missing documents that are needed in the study.  At this stage also, 
study hypothesis would be formed. Based on this suggestion, the 
following questions guided this study in the quest for additional 
documents: What are Malaysia‘s policies on nuclear activities, 
particularly on the nuclear fuel cycle? How do the views in the 
documents relate to genuine principles in the MNA regime and to the 
principles of multilateralism?  
 
Next step, which is step 4 is the stage for analyses the arguments. 
Analyse the contradictions and tensions in the discourse, whether they 
are obvious or not, so as to analyse the patterns of arguments to identify 
the legitimating principles. One of the main patterns found in the study of 
MNA regime documents is that most of the documents present the 
features and benefits of the proposed MNA regime from the perspective 
of supplier states and less from newcomer states. Then, step 5 is the 
historical conjuncture of discourse. This step distinguishes historical 
analysis from the other types of discourse or text analysis. The historical 
conjuncture is to capture what happens in the circumstances of 
relationship between historical and political conditions to develop a good 
argument. For example, Indonesia demonstrated interest in developing 
nuclear weapons during President Sukarno’s time in office in the 1960s; 
however, these plans ended when Sukarno was forced to transfer 
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presidential power to General Suharto in 1966. And finally, is step 6, the 
conclusion of the analysis and thesis writing. 
 
1.5.3  The Case Study  
 
The case study method is the method that focusses on one particular 
case in more detail (Thomas, 2014). The case study selected should 
represent a significant issue/issues and must have an adequate fact 
base to make possible reasonable conclusions, even if it does not 
directly state any conclusions. Ellet (2007) suggests that when carrying 
out a case study analysis, the researcher must be able to construct 
conclusions based on information given in the text; need to filter out 
irrelevant or less important facts/data of the text; the furnish missing 
information through cross-reference/ inferences; and combine evidence 
from different parts of the case and incorporate it into a conclusion. 
 
In this study, several interviews were carried out for the purpose of 
obtaining data on Malaysia’s nuclear activities in addition to information 
gathered from country statements, journals and policy documents. The 
interviews were carried out among high ranking officials and former 
officials from the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia), the 
Malaysia Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) and National Nuclear 
Energy Agency of Indonesia (BATAN): 
 
i. Dato’ Muhamad Lebai Juri, Dr. Director General of the Malaysian 
Nuclear Agency; 
ii. Mr. Hamrah Ali. Director General of the Malaysia Atomic Energy 
Licensing Board; 
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iii. Mr. Totti Tjiptosumirat, Head of Bureau for Legal, Public Relation 
and Cooperation, National Nuclear Energy Agency of Indonesia 
(BATAN). 
 
At first, the researcher was able to get appointments for interviews with 
high ranking officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Unfortunately, these interviews were cancelled at the very last minute 
due to the sensitivity of the topic. This may be because the MNA is still 
under negotiation and there are no agreements in place yet. Also, this 
proposal was rejected by many Member States of the IAEA, which they 
considered as a tool to deny their rights under the Article IV of the NPT. 
The only proposal that is being negotiated during this study is the 
establishment of a Nuclear Fuel Bank between the government of 
Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel bank 
was established as a reserve in the event of the failure of nuclear fuel 
provision by the suppliers.  
 
Then, the IAEA had suggested to interview experts from NGOs involved 
in nuclear non-proliferation. However, due to the focus of this project on 
the implementation policy of MNA, interviews for this study should only 
have been carried out with policy makers, representatives of 
international organisations or states. Therefore, a decision was made 
that information needed for this study will be gathered from country 
statements, policies and websites of relevant entities, such as the IAEA 
and Nuclear Supplier Group.  
 
The decision to limit the number of interviews was also based on the 
fact that the information gathered from the interviews with the IAEA 
officers was likely to be the same as what was communicated in the 
public domain. As a result, interviews were carried out among officers 
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from Malaysia and Indonesia. Vietnam officials were contacted for 
interviews but refused to discuss nuclear power development, keeping 
the issue closed to speculations from the public, including international 
community. 
  
The main focus of this study is the Malaysian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. 
Hence, information gathered from interviews with selected agencies in 
Malaysia are important and sufficient for this study. Interview 
participants are or were directly involved in national nuclear activities as 
policy decision makers. Any discussions about nuclear issues that 
involve Malaysia will refer to them for consultation and advice. Nuclear 
Malaysia is also a liaison agency for the IAEA, while AELB is a nuclear 
regulatory agency in Malaysia. 
 
Meanwhile, data and facts to identify factors involved in establishing 
trust in nuclear cooperation were collected based on the analysis of 
previous nuclear agreements and nuclear programme issues. Three 
examples – or potential pathways - of cooperation were selected, 
namely: 
 
 The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which is 
responsible for the European nuclear power programme and 
nuclear cooperation under the European Commission (EC).  This 
case is selected because Euratom is one of the successful 
multilateral organisation in nuclear activities and cooperation, 
which gained trust from its Member States for it success.  
 the nuclear programme of the UAE as a country from the Middle 
East that was trusted by the supplier group to build a nuclear 
power plant in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the 
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Fukushima Daiichi accident, both events of great impact on 
nuclear power programmes globally. 
 Iranian nuclear cooperation with P5+1. 
1.6 The Thesis Structure 
There are three parts to this thesis, divided into seven chapters. Part 1 
establishes the theoretical approach; Part 2 examines four potential 
pathways towards a nuclear fuel cycle that Malaysia might adopt; and 
Part 3 provides a summary and conclusion to the Thesis. 
 
Part 1 contains two chapters. Chapter 1, Towards an Understanding of 
Malaysian Policy on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, discusses the novelty of 
this research project, the only existing policy study of Malaysia’s Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Policy, and the gap analysis that needs to be conducted. 
 
Chapter 2, Towards Successful Nuclear Cooperation: Building Trust 
through Multilateralism, presents a literature review focusing on 
multilateralism as the optimal solution for nuclear security and non-
proliferation. This chapter explores the notion of multilateralism through 
four theoretical lenses: Realism, Constructivism, Liberal Institutionalism, 
and Neo-functionalism. Chapter 2 explains further the differences 
between the implementation of multilateralism by western states and by 
ASEAN. 
 
Part 2 of this thesis consists of four chapters that explore and discuss 
the four potential pathways of this study. Chapter 3, The Foundation of 
Euratom and the Evolution of the Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle, explores the evolution of efforts to overcome issues that 
related to nuclear weapons proliferation and the evolution of MNA. This 
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chapter analyses the factors that contributed to the failure of nuclear 
initiatives proposed since 1946. Past mistakes should not be repeated in 
modern multilateral nuclear cooperation.  The study looks at three 
historical periods, the Cold War, Post-Cold War, and the contemporary 
era marked by more complex trans-national issues such as terrorism 
and modern nuclear proliferation. The chapter also explains how the 
MNA impacted newcomer states, and developing countries in particular, 
as well nuclear supplier states with open fuel cycles (with no 
reprocessing or enrichment facility). Chapter 3 moves on to analyse in 
greater depth the establishment and evolution of Euratom. Euratom was 
selected for this study because of its success in handling nuclear 
matters in Europe. These findings are linked to the structure of the 
proposed MNA and the concept of multilateralism to see if key features 
of Euratom may be used in implementing MNA. 
 
When discussing multilateralism, debating the nature of trust is 
unavoidable because it involves multinational cooperation and different 
national policies. Trust, briefly introduced in Chapter 2, is explored in 
more detail in Chapter 4 through two case studies: the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Iran. The former has a reputation as a ‘trusted’ 
member of the international community, while the reverse is true for 
Iran: making a comparison potentially very useful in determining what 
elements are necessary in building a relationship of trust. 
 
Research on the relationship of Iran and the UAE countries with the US 
is important for Malaysia to understand the factors that would establish 
trust with the supplier states such as the USA. The USA is the point of 
reference because it influences nuclear politics and international 
relations more than any other single state. The study also includes 
observation on the history of nuclear activities and policies in the UAE 
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and Iran. It is expected that these studies would provide knowledge 
about the state leader’s notion with regards to their state’s identity that 
drives their choices for nuclear technology; whether for energy or 
weapons. 
 
After recognising the lessons learned from previous MNA and 
understanding the notion of multilateralism and trust within it, Chapter 5, 
Prospects for ASIANTOM: A Focus on Indonesia and Vietnam, explores 
the ASEAN perspective on the idea of multilateral institution / 
organisation and Asian views on the implementation of MNA. Two 
countries that explicitly have announced their readiness to build nuclear 
power programmes, Indonesia and Vietnam, were selected as case 
studies. The case studies focused on the country’s foreign policy and 
policy on multilateral cooperation. This analysis offers insights into the 
state’s motivation for developing a nuclear program. This chapter also 
closely focused on the idea of developing trust between supplier and 
consumer states. 
 
Chapter 6, Malaysia’s Best Option: A Multilateral Approach to the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, presents the Malaysian perspective on the 
implementation of the MNA. The study’s approach is the same as in 
Chapter 5, by focussing on the country’s foreign policy and policy on 
multilateral cooperation, country’s policy on Nuclear Programme for 
Peaceful Purposes and the MNA. Results from this chapter are used to 
compare Malaysia’s position in nuclear activities with other ASEAN 
countries, which, indirectly, would offer a picture of the ASEAN’s views 
towards MNA. 
  
Part 3 of this Thesis presents the main findings of the study. It discusses 
the general factors for nuclear cooperation and factors that affect 
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multilateral nuclear cooperation such as the MNA. Factors from Chapter 
3, 4, 5 and 6 are taken into account to construct a foundation for 
Malaysia’s decision on joining MNA and designing Malaysia’s Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Policy to assure its fuel security and sustainability.  
1.7 Expectation of the Study 
Findings and information from this study are expected to form strategies 
for Malaysia’s national policy on the nuclear fuel cycle, if and when the 
country decides to utilize nuclear energy, as well as how it can in turn 
influence Malaysia’s decision about MNA.  This is important because 
Malaysia has very little experience in the arena of nuclear energy and 
wishes to gain access to nuclear technology and essential nuclear 
material on terms that constrain its sovereignty as little as possible. 
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Part 1: The Approach 
Chapter 2 
Towards Successful Nuclear Cooperation: 
Building Trust through Multilateralism 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis focuses on two variables in 
nuclear cooperation, multilateralism and trust. In analysing 
multilateralism theoretically, two assumptions were made. First, regional 
and intergovernmental cooperation is in a way subordinate to 
multilateral arrangements; therefore, discussions around the notion of 
multilateral cooperation include regionalism and intergovernmental 
cooperation. Second, nuclear cooperation occurs primarily among 
sovereign states or intergovernmental organisations, but it does not 
include non-governmental organisations. These assumptions are the 
foundation for a literature review to establish a theoretical framework for 
this thesis. This thesis aims to identify factors that are at play to design 
Malaysia’s policy on the best option for accessing the nuclear fuel cycle 
without jeopardising nuclear security and states’ rights in nuclear 
technology. The results will consequently resolve the dilemma regarding 
whether Malaysia should either: 
 
i. Accept the initiative of the multilateral approach to the nuclear 
fuel cycle, even though this means that Malaysia will pass up the 
right to gain knowledge of nuclear technology. If Malaysia decides 
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to choose this option, this means that the country will fully depend 
on foreign nuclear fuel sources. Moreover, this option will commit 
Malaysia to solely civil applications in the NPP; or 
ii. Decline the initiative and dispute the right as stipulated under 
Article IV of 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), although this will limit Malaysia’s access to the 
nuclear fuel cycle programme. However, this option may raise 
questions in the international community as to why Malaysia is 
interested in enrichment or reprocessing technology at this early 
stage of its nuclear power programme. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the gap analysis of this study is 
the challenge of strict access to some technology in the nuclear fuel 
cycle, such as reprocessing and enrichment. Although Article IV of the 
NPT has secured the rights of its Member States to nuclear technology 
transfer, the solution for security of Malaysia’s nuclear fuel supply is 
through multilateral cooperation; specifically, through the mechanism of 
the MNA. In most forms of cooperation, trust is the main issue. This is 
especially true in multilateral cooperation because it involves various 
national policies with multiple national interests. Based on the gap 
analysis as discussed in Chapter 1, the only option that is available to 
Malaysia to secure and sustain its fuel supply is through the 
implementation of an MNA. Therefore, this study inquires deeper into 
the notion of multilateralism and trust within it. 
2.2  Normative and Analytical Definition of Multilateralism  
It is important to clarify the definition and the concept of multilateralism 
before studying the MNA and the politics of nuclear cooperation. 
Multilateralism is more acceptable in international relations on the one 
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hand because it is seen as an equal form of international cooperation in 
which, in ideal situations, all decisions are made by consensus. This is 
an important factor in cooperation because it represents member states’ 
concern to convey and protect their national interests. This is especially 
the case among developing countries, who can have an equal voice with 
developed countries. On the other hand, multilateralism is accepted 
because it allows power distribution among states and creates a system 
that requires rules to be put in place, which legally bind all participating 
states. Furthermore, the multilateral bargain is attractive because it 
involves the coordination of policies, which are achieved through rule-
based constraints on policy choice rather than policy autonomy.  
 
Institutions can serve two purposes. First, institutions can help solve 
problems of collective action and reduce the problem of commitment as 
well as transaction costs that stand in the way of efficient and mutually 
beneficial political exchange. Second, institutions could also be used as 
an instrument of political control, meaning that powerful states might be 
interested in making their advantages as systematic and durable as 
possible by trying to tie up weaker states in constructive institutional 
arrangements (Ikenberry, 2008). Johnson (2006) has suggested that 
multilateral negotiations are dependent on the interplay of several 
interrelated factors, including ‘the structure and procedures of the 
negotiating forum; timing and the political–diplomatic climate; the 
motivation, preferences, perceived interests and political will of the 
players, especially major players capable of impeding or facilitating 
progress; the degree of trust, tension, conflict and cooperation between 
some or all of the parties (which may also be influenced by geopolitical 
relations and objectives or problems in parallel negotiations in other 
forums, such as trade); relative levels of domestic public awareness, 
engagement and pressure; the relative levels of political commitment 
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and internal stability of governments represented in the negotiations; 
personal and organizational leadership and corresponding alliances; 
and negotiating strategies and tactics employed’ (Johnson, 2006:57). 
 
The best-known definition of multilateralism comes from Ruggie in 1992, 
who views it as “an institutional form that coordinates relations among 
three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct” 
(Ruggie, 1992 see also Caporaso, 1993; Ikenberry, 2006 and Keohane, 
2006). The concept of multilateralism, according to Ruggie, “is the idea 
of ‘an architectural form,’ a deep organizing principle of international life” 
(Caporaso, 1993). This concept has been used as the basic foundation 
to study possible transformations in world politics. Keohane also claimed 
that the notion of multilateralism is accompanied by discrimination 
among states, according to power, status, wealth or other characteristics 
(Keohane, 2006). Meanwhile, Ikenberry in 2003 described 
multilateralism as the coordination of relations among three or more 
states according to a set of rules or principles (Ikenberry, 2003). As a 
result, states have to ensure that their national interests are compatible 
with certain international norms (Rodhan et al., 2009). This is the reason 
why states entrusted and delegated some of their capabilities to 
relatively independent bodies or organisations because of their national 
institutional constraints (Cheneval, 2011).  
 
More recently, multilateralism seems to have moved beyond a dynamic 
process and is much broader than the coordination among more than 
three states or groups of policies, giving it a much more extensive 
meaning and normative definition. Defarges (2005) argues that 
multilateralism includes any system associating several states which are 
united by equal and mutual obligations, as well as by common rules and 
applications of democratic principles to international relations. In 
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addition, Keohane explained that multilateralism is an institutionalized 
collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states, 
which is also deﬁned as persistent set of rules that constrain activity, 
shape expectations and prescribe roles (Telò, 2012).  
 
In a modern definition, multilateralism is defined as ‘three or more actors 
engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalised international 
cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by 
and large) equally to all states’ (Bouchard and Peterson, 2010:10). In 
the case of studying the MNA, the normative definition is more 
appropriate because this study is exploring;  
 
a) How a state should behave in multilateral cooperation, as argued 
by Ruggie; 
b) How equality should be treated among member states;  
c) The relationship among technology holders themselves; for 
example, influenced by the history of WWII, the US might have 
no intention of pairing equally with some European countries in 
the development of nuclear technology; and 
d) The contributions of world order in creating an ideal MNA. 
2.3 The Basic Principles of Multilateralism and the Relationship 
with International Order 
Multilateralism is accepted in the International Relations (IR) theory as 
vital to the stability of relations within the Western Bloc after World War 
II (Griffiths et al., 2009) and gained popularity due to certain standards 
or principles with the same interests and concerns. According to Ruggie, 
these principles are represented by three characteristics (Winters, 
2000):  
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i. Non-discrimination by generalising rules of conduct, whereby 
interaction between parties is governed by a recognised general 
principle. It is governed by ‘norms exhorting general if not 
universal modes of relations to other states, rather than 
differentiating relations case-by-case’ (Caporaso 1993: 54); 
ii. Indivisibility: it is one whole system which means that one action 
by one party will affect the others; and 
iii. Diffuse reciprocity whereby all parties expect to gain from the 
system in the long run regardless of any issues, but do not 
demand precise reciprocity from each deal for each time. As 
explained by Bouchard and Peterson, “diffuse reciprocity 
underpins the hypothesis that multilateralism helps solve 
problems of coordination on which transaction costs are high and 
states are mostly indifferent to outcomes (such as on international 
telephony or river transport). When international problems 
demand coordination, governments are happy to lose today as 
long as there is the prospect of winning tomorrow. But only rarely 
can multilateralism be expected to solve collaboration problems, 
such as those of collective security, when governments have 
grave fears about the consequences of ‘losing today’. Diffuse 
reciprocity also helps explain why powerful states, while 
invariably choosing institutions that serve their interests, may find 
that multilateral arrangements become more attractive to them as 
they value the future more highly” (Bouchard & Peterson, 
2010:8). 
 
Multilateralism explicitly is an agreement between many states with the 
aim to ensure the same rights, equality, responsibility and commitment 
for all members. In multilateralism, if rules and principles are put into 
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place, even a hegemonic country is subject to the same rules as others 
(Martin, 2003).  
 
However, that is not the case and it will not be in the future either, as far 
as multilateralism of nuclear cooperation is concerned. This is because 
MNA is an initiative that engages two distinct groups: (1) a group of 
states that have full access and rights of nuclear fuel cycle technology; 
and (2) a group of states that do not have any of this technology at all. 
The country that holds the technology would indeed maintain their 
commercial interests and will not freely share with those who do not 
have the technology.  Furthermore, from a security perspective, it is 
argued that it is too risky to transfer this technology freely, as it might be 
used to develop weapons of mass destruction. So, any requirement of 
equality between these two groups would prevent a deal.  
 
Then how can the MNA guarantee that all member states will have the 
same rights and equality? Although Article IV of the NPT clearly 
stipulates that as long as nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, all 
member states have the same rights and equality, technology holders 
are worried that this may be misused to protect their interests. 
Subsequently, for the MNA to be accepted by both groups of countries, 
the terms of equal rights in the MNA need to be clearly defined and 
agreed upon by all members. 
 
In terms of designing a strategy for participation in the MNA, this study 
also discusses the relationship between multilateralism and international 
order. In the conventional diplomatic definition, ‘multilateral’ refers to 
relationships among more than two states with an aim to address a 
specific common issue or set of issues. The term multilateral is also 
used to reflect international economic relations, such as the notion of 
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multilateral trade. Therefore, from this perspective multilateralism 
involves: 
 
(a) The inter-state system, which is limited to relations among states 
through diplomatic channels or inter-state organisations. This 
political aspect of multilateralism has as its primary goal the 
security and maintenance of economic multilateralism; and  
(b) The relationship between economic actors of civil society within a 
framework regulated by states and international organisations 
(Cox, 1992).  
 
Nevertheless, the new world political order is characterised by a much 
higher level of flexibility and space for strategies and readjustments than 
before, and by a relative loss of ability of the big powers to control it, 
despite their continuing military hegemony. So, this study is interested in 
observing the role of international order that has impacted the activities 
of nuclear knowledge and technology transfer and determining the role 
of multilateralism in reducing the impact. Initially, multilateralism must 
interact with three institutional domains of international relations, namely 
the international order, international regimes and international 
organisations, for it to be successfully implemented. This could be 
implemented through the international regime, which is only assumed to 
be a multilateral institution when principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures and expectations are consistent with multilateral 
principles (Ruggie, 1992). 
 
Historically, science and technology were heavily dominated by the U.S. 
and Russia. However, the situation is changing and the role of 
developing and poor countries has been strong in international 
organisations and has led to science and technology being transferred 
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worldwide. This is especially true in case of some Eastern countries, 
which have become developed countries and world leaders in some 
technologies, such as China, Japan and South Korea.  
 
Political analysts observe that there are three suggested assumptions 
for these developments. First, science and technology developed by the 
rich countries in the North are biased towards their own interests and 
should therefore not be adopted blindly by the South. Second, 
technology transfers between rich and poor countries tend to be usually 
disadvantageous to the latter, and to increase the disproportionateness 
and dependency of poor countries from rich countries. Technical 
transfers between poor countries, on the contrary, are healthy, and 
should be stimulated. Third, the Northern and rich countries are 
responsible for the asymmetry between North and South, thus, they 
should compensate for this condition through massive transfers of 
resources to the poor. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of some 
technologies, such as nuclear technology, these transfers should be 
made on a multilateral basis by the establishment of complex 
international organisations (Schwartzman, 1982).  
 
Nuclear technology rivalry and races between these two axes may 
indeed lead to better consequences but might also lead to more 
disastrous results, such as nuclear weapon rivalries. For this reason, a 
mechanism to control technology development is indispensable and 
multilateral regimes seem to be an ideal tool for this purpose. 
Multilateralism is accepted worldwide as an international tool to promote 
economic, political and security-related cooperation and community; 
unite state-building and democratisation; check heavy-handed 
behaviour by strong states; create and lock in norms and values; 
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increase transparency; make states and international institutions more 
accountable; and help to manage the negative effects of globalisation.  
 
These were fitted in the framework of constitutive rules of international 
order. Hence, without a doubt, multilateralism has been widely used for 
centuries as a pattern for international relations to resolve issues raised 
due to the complexity of new international order (Fawcett, 2004). In the 
case of nuclear technology, it could be used to control the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 
2.4  The Conceptualisation of Multilateralism and the MNA from a 
Theoretical Viewpoint 
For the purposes of this study, the conceptual routes explained by 
Caporaso are used to unpack the concept of multilateralism. Caporaso 
elucidated it through three stages: why (states and state interests, 
capabilities, and strategies), how (communications) and implementation 
(institutional process) (Caporaso, 1993).  
 
Stage 1: is an individualist paradigm in which states "enter into" 
contractual relations with other states in a rational and self-interested 
way.  
 
This paradigm is based on factors that might influence the decision to 
enter into cooperation, including state interests and the social behaviour 
of states. The social behaviour of actors such as their preferences, 
capabilities and strategies in interacting with others could be explained 
through the pool of theories in international relations (Caporaso, 1993). 
State identity without a doubt influences multilateral cooperation 
because it inspires state goals, such as security, stability, and economic 
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development, which in turn become the basis for states’ national 
interests (Griffiths, Roach and Solomon, 2009). From the constructivist 
perspective, as explained by Jutta Weldes, national interest plays an 
important role in international relations in two ways, through the concept 
of the national interest policy-makers understand the goals to be 
pursued by a state’s foreign policy, which in practice forms the basis for 
state action; and as a rhetorical device through which the legitimacy of 
and political support for state action is generated. The national interest 
thus has considerable power in that it helps to constitute a multilateral 
agreement as important and to legitimise the actions taken by states 
(Burchill, 2005). Thus, national interest shapes political behaviour, by 
serving as a means of defending, opposing or proposing policy. And it is 
employed by students of international relations as an “analytical tool for 
describing, explaining and assessing the adequacy of a nation’s foreign 
policy” (Burchill, 2005:23). In this relation, as defined by Wendt, a 
country generally has four distinct interests, namely to preserve and 
further their (1) physical security, (2) autonomy, (3) economic well-being 
and (4) collective self-esteem (Zehfuss, 2006). Joseph Frankel in 1970 
draws in his study between using the term of national interest to explain 
and analyse the foreign policy of nation-states and those who employ 
national interest to justify or rationalise state behaviour in the international 
realm. He characterised national interest in two aspects - objective national 
interests which relate to a nation-state’s ultimate foreign policy goals 
which can be evaluated, compared and contrasted. State interests are 
inspired by factors such as history, geography, neighbours, resources, 
size of population, and ethnicity. In the case of MNA, it is clear that 
states that are interested in joining will clearly be influenced by nuclear 
economy, politics and security. Meanwhile, second aspect is subjective 
national interests which depend on the preferences of a specific 
government or policy elite, and include ideology, religion and class 
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identity. These interests are based on interpretation and be subject to to 
changes (Burchill, 2005). These factors need to be considered when 
proposing multilateral cooperation. For example, the way Asia-Pacific 
countries implement multilateral cooperation is different to the Western 
Bloc (Europe and America). This will be further explained in the next 
sub-section of this chapter. 
 
In cooperation, it is understood that different states have different goals 
and interests. However, the question is whether multilateralism is the 
answer for the states to achieve agreement or settlement in their 
differences. To answer this academically, a three-step model based on 
analysis by Bouchard and Peterson can be employed to understand 
factors considered by policy-makers to initiate successful nuclear 
multilateral cooperation. First step is in to consider how different IR 
theories view multilateralism that it would be related to the nuclear 
multilateral cooperation. According to neorealists, each state actor is 
responsible for ensuring their own well-being and survival. 
Consequently, realists / neorealists do not advocate that a state entrusts 
its safety and survival to another actor or international institution, such 
as the United Nations (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001). Realists / neorealists 
stress the importance of power distributions; where states are seen as 
competing with each other to achieve security from external threats, 
which can be achieved only through relative gains in military and 
economic power. As states pursue this goal, realists define them as 
unitary actors competing to minimise their power in ways determined by 
the nature of the international system (Dunne & Schmidt, 2001). 
Neorealists highlight the weakness of international institutions and the 
fragility of co-operation (Keohane, 1990) and argue that international 
institutions are either weak or act to obscure hegemonic control, as in 
the cases of the IMF or Non-Proliferation Treaty (Bouchard & Peterson, 
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2010). Waltz argues that the multipolar structure suggested in 
multilateralism is dominated by three or more great powers, so states 
rely on alliances to maintain their security. This is inherently unstable, 
since ‘there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear 
and fixed lines between allies and adversaries’ (Waltz, 1981). According 
to the traditional realist perspective, extending the interests of a 
particular state seems safer by going alone and looks easier to defend 
than reliance on co-operation (Burchill, 2005). Meanwhile, neorealism is 
generally considered a major advance from the classical version of 
Hans Morgenthau and others because neorealists believe that the broad 
outcomes of international politics are derived from the structural 
constraints of the state’s system rather than from unit behaviour. Thus, 
neo-realist theory continues in a series of logical interpretations from the 
fundamental postulate of a state’s system in which all units are 
autonomous, and the system is structured by anarchy rather than 
hierarchy (Schroeder, 1994). Therefore, neorealists see organisations 
established through multilateral cooperation as an epiphenomenon 
because it is also subject to other factors for it to succeed. For example, 
security stability in the SEA region not only depends on the 
establishment of ASEAN but also depends on relations with the major 
states such as the U.S., China, and Japan for it to be successful (Simon, 
2008). Conferring to a constructivist perspective, international relations 
are primarily structured by shared ideas and states’ interaction (inter-
subjectively) rather than material forces, and that the states’ identities 
and interests are constructed by these shared ideas (Weldes, 1996). 
This could be achieved through cooperation, such as bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation. According to Rieker, constructivists agree that 
cooperation is a result of social interaction and collective identity 
formation, not only inter-state or intergovernmental bargaining, and they 
do not agree that the interests of states are fixed and independent of 
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social structures (Griffiths, Roach & Solomon, 2009). Here 
constructivism contrasts with realism, which argues that the world is 
anarchic, and states seek to maximise power and security through the 
economy and military and prefer hegemony. Constructivists suggest that 
multilateralism not only has deeper impact and regulates state 
behaviour, but also helps develop collective identities that can resolve 
the security dilemma (Acharya, 2005). Interests of the state are 
therefore understood to be formed through inter-state interaction 
(Weldes, 1996). 
 
Meanwhile, liberalism assumes that states seek to maximise prosperity 
and use international regimes to facilitate cooperation. Liberal 
institutionalists are certain of the role played by institutions to create 
peace out of international anarchy. Neoliberal institutionalism's most 
prominent claim is that institutions are developed when states foresee 
self-interested benefits gained from cooperation and under conditions 
that are capable of overcoming obstacles to cooperation (Hemmer & 
Katzenstein, 2002). So, institutionalists argue that common goals play 
an important role in the international system and help international 
organisations convince states to cooperate and they reject the realist 
assumption that international politics is a struggle for power. Military 
security is the top priority for realists, while liberal institutionalists argue 
that force is an ineffective instrument of policy in the modern world. 
Liberal institutionalism suggests that to promote peace, states must 
cooperate and surrender some of their sovereignty to create ‘integrated 
communities’ to promote economic growth and respond to regional and 
international security issues (Devitt, 2011). Liberal institutionalism 
suggests four characteristics, which differentiate institutionalism from 
realism. First, multiple channels which allow for interaction among actors 
across national borders and increase the interaction and links between 
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actors and non-state actors; second, an attention is given equally to all 
issues; third, there is no distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics 
unlike realism in which the emphasis is on security issues; and forth the 
decline of military force as a means by which policy is determined. 
Furthermore, within a liberal institutionalist model, states seek to 
maximise their benefits for the sake of their national interests, which 
could be gained through cooperation and without the use of force 
(Nuruzzaman, 2008; see also Devitt, 2011). Therefore, they are less 
concerned about the advantages that could be achieved by other states 
in the same cooperative arrangements, but only concerned if there is 
non-compliance or deceitfulness by states in the cooperation. This 
means that liberal institutionalism puts more emphasis on soft power 
and cooperation through the forms and procedures of international law, 
the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation 
(Devitt, 2011). They believe that international institutions can bring 
opportunities for weaker countries to have more access and a louder 
voice at international forums to discuss transnational issues such as 
terrorism, the environment and humanitarian disputes, which need to be 
discussed in a multilateral context.  
 
As for neo-functionalists, they would go even further and view 
multilateralism as fundamentally normative. Neo-functionalism assigns a 
dynamic role to interest groups in the process of integrating pluralist 
communities. By participating in the policy-making process, interest 
groups are expected to develop a stake in promoting further integration. 
This allows them to acquire economic payoffs and additional benefits 
from maintaining and stimulating the organisations through which certain 
demands can be voiced and goals are achieved. This implies that in the 
integration process interest groups have an instrumental role to play in 
the maintenance of the system, and that by virtue of their participation in 
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the policy-making process of an integrating community they will "learn" 
about the rewards of such involvement and undergo attitudinal changes 
inclining them favourably towards the system (Lodge & Herman, 1980). 
 
However, critical or dependency theorists do not agree that 
multilateralism promotes international harmony, but rather believe that 
its purpose is to exploit the weak. Most multilateral organisations have 
their rules of the eventual latent membership written by a sub-group, 
which is often hegemonic (Bouchard & Peterson, 2010). Even though 
the written rules will be distributed to all member states for clarifications 
before entering into force, the knowledge and experience gap among 
states will lead the weak states to agree with the proposition without 
complete understanding. In summary, different theories give different 
views about the basic goals of multilateralism. 
 
Table 1: Theoretical Models of Multilateralism (Bouchard & Peterson, 
2010:17) 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
neorealist liberal 
institutionalist 
constructivist neo-
functionalist 
Radical/ 
critical/ 
3rd world 
Model of 
Multilateralism 
weak 
(hegemony) 
Cooperative / 
functional 
transformative Normative / 
integrative 
dependen
t 
 
A second step to explain to understand factors to initiate successful 
nuclear multilateral cooperation is to consider whether universality is 
excluded by different functional objectives in different issue areas. For 
example, when used economistic models to describe, explain and 
predict why and when multilateralism emerges: would it be expected 
that the ‘supply’ of multilateralism to be responsive to demand for it? 
Definitely, it be subjected on the issue-area (Bouchard & Peterson, 
2010). A simple example that is used by Bouchard and Peterson is 
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regulatory cooperation. In the early 1990s, economic activities between 
the U.S. and the EU led to speculation that these two economic giants 
could create a ‘transatlantic economic space’. The economic activities 
flourished and increased because economic exchange and trade were 
not obstructed by different regulatory regimes after they eventually 
agreed to sign multilateral treaty in the area of regulatory policy, in which 
all EU members used one uniform law (Bouchard & Peterson, 2010). 
Thus, multilateral, in this case has unify several laws from different 
states into one regulation. In the case of MNA, it is discussed based on 
two foundations - economy and security - and it involves states’ high 
political commitment. In the economic arena, the key principle of 
multilateralism is non-discrimination. Meanwhile, in the security field, 
multilateralism involves the creation of a non-exclusionary setting for 
order maintenance, conflict regulation and peace. Both in the economic 
and the security arenas, the primary objective of multilateral interactions 
is to discourage participating actors from discriminating against each 
other, promote transparency and mutual reassurance, and resolve 
contentious issues peacefully and constructively (Acharya, 1997).  
 
As a third step, multilateral cooperation is debates about the trade-off 
between inclusiveness and effectiveness must be confronted. 
Regionalism for example is always viewed as on the march globally 
compatible with a more multilateral world? (Bouchard & Peterson, 2010; 
see also Telò, 2012). Bouchard and Peterson indicated that regionalism 
is a hypocritical group of states, such as those of the EU, that interested 
to seek ‘an ever-closer union’ between themselves but claimed that they 
are seeking to promote multilateralism globally (Bouchard & Peterson, 
2010). But, in case of nuclear cooperation, regionalism perhaps an 
alternative for nuclear cooperation because it involves security-building 
of the region and involving countries would be more inter-connected and 
45 
 
more interdependent (Severino, 1999; see also Bailes et.al, 2007). 
When discussed multilateralism, another factor that need to be 
considered is to oversee the trade-off between inclusiveness and 
effectiveness and the number of participations in multilateral cooperation 
and geopolitical preferences of the country (Bouchard & Peterson, 
2010). Is the state more compatible with regionalism than 
multilateralism? A study, The Possibility of Cooperation, by Michael 
Taylor, who used the prisoner’s dilemma approach, concluded that 
cooperation amongst a relatively large number of players is less likely to 
occur than cooperation amongst a small number. This is obviously true 
because there are more actors involved, and more interests exist which 
need to be taken into account (Caporaso, 1993). ASEAN, for instance, 
is very cautious about inclusiveness and executive power of the head 
country. In addition to those proposed by Bouchard and Peterson, 
Caporaso suggested that there are two steps to be deliberated on 
before deciding to implement multilateral cooperation are the 
explanation of cooperation; and conditions under which cooperation 
should be implemented (Caporaso, 1993). 
 
A decision to join multilateral cooperation is the biggest step for any 
state because they may have to relinquish some of their policies that are 
purely national in order to embrace a more multilateral focus in their 
international affairs (Rodhan et al., 2009). States sometimes need to 
offer significant levels of flexibility during decision making and resist 
short-term temptations to gain long-term benefits. This suggests that 
different configurations of state interests will create different types of 
"cooperation problem” (Martin, 1992) and state interests may be 
reflected through state behaviour. State behaviour is significant to the 
domestic political and cultural affairs and civil society actors (Newman, 
2007). However, when a state commits to multilateralism, the 
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commitment should be bound by the international system unless the 
state is thinking of withdrawing from a multilateral agreement. In some 
cases, during multilateral cooperation negotiations, states sometimes 
involuntarily give priority to their national interests during the 
negotiations (Hampson & Heinbecker, 2011).  
 
Other factors that need to be considered during multilateral cooperation 
are transaction costs and multilateral regimes. Transaction costs are all 
costs incurred in exchange, including the costs of acquiring information, 
bargaining and enforcement, as well as the opportunity costs of the time 
allocated to these activities (Caporaso, 1993). The relationship between 
the number of actors and transaction cost is directly proportional: the 
more actors involved in the cooperation, the higher the transaction costs 
will be (Caporaso, 1993). However, some countries seek multilateral 
cooperation because they cannot deal with the cost of managing certain 
issues and hope that the multilateral cooperation may reduce the cost.  
 
Stage 2: Social-communicative approach 
 
The focus of this approach is on the identities and powers of individual 
states. The "interaction repertoires" of states include communication, 
persuasion, deliberation, and self-reflection (Caporaso, 1993). In order 
to gain or ensure that states’ national interests are effectively achieved, 
states will interact with each other. A constructivist, Rieker, views 
cooperation as a result of social interaction and collective identity 
formation, not inter-state or intergovernmental bargaining. He also 
disagrees that the interests of states are fixed and independent of social 
structures (Griffiths, Roach & Solomon, 2009). Constructivists 
developed a distinctive approach that focuses on the social interaction 
of agents or actors who explore the construction and regulative 
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influence of international norms to link the fundamental institutional 
structures with state identity and interests. From this perspective, 
multilateralism is all about communication or inter-state relations and 
system. States communicating or cooperating in multilateralism can be 
distinguished from other types of inter-state relations in three ways. 
Firstly, it entails the coordination of relations among a group of states, 
as opposed to bilateral “hub and spoke” and imperial arrangements. 
Secondly, the terms of a given relationship are defined by agreed-upon 
rules and principles and sometimes by international organisations, so 
multilateralism can be contrasted with interactions based on ad hoc 
bargaining or straightforward power politics. Thirdly, multilateralism 
entails some reduction in policy autonomy, since the choices and 
actions of the participating states are, at least to some degree, 
constrained by the agreed-upon rules and principles (Ikenberry, 2003). 
 
Stage 3: Institutional approach 
 
Institutionalism has ties to the second approach in its insistence on the 
importance of communication, reflection, discussion, learning, and 
interpretation. Caporaso described three major components employed in 
the institutional approach to multilateralism. First, the institutional 
approach attaches importance to institutions, norms, and roles and 
facilitates activities. Second, institutionalism concerns the relationship 
between preferences, norms and beliefs; and third the institutional 
approach has to do with the proper way to understand cooperation. 
Institutional theorists perceive the complex patterns of cooperation 
already fixed within states and interstate systems, for example, common 
language and norms, diplomatic rules on how states should represent 
themselves and rules implied in regard to sovereignty (Caporaso, 1993).  
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The institutional approach, therefore, is not only about rules, norms and 
habits of cooperation that states take part in. It also recognises that 
these practices are constitutive of identities and the power of states. The 
approach also acknowledges that institutions are not necessarily chosen 
on a rational basis but as the result of trial-and-error activity, coupled 
with selective pressure from the surroundings (Caporaso, 1993). 
However, institutions are also instruments of political control. This 
means that a powerful state will want to make its advantages as 
systematic and durable as possible by trying to tie up weaker states into 
favourable institutional arrangements (Ikenberry, 2008). Based on the 
above-mentioned theoretical routes, this study examined the concept of 
multilateralism to elucidate Malaysia’s interest in joining the MNA or vice 
versa.   
 
In practice, political researchers suggest that implementation of 
multilateralism is carried out through the establishment of treaties or 
conventions. Defarges, for example, has outlined four main key 
elements in the implementation of multilateralism: 
 
i. Multilateral agreement construction starts from a social treaty 
through to the conclusion of an agreement. The agreement which 
is a contract between the parties consists of basic objectives and 
should be invoked by all members. The treaty that is developed is 
governed by texts which bind all member states with rules and 
procedures. It is inclusive and can only function properly without 
excluding any one of its members. The aim is to incorporate all 
states as a single community of rules. Member states which 
breach the system’s legitimacy must be penalised through 
sanctions.  
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ii. Multilateral treaties are supposed to be egalitarian, which means 
that contracting parties work together on the basis of same and 
equal rights and obligations. Multilateralism requires participating 
states to adopt its principles: respect for the territorial integrity of 
other states; non-recourse to force in the event of a dispute; and 
respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. If necessary, 
it can accommodate undemocratic states, but with the condition 
that the state can fully accept the rules and principles which apply 
to them in good faith. Thus, mutual confidence must be 
established. However, in reality, the multilateral system contains 
non-equal aspects. An example of this ambiguity is the NPT. 
Non-members of the NPT have the right to retain their nuclear 
arsenals, while other states that are bound to the treaty are equal 
on an ‘inferior’ footing, through their renunciation of nuclear 
weapons and their acceptance of inspections by the International 
IAEA based in Vienna. 
 
iii. The treaty has to provide mechanisms for resolving differences or 
restoring order in the event of disputes between its members as 
well as possible violations of the agreement. This means that 
multilateralism rests on good will and confidence, not inequality 
and violation of the system’s rules. Therefore, the system needs 
to establish a range of instruments to overcome or settle disputes 
between the members through negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration. 
 
iv. Multilateralism requires that any use of power by member states 
(especially so-called major fund contributors) or appointed 
multilateral institutions is under control. States can be tempted to 
use treaties as a blocking mechanism to support their existing 
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advantages, with the inter-state association enabling them to 
mutually guarantee their power over their people. In this case, it is 
important that the multilateral treaty should establish independent 
mechanisms for accountability and balance, such as the 
International Court of Justice (Defarges, 2005). 
 
Multilateral arrangements need a stronger precondition, which goes 
beyond self-interest: a certain degree of mutual trust and reputation, and 
the support of domestic economic and non-economic demands, ideas 
and common objectives of states. It also requires states’ goodwill, 
including acceptance of limiting and/or sharing national sovereignty 
(Telò, 2012).  
2.5  Understanding the Concept of Multilateralism in Southeast 
Asia and the Difference in the Trends of Regionalism and 
Regionalisation in Europe 
From a geopolitical perspective, South East Asia (SEA) is one of the sub-
regions in Asia together with Northeast Asia and South Asia. Both 
Northeast and South Asia comprise states that are political and 
economic Great Powers, namely the People’s Republic of China, India, 
Japan, Russia, and South Korea. In contrast, SEA countries consist of 
states with vibrant economies, including Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam (Simon, 2008). Recognising the economic 
benefit of nuclear energy beyond fulfilling national energy demands, 
many SEA countries have announced their interest to develop nuclear 
power programmes. This, indeed, has increased concerns among 
developed countries that it would increase the risk of the creation of the 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, this interest is 
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also good news for the nuclear industry, when many Western countries 
have decided to shut down or have no interest in new nuclear power 
plants after the Fukushima accident in March 2011. 
 
To explain nuclear cooperation in Asia, it is crucial to understand how 
ASEAN implements the concept of multilateralism. This is necessary to 
assess whether a nuclear multilateral institution, like Euratom, could be 
established in Asia. Moreover, before exploring the concept of 
multilateralism in ASEAN, it is also important to understand the U.S. 
influence in the arena of international nuclear cooperation. The US is the 
key player that influences many nuclear political events, such as nuclear 
issues in Iran and India.  
 
The concept of multilateralism has been contested in nuclear security 
cooperation discussions. The concept of multilateral cooperation in 
security emerged after the post-Cold War, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when the U.S. military presence dominated the Asia-
Pacific region (Sundararaman, 2011). Prior to this, most of the security 
structures in the region were implemented through bilateral cooperation. 
This led to newer forms of security arrangements, in which 
multilateralism became more prominent (Sundararaman, 2011).  
 
More recently, multilateralism became popular in the arena of 
international politics. This trend of cooperation includes the U.S., which 
is the dominant political actor, militarily, economically, politically, and 
ideologically superior to other states (Homolar, 2012). Since the end of 
the World War II, the U.S. has been actively involved in multilateral 
diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian activities (Jones, 2013). 
However, during the George W. Bush’s administration, the U.S. 
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international engagement favoured a unilateral approach that relied on 
military force and ad hoc alliances.  
 
Equally explained by the realism framework, Bush’s administration 
asserted that multilateralism is a weak link in ensuring global security 
and alleged that the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) did not fulfil 
its basic responsibilities during the major diplomatic crises in the 1990s, 
for instance; the Arab-Israeli dispute, Yugoslavia, Iraq, or the North 
Korea (Krause, 2010). Nevertheless, recognising the benefits gained 
through multilateralism, president Obama has used multilateralism as a 
central element of the U.S. foreign policy. This approach is reflected his 
campaign for global partnership with the UN and other nations 
(Homolar, 2012).  
 
Multilateralism is well defined within Europe, either in security structures 
or economy arrangements (Ruggie, 1992). Multilateralism in Europe 
was influenced by three major powers: Great Britain, France and 
Germany (Krause 2004). Besides being a preventive diplomatic 
measure, the rationale behind the increased interest in multilateralism is 
the desire to promote economic growth and maintain the continuity of 
economic interdependence without the risk of war (Chanto, 2003).  
 
Meanwhile, the concept of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific is closely 
linked to the process of identity building. It became dynamic after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that obliged members of the 
ASEAN to adopt multilateralism as a process of identity building, 
preventive diplomacy, confidence building measures and security 
building measures (Sundararaman, 2011). To understand how SEA 
multilaterally interacts and cooperates, it is important to explore and 
understand their standpoints, principles, national interests and how they 
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implement their foreign policy. These could be observed through the 
establishment of ASEAN.  
 
Unlike other regional institutions, ASEAN was implemented based on its 
own concept, known as ‘ASEAN Way’ and was claimed to increasingly 
become counter-productive to the construction of a genuine security 
community for ASEAN (Saravanamuttu, 2005). The foundation of this 
concept was built on four key principles, 'open regionalism', 'cooperative 
security', 'soft regionalism', and ‘consensus’, that created the identity of 
multilateralism in Asia-Pacific (Acharya, 1997). These principles were 
clearly echoed in the statement of Abdul Razak, the former Malaysian 
Prime Minister: 
 
We the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia, must get together 
and form by ourselves a new perspective and a new framework 
for our region. It is important that individually and jointly we 
should create a deep awareness that we cannot survive for long 
as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act 
together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family 
of Southeast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship 
and goodwill and imbued with our own ideals and aspirations and 
determined to shape our own destiny (Maidan & Abad, 1997:4; 
ASEAN, 1997).  
 
This statement was then supported by the speech of S. Rajaratnam, a 
former Singapore Minister of Culture who, at that time, served as first 
Singapore Foreign Minister. He explored Singapore’s position in regard 
to the importance of multilateralism for national prosperity in his 
statement, “We must now think at two levels. We must think not only of 
our national interests but posit them against regional interests: that is a 
new way of thinking about our problems” (Maidan & Abad, 1997:5; see 
also ASEAN, 1997). 
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Multilateralism is accepted globally as an international tool to solve 
transnational issues rather than ad hoc diplomacy. Therefore, ASEAN’s 
original raison d’être was to protect each state’s sovereignty, threatened 
at the height of Cold War and during America’s military involvement in 
Indochina (Simon, 2008). ASEAN was proposed by Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei in 1967 with the aim for 
stability, prosperity and better economic and social of SEA (Flores & 
Abad, 1997). The concept of multilateralism had rarely been negotiated 
in Southeast Asia until the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 with the 
aims to accelerate economic growth, social progress, socio-cultural, 
peace and stability of the region, and opportunities for member countries 
to discuss differences peacefully.  
 
Following the U.S. invasion in Vietnam, ASEAN indicated that they are 
more interested in any cooperation that could guarantee the stability of 
Southeast Asia. This was clearly implied in S. Rajaratnam’s statement 
as below: 
 
In Southeast Asia, as in Europe and any part of the world, outside 
powers had a vested interest in the balkanization of the region. 
We want to ensure a stable Southeast Asia, not a balkanized 
Southeast Asia. And those countries who are interested, 
genuinely interested, in the stability of Southeast Asia, the 
prosperity of Southeast Asia, and better economic and social 
conditions, will welcome small countries getting together to pool 
their collective resources and their collective wisdom to contribute 
to the peace of the world (Maidan & Abad, 1997:5). 
 
After the economic and even political crises that took place in East Asia 
in the late 1990s, multilateralism in SEA has shown conflicting 
tendencies. First, bipolarisation between the older member countries 
and the newcomers, between generations, and between state and 
people or civil society. Second, inward-looking policies of the member 
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countries after the economic crisis, shown quite obviously in their 
different responses to the International Monetary Fund. Third, the 
possibility of being integrated into a larger framework such as East Asia, 
also apparent after the crisis. Fourth, sub-regionalisation under the 
current framework as shown in the conclusion of an anti-terrorism 
agreement by four ASEAN countries in response to the aftermath of the 
September 11 incident. Despite these complications, multilateralism is 
still valid and effective as a modus operandi of managing relations 
between countries in SEA (Takano, 2003). 
 
Before ASEAN, the region witnessed the establishment of the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and The Greater Malayan 
Confederation (for Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia), or 
Maphilindo. Although these earlier models were not successful, the key 
factor that brought about the creation of these two institutions was the 
concept of shared values and culture as the basis of collective identity. 
For example, ASA claimed to be a part of an Asian cultural, political, and 
economic context, and not just a state from the same region. This was 
supported by the statement from former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat 
Khoman, that ASA was embedded in “Asian culture and traditions” 
(Duara, 2010).  
 
Maphilindo, too, was an example of the potential use of common culture 
in unifying the Southeast Asian region and in advancing political and 
strategic objectives. This meant all three member states agreed not to 
use “collective defence to serve the interests of any among the big 
powers” and used the principle of consultation, or Musyawarah, as the 
basis for settling any disputes among members. Later, this non-
aggressive approach was ASEAN’s main approach to regional 
interaction and cooperation (Goh, 2003:114). As cited by Malaysia's 
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former foreign minister, Abdullah Badawi, ‘the concept of the ARF 
requires the development of friendship rather than the identification of 
enemies’ (Acharya, 1997:326). This idea was further supported by a 
statement of the former foreign minister of Australia who pointed out that 
‘the purpose of ARF is to build security with others rather than against 
them' (Acharya, 1997:326).  
 
Moreover, the members of ASEAN also agreed upon a set of procedural 
norms which are also thought to symbolise the spirit of the “ASEAN 
Way”. These norms have been identified by the Malaysian Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies as the principle of seeking 
agreement and harmony, the principle of sensitivity, politeness, non-
confrontation and agreeability, the principle of quiet, private and elitist 
diplomacy versus public washing of dirty linen, and the principle of being 
non-Cartesian, non-legalistic. However, this set of norms only describes 
the vehicle for carrying the action rather than the result of the action 
because they do not identify specific goals of policy. Instead, they 
prescribe the manner in which the member states should manage their 
affairs and interact with one another within the context of ASEAN (Goh, 
2003).  
 
The 'ASEAN Way' consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour 
as well as a decision-making process based on consultations and 
consensus. The code of conduct incorporates a set of principles, such 
as non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of 
force, pacific settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states, which can be found in the Charter 
of the United Nations as well as regional political and security 
organisations elsewhere in the world. To this extent, the 'ASEAN Way' is 
not an unusual construct.  
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However, it can claim a certain amount of uniqueness in the manner of 
operationalizing these norms into a framework of regional interaction. In 
this respect, the 'ASEAN Way' is not so much about the structure of 
multilateral interactions, but rather about the process through which 
such interactions are carried out. This kind of style involves a high 
degree of wisdom, informality, rationality, pragmatism, consensus-
building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles, which are contrasted 
with the Western style of multilateral negotiations.  
 
Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has practised multilateral 
cooperation in various fields and provided the region with good inter-
state relations. Within this environment, members could concentrate on 
their own economic development and national integration. This 
demonstrated that SEA states recognised the importance of 
multilateralism in promoting economic growth and strengthening national 
security. However, Asian policymakers and leaders have a preference 
that the implementation of multilateralism should be based on 
consensus, soft and friendly approaches, and non-binding 
commitments. Until the early 1990s, ASEAN was basically able to apply 
shared indivisible values in a non-discriminatory manner, and ensure 
member states’ rights, obligations and interests almost equally. 
However, this indeed raised problems with regard to implementing the 
third principle of multilateralism – reciprocity. National interests always 
come before group interests, especially if the issue at stake impacts 
negatively only one country. 
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2.6 The Effectiveness of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in Solving Disputes and 
Conflicts in ASEAN 
The question remains as to whether the ASEAN Way is an effective 
concept in solving disputes in the region of Southeast Asia. It appears 
that ASEAN has been incapable of solving most of its pressing security 
problems amongst members, for example, the Thai-Cambodian border 
dispute, where massacres occurred over the past year, or the Rohingya 
refugee crisis. Given the magnitude of the crisis, political experts 
recommended that Southeast Asian leaders should re-examine the 
principle of non-interference in domestic matters of neighbouring 
countries in order to maintain peace and stability in the region (Gaetano, 
2015). ASEAN is also overshadowed by China’s growing power, which 
has discouraged ASEAN from taking any action against China, 
especially on the territorial disputes. ASEAN seems more concerned 
that they will anger Beijing by taking a strong stand on China’s 
aggressive behaviour towards their ASEAN partners in the South China 
Sea.  
 
This happened for two main reasons. The first is that China is much 
more powerful, both economically and militarily. For example, in 1990s, 
ASEAN’s GDP was more or less equivalent to China’s. However, today, 
China’s economy is more than three times as large (Mazza & Schmitt, 
2011). The second reason is that China has effectively drawn several 
ASEAN members into its circle, which has made many of the Southeast 
Asian states see their ASEAN membership as less of a priority than 
keeping good bonds with China (Mazza & Schmitt, 2011). This 
explained why Jakarta and Singapore highlighted their non-claimant 
status to the territorial disputes with China as a reason to not interfere in 
the crisis, even during their turn as chairman of ASEAN (Mazza & 
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Schmitt, 2011). Hence, as explained by neo-realist theory, ASEAN 
needs to rely on relations with the major actors, such as the U.S or 
Russia, if they are interested in balancing the power of China in the 
region.  
 
Another example is an environmental issue. Every year countries in 
SEA region face the haze problem, which is claimed to be originating 
from open burning in Kalimantan, Indonesia. The problem happens 
every year. Countries that are affected criticise the situation through 
media but no serious action has been taken.  However, Indonesia and 
environment rights activists claimed that Indonesia is not entirely to be 
blame, as some of the corporations accused of illegal burning have 
Malaysian and Singaporean investors (BBC News, 2015).  
 
Regional leaders, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and 
Singaporean Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam, have strongly urged for 
action and criticized Indonesia’s handling of the crisis. In spite of the 
strong anger of regional leaders, as well as mounting pressure from 
their populations, there have been no successful regional solutions to 
the haze. Although ASEAN has shown a degree of willingness and 
proactivity with regard the issue on the haze, there is a doubt whether 
the bloc has the capability to provide a regional solution. This results 
from observers pointing to ASEAN’s diplomatic practices, which 
emphasize non-interference in members’ domestic affairs. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how a regional solution can be enacted as states cannot 
impose any regulation or binding agreement on each other (Edwards, 
2015). This was supported by a statement of the Malaysian Minister of 
Natural Resources and Environment Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar who 
stated during a joint press conference with his ASEAN counterparts at 
the 12th Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on 
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Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) in Kuala Lumpur, "We work 
together to overcome any problem but we can't bulldoze through... We 
must respect others' sovereignty," (Leong, 2016). 
 
If serious action was not taken on these above-mentioned issues 
because of the ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of each other or respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of member states, then ASEAN needs to revise these principles. The 
reason for this is that the nuclear matters are serious and if one of the 
countries with nuclear power makes a mistake, the impact may be 
disastrous.  
 
Multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is another context to study 
the interest and expectation of SEA states in multilateralism. The Asia-
Paciﬁc region has no hegemon and since the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) was established, the Asia-Pacific has enjoyed 
many benefits in terms of settling transnational issues in the Asia-Paciﬁc 
region. Similar to other multilateral institutions, if there are disputes 
among members, they are addressed through collective action.  
 
It is worth to note that the factors, principles and concepts behind the 
creation of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region is different 
from other regions. Yukio Satoh, a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry 
officer in 1991, argued that there were four reasons as to why the 
European concepts and processes did not fit the conditions of the Asia-
Pacific region (Acharya, 1997). The first reason is that Asia lacks 
Europe's bipolarity because of the presence and role of China. 
Furthermore, many Asian states adopted a non-aligned foreign policy 
posture. The second reason is the differences in the military conditions 
in the respective regions. Asian threat perceptions were more diverse, 
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the structure of Asia's alliances was based on bilateral cooperation, and 
force postures of the U.S. and Soviet Union in the region were 
asymmetric. The U.S. on the other hand, forward deployment strategy 
which rely on naval forces, while the Soviet defense posture was more 
land-based (Bagley, 1977). Asia also had a larger number of unresolved 
conflicts and disputes; and the forth reason because Europe during the 
Cold War was preoccupied with nuclear war, while Asia's main concern 
was with economic development. Thus, the primary aim of regional 
cooperation to date had been economic, not political or security-related.  
 
It is believed that the demand for multilateral institutions in the Asia-
Pacific region is driven by three motivating factors. First, there is the 
desire to build upon, exploit and maximise the pay-offs of economic 
liberalism and interdependence. Besides being a primary catalyst of 
APEC, it has also encouraged security multilateralism in hopes to 
benefit from the supposed effects of interdependence in reducing the 
threat of war. Second, as a problem-solving exercise aimed at 
preventing and containing the risk of regional disorder posed by an array 
of historic and emerging regional disputes and rivalries. Third, as an 
insurance policy for the region against the current instability in the global 
economic and security climate.  
 
In the economic arena, Asia-Pacific nations shared the same feeling on 
the uncertainties of the future of the world trading system, and fears 
around the emergence of discriminating regional trade blocs in America, 
Europe, and Asia. The concerns about the relationship among the major 
power states also encouraged the Asia-Pacific to create a security 
sphere because this region is vulnerable to an unstable balance of 
power (Acharya, 1997). 
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According to Paul Evans, institution-building in the Asia-Pacific region is 
'emerging from unique historical circumstances and will likely evolve in 
its own particular way', not following the pattern established in Europe 
and North America (Acharya, 1997:10). Some Asian policymakers 
overruled European-style multilateral institutions, such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). This 
is because Asia advocated that multilateralism should imitate local 
realities and practices. Hence, Southeast Asian leaders frequently 
expressed 'ASEAN Way' as the organising framework of multilateralism 
at the Asia-Pacific regional level. The concept of 'ASEAN Way' is not 
much different to the process of multilateral institution-building in the 
Asia-Pacific region, which has underlying four key concepts, i.e. 'open 
regionalism', 'cooperative security', 'soft regionalism', and 'consensus' 
(Acharya, 1997). These concepts can be explained through the 
establishment of APEC.  APEC was established in 1989 with the aim ‘to 
create greater prosperity for the people of the region by promoting 
balanced, inclusive, sustainable, innovative and secure growth and by 
accelerating regional economic integration’. This aim is put forward 
through a system in which all goods, services, investments and people 
move easily across borders by having faster customs procedures at 
borders and one set of common standards across all economies (APEC, 
n.d). In this view, APEC applied the concept of 'open regionalism' and 
'cooperative security' that goes beyond the traditional notion of free 
trade areas, which promote non-discrimination within a given regional 
grouping. The concept of 'open regionalism' specifies that "the outcome 
of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region will be 
the actual reduction of barriers not only among APEC economies but 
also between APEC and non-APEC economies' (Archarya, 1997:325).  
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Other key concepts are 'soft regionalism' that promote a sense of 
regional awareness or community (Fawcett, 2004), and 'consensus' in 
which all members have an equal voice and decision-making is reached 
by consensus. These two key concepts appear to be closely influenced 
by the concept of 'ASEAN Way'. Constructed by these two keys, APEC 
participation is a non-legalistic system of non-binding voluntary 
obligations based on open dialogue (APEC, n.d).  Soesastro (1995) 
clarified that the ASEAN approach to economic cooperation is “to agree 
on principles first, and then let things evolve and grow gradually” 
(Woods, 1995:5). This approach indeed contrasts with the American 
approach, which is to start with commitments that cover a wide range of 
issues and legally bind all its members. This is something that is not 
favoured among Asia’s leaders who constantly emphasise the 
importance of the 'comfort level' during multilateral gatherings (Woods, 
1995).  
 
The ASEAN countries’ approach to multilateralism is different to the 
Western countries. Multilateral agreements in the West strictly bind their 
members within the legal boundaries described, whereas ASEAN 
countries tend to refrain from involving themselves in each other’s 
domestic affairs. However, in the case of the MNA, ASEAN should 
follow what is being practiced by other regions because nuclear matters 
involve high risks and legal binds are crucial to ensure everybody is 
following the law.  
 
Malaysia needs to take this into account when designing the nuclear fuel 
cycle policy. It is necessary to ensure that Malaysia‘s sovereignty and 
rights in nuclear technology are protected during multilateral cooperation 
negotiations. Comparable to other developing countries that are 
interested in nuclear programmes, Malaysia, too, expects that such 
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cooperation would assist the country in its nuclear power development 
and not serve as a tool to dominate either its fuel supply or national 
sovereignty. The foundation of Malaysia's foreign policy is based on 
geographical, historical, social and political factors. Its national interest 
is mainly focused on security, economy, internal security, and 
sovereignty. After nearly 60 years of independence, Malaysia’s foreign 
policy drastically changed from a close relationship with the West to 
more neutral non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, especially 
during Mahathir’s premiership. During Mahathir’s administration (from 
year 1981 until 2003), Malaysia became more vocal, especially on the 
issues concerning third world countries. This was reflected in Malaysia 
policies that were implemented during Mahathir’s administration such as 
the Look East Policy and Third World Spokesmanship in the Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM).  
 
Malaysia’s foreign policy went through further changes when, during 
Abdullah Badawi’s terms, (from 2003 until 2009) and Najib’s terms, who 
is Malaysian current prime minister, Malaysia shifted to a more pro-
Western policy (Kuik, 2013). These changes have influenced Malaysia's 
decisions regarding nuclear cooperation, especially involving Western 
suppliers such as the U.S. A good relationship with a nuclear supplier 
group is very important, especially with the U.S. as the source country of 
most nuclear energy technology. Moreover, most nuclear security and 
non-proliferation efforts and agreements are initiated and proposed by 
the supplier group, of which the majority are from the Western Bloc.  
 
The next chapter discusses these initiatives, expectations from the 
major players in nuclear energy technology and the reasons why these 
proposals failed. Malaysia could predict what is expected from the group 
during future nuclear negotiations based upon the past precedents and 
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examples of previous nuclear negotiations. Despite using an 
international platform, such as the IAEA, the supply group of countries 
are the major donors to the IAEA activities, especially in the fields of 
security and non-proliferation.  
 
This is where trust plays an important role, both for countries like 
Malaysia trusting nuclear supplier states, such as the U.S., and vice 
versa. Trust is or should be a two-way relationship that links the nuclear 
suppliers and the consumers.  It is not just a question of the consumer 
states having to convince the suppliers of their genuine motivation for 
nuclear power, but also how consumer states can be convinced that 
supplier states’ intentions are genuinely to assist and not bully. 
2.7 Multilateralism: Putting Trust into Nuclear Cooperation 
Multilateral means that one party is reaching out their hand to the other 
in an effort to reach better results through cooperation and this definitely 
requires trust (Rathbun, 2011).  When trust is absent, there will be an 
intervention that will sometimes jeopardise the cooperation. When there 
is no trust, then there is international political intervention which is 
possibly the strongest factor that can restrain technical progress and 
change the trajectory of technology, thus affecting organisational 
processes and other techno-economic factors. Trust can be developed, 
and it binds societies and states. Nonetheless, trust is often difficult to 
shape and maintain, mainly when there is a conflict of interests in the 
group (Leslie, 2004).  
 
For this reason, many efforts have been proposed and created, for 
example, confidence-building measures. Such measures were created 
under a multilateral framework to enhance cooperation towards 
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promoting peace, security and stability in the region and worldwide. 
Thus, multilateralism and trust work together for better security, whether 
social or economic. When a state agrees to take on the commitments 
and obligations of a multilateral approach, such as by taking 
membership at an inter-state institution, it is agreeing to reduce its policy 
autonomy (Ikenberry, 2008).  
 
On the one hand, the concern is whether establishing a trustworthy 
security system and infrastructure is sufficient for Malaysia to gain the 
trust of the international committee, especially the NSG. On the other 
hand, it is unclear whether Malaysia can trust that the MNA will not be 
used as an apparatus to monopolise the technological and economic 
spin-off under the guise of security and non-proliferation, especially with 
regards to international concerns about nuclear terrorism. Hence, it is 
important for this study to consider the relationship between 
multilateralism and trust because trust is a challenge to the 
implementation of the MNA. Most of the NPT member states preserve 
their rights to obtain enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which they 
might believe is a matter of their right and national sovereignty (Hund, 
Kessler, Mahy, McGoldrick, Bengelsdorf & Seward, 2007), and do not 
trust the reliability and effectiveness of the MNA.   
 
The implementation of multilateral mechanisms is challenging because it 
requires high trust among states. United Nations former Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the importance of trust among nations 
in his speech at the 2009 European Forum Alpbach Political 
Symposium. He stated that a multilateralism is where countries and 
regions engage each other in a spirit of trust, cooperation and mutual 
reliance.  
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Trust is an important pillar in social, economic, and political life; this, in 
fact, is a very old outlook - at least since Confucius, who suggested that 
trust, weapons, and food are the essentials of government (Newton, 
2007).  
 
In promoting MNA, trust is vital to attract newcomer, or consumer, 
countries to participate in the initiative. They trust that the supplier 
countries will fulfil their national needs, i.e. supply nuclear fuel, without 
any disruption caused by unforeseen causes, such as political 
circumstances. At the same time, recipient states also need to build 
suppliers’ trust by pledging that they will not develop any reprocessing 
or enrichment facilities without consent from the suppliers group. 
 
This study explores the factors that contribute to developing trust 
between these two groups of states in order for them to create 
multilateral cooperation involving advanced nuclear technology and so 
called ‘sensitive technology’. Before exploring this issue in more detail, it 
is important to understand how trust can be gained, shaped and 
maintained by understanding the definition and types of trust. Then, it 
can be used to identify and recognise the factors that would enable 
Malaysia to gain trust among the nuclear community, in particular the 
nuclear supplier states, and how it will influence the decision of the 
suppliers. Through these factors, a model will be constructed to 
establish a confidence-building measurement of MNA. The attitudes of 
trust or distrust countries express are quite closely aligned with the way 
they behave (Newton, 2007). This project explored how the behaviour of 
a nation would impact the trust of nuclear suppliers towards the said 
country. 
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Definitions of trust vary and there is much debate regarding how it 
should be defined or distinguished from other similar terms such as 
mutuality, empathy, reciprocity, civility, respect, solidarity, and fraternity. 
One definition of trust is an acceptance that others will not deliberately 
or purposely do harm and will look after others’ interests, if this is 
possible (Newton, 2007). Trust has also been defined as a belief that 
the other side is trustworthy, that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation, 
and mistrust as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy or prefers to 
exploit one’s cooperation. Both will end in cooperation or conflict and 
this can make a difference between peace and war (Kydd, 2007).  
 
Some scholars describe trust as a calculated decision to engage in a 
transaction with another party based on a probability assessment 
attached to the other party that is likely to engage in cooperation. This 
concept requires a country to evaluate qualities, credibility, competence 
and social constraints of its potential partner (Leslie, 2004). Trust 
facilitates or initiates cooperation, so states can begin a virtuous circle of 
trust, collaboration, and enhanced existing trust among them (Rathbun, 
2011). 
 
There are two distinct types of trust that serve different purposes and 
have dissimilar foundations: (1) "strategic trust" - trust that was based 
upon knowledge and experiences, and (2) "moralistic trust" - trust in 
people whom we don't know and who are likely to be different from 
ourselves. Moralistic trust assumes that we do not risk much when we 
put faith in people we do not know, because people of different 
backgrounds still share the same underlying values. We cannot base 
trust in strangers on their trustworthiness because there is no way for us 
to know whether they are honourable. Moralistic trust provides the 
rationale for getting involved with other people and working towards 
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compromises.  Moralistic trust is the foundation of a civil society. It is not 
simply a summary of our life experiences, but a value that reflects an 
optimistic view of the world. So, this trust is based upon rationale, faith 
and common values or interests. Moralistic trust promotes consensus 
and compromise in society and the polity and is essential to civil society 
(Uslaner, 2000/2001).  
 
However, in the case of nuclear knowledge and technology transfer 
activities, it is too risky to rely on moralistic trust. Previous cooperation 
between the recipient and newcomer states is vital for future nuclear 
cooperation. The history of the particular country also influences the 
decision for nuclear cooperation. For example, the ambitions for a 
nuclear programme of India and Pakistan are perceived differently by 
supplier groups, especially the U.S. Unlike India, political observers 
characterised Pakistan as a country with a high risk of terrorism 
activities. This is based on several factors and the most prominent was 
the results of investigations into Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's 
nuclear black market and proliferation network, which also involved a 
company from Malaysia. Moreover, links of some retired Pakistani 
military and intelligence officials and nuclear scientists with Taliban and 
al-Qaeda terrorists also play a role. The international community worried 
that these radical Islamists could invade the country and take over the 
country's nuclear facilities. This is different from India’s nuclear activities, 
which have never been linked to any terrorism activities. Based on these 
factors, the trust that is established when nuclear cooperation is initiated 
performs a strategic function in reducing the security risk. 
 
In the context of international relations, trust is central because when 
countries can trust each other, they can live in peace, provided that they 
are not interested in expanding their power for their own sake in a 
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punitive and aggressive manner (Kydd, 2007). If international relations 
take place in anarchy and trust can affect countries’ ability to cooperate 
in anarchy. In order to identify the factors that could nurture trust 
between countries, this thesis will use historical events to understand 
how trust could be gained and what factors can lead to mistrust between 
countries.  
 
Trust is important in the MNA because when joining this scheme, 
consumer states agree to temporarily withdraw their right to build 
reprocessing or enrichment facilities. These facilities could guarantee 
their fuel supply, especially to countries with no uranium resources. So, 
the consumer state puts their trust in another country to ensure that the 
fuel supply for their nuclear energy programme is continued and 
sustained. Therefore, this policy study is interested in identifying 
important factors for nuclear cooperation, which would be the basis for 
nuclear multilateral cooperation. For this purpose, the focus is on the 
motivations and actions of the U.S. in regard to nuclear cooperation by 
studying one of the most prominent and controversial nuclear 
negotiations, the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation. Investigations also will 
be carried out on the reaction towards Iran’s nuclear deal and the United 
Arab Emirates’ nuclear programme after the Arab Spring in 2011. These 
case studies were deliberately considered as areas affected by the U.S. 
policy and law on nuclear cooperation since most nuclear power 
technology originated from the U.S. This study also looks at the 
influences of US nuclear policy on international nuclear cooperation. 
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2.8 Relationship between Multilateralism, Trust and Modern 
National Security 
The subject of security was dominated by realism during the Cold War. 
The realists viewed the national security solution as the problem and 
sought to widen the concept and shift the burden of security from the 
individual state to the international level. International security studies 
started during the Cold War, concerned with the military (conventional 
and nuclear) capabilities of foes, allies and self. National security 
became a synonym to military security. However, the context of national 
security had been widened explicitly to include economic stability, 
governmental stability, energy supplies, science and technology, as well 
as food and natural resources (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). 
 
Over the last few decades, many states have realized that some key 
issues in national interest such as security, environment and human 
rights violation are too complex to handle individually and will be much 
easier to manage through multilateral cooperation (Powell, 2003). 
Nuclear matters definitely need such cooperation because of the 
sensitive nature of nuclear technology. The MNA has been initiated to 
ensure global security and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
while strengthening economic benefits of nuclear energy for all states. In 
order to combat security threats effectively, a multilateral response has 
become an important tool based on several rationales such as a need 
for joint security given the instability of the region, to handle collective 
external threats, economic rationale and geographic vicinity as well 
similarities in political, institutional, and cultural (Barwani, 2005). 
 
The nuclear fuel cycle involves issues of global security. The process 
towards global security and peace have evolved around the axis of 
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legislative and legal frameworks that have been pursued multilaterally 
and characterized by the notion of legitimacy (Mogami, 2011). 
Regarding the existing rules of many multilateral organisations, any 
decision is made through consensus or majority vote according to the 
rules of procedure, even in an emergency. However, Keohane argued 
that this is no longer applicable when facing the risk of terrorism or the 
development of weapons of mass destruction. It is quite discomfiting to 
find that there is no consensus among states when it comes to these 
two major issues and it may consequently lead to unfair decisions and 
verdicts based on self-interest. If an international organisation 
(multilateral organisation) cannot act in response to the most pressing 
global problems, their legitimacy is questioned (Newman, 2007). Thus, 
issues of legitimacy, accountability, social justice, and effectiveness are 
generating calls for change and this is believed to be gained through 
multilateralism (Hampson & Heinbecker, 2011). 
 
It cannot be denied that multilateralism creates a platform for global 
peace and stability. Throughout history, multilateralism prevented major-
power wars, which have been devastating Europe for centuries. Another 
example was when NATO succeeded in preventing a war between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union (Martin, 2003). Non-proliferation initiative is 
yet another example of multilateral cooperation.  Many policy analysts in 
the 1960s predicted that by the 1980s, around two dozen states would 
have developed nuclear weapons. However, it turned out that only a few 
states had the potential for a nuclear proliferation threat. This happened 
after the creation of multilateral initiative, namely NPT regime, and this 
demonstrated that policy initiatives could focus on a handful of states 
(Ruggie, 1992). Other multilateral efforts that contributed to the 
reduction of nuclear proliferation threat were the creation of regional 
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nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  
 
No state can deny the advantages and benefits that they may gain from 
multilateral cooperation. Multilateralism enables developed states to 
promote their values: the market economy, free trade, good governance, 
technologies, and etc. more widely and more easily to developing states 
(Rodhan et.al 2009). Multilateral cooperation also allows for sharing 
experiences and knowledge among states, which will lead to better 
management and operation especially in the technical areas. However, 
as mentioned above, developing states would still have reservations 
because they would like to ensure that state sovereignty and rights such 
as rights in Article IV of the NPT are respected. 
2.9  Malaysia’s Route for Its Nuclear Fuel Cycle Option   
Major concerns in nuclear activities are nuclear safety, security, and 
non-proliferation. After 5 decades since 1945, the world has witnessed a 
proliferation of States with nuclear weapons (NWs). For examples, the 
US acquired them in 1945, the Soviet Union in 1950; the UK in 1953, 
France in 1961, China in 1965, Israel around 1968, India in 1974, South 
Africa around 1982 and Pakistan around 1995 (Boulton, 2015). The 
literature on nuclear proliferation focuses on the demand side and 
explains decisions to acquire nuclear weapons on the basis of security 
threats, hegemonic ambitions, national identity, or other related factors. 
 
 For these reasons, the role of civilian technical nuclear cooperation is 
generally discounted as a motivating factor in the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Fuhrmann argues that civilian nuclear assistance 
over time increases the probability of states to initiate nuclear weapons 
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programs and known as ‘nuclear latency’ (Bluth, Kroenig, Lee, Sailor & 
Fuhrmann 2010; see also Fuhrmann & Ykach, 2015). He also debates 
that civilian nuclear assistance has an enabling function for states that 
seek to acquire nuclear weapons. However, this argument seems 
doubtful. Currently there are 191 states members of the NPT, including 
five nuclear states. From this figure, only one country, which is the North 
Korea that has made the decision to withdrawal NPT and go for nuclear 
weapon development after receiving civilian nuclear assistance when its 
nuclear program started in 1972 (Bluth, et al., 2010).  
 
On the other hand, other countries such as South Africa disarmed its 
nuclear weapon program in 1990 and remains the only state to have 
completely disarmed and dismantled its nuclear arsenal (Boulton, 2015). 
This followed by other countries, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine that returned their ‘inherited’ weapons to Russia in 1995 in 
accordance with the ‘Lisbon Protocol’ and more focus on increasing 
civilian nuclear cooperation (Bluth, et al., see also 2010, Boulton, 2015). 
The number of cases of nuclear proliferation is too small that it is hard to 
see how statistical analysis can give any meaningful answer about 
interconnection between civilian technical nuclear cooperation towards 
state’s motivation for nuclear weapon. This data also impossible to 
develop any kind of statistical analysis that will predict whether countries 
that do receive civilian nuclear assistance are more likely to leave the 
NPT (Bluth, et al., 2010). 
 
Measures for governing nuclear non-proliferation so far include a 
combination of institutional systems and supply side approaches (Kuno, 
2013). Yet, the inalienable right of peaceful use of nuclear power, as 
stipulated in the Article IV of the NPT, is the main factor when designing 
these controlling measures. De facto, the NPT has loopholes in 
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implementing nuclear security and non-proliferation. So, there is a need 
to develop high capacity nuclear non-proliferation measures based on 
new concepts, which are different from the conventional ideas of 
individual national efforts. A multilateral approach could increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of such measures, while remaining 
economically attractive, which will be discussed further in this chapter. 
For this reason, demand side approach represented by the MNA is the 
most promising solution (Kuno, 2013). 
 
 
Diagram 2: Shows the combination of institutional systems, supply side 
approaches and demand side approaches, as suggested by Yusuke 
Kuno (Kuno, 2013). 
 
Another factor that might increase the interest of states to have 
reprocessing technology is to overcome the issue of nuclear waste, 
especially high-level waste from the nuclear power program. Beside 
toxicity, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) is thermally very hot and therefore 
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safe disposal of nuclear waste is problematic (Boulton, 2015). Although 
reprocessing is advocated as a convenient way of reducing the bulk of 
materials for storage, the recovered plutonium profoundly increases the 
risk of weapons proliferation while the plutonium-poor supernatant 
remains very hot (Boulton, 2015:109). Unfortunately, facilities to 
separate uranium isotopes and reprocessing plutonium contribute to the 
developing of fissile nuclear weapons. So, although States do not have 
nuclear weapons but with civil nuclear power plants still have can 
access to the Pu239 generated in the reactor cores and present in the 
nuclear waste (Boulton, 2015). This scenario that has make the decision 
to control new facilities for reprocessing and enrichment, particularly 
among newcomers in nuclear power industry.  
 
Look at the situation in South-East Asia (SEA), it is different compared 
to other regions such as the Americas, Europe, or Africa in terms of 
sources for a closed fuel cycle. Although some Asian countries such as 
China, India, and Japan develop their closed fuel cycle and have varying 
levels of domestic uranium enrichment and SNF reprocessing 
capabilities, it still not as developed as in America, Europe and Russia 
(Platte, 2014). Moreover, no Asian country is self-sufficient in its nuclear 
fuel cycle, in particular for the natural resource of uranium - unlike other 
states, such as Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, and 
Uzbekistan, which have large sources of uranium ore. Meanwhile, 
countries like France, Russia, and the U.S. are the key holders of 
nuclear technology and services, particularly in enrichment, fuel 
fabrication, and reactor design and construction services (Platte, 2014). 
For these reasons the nuclear power sector in SEA requires bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, especially in the management of SNF. 
Multilateral cooperation not only closes the gap in resources and 
technology, it also strengthens nuclear safety, security and non-
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proliferation, especially in light of the international concern over nuclear 
terrorism. The main reason for most of nuclear cooperation suggested to 
be implemented through multilateralism is due to the understanding that 
nuclear technology may be used as a threat, such as nuclear terrorism. 
International concern over nuclear terrorism has increased since the 11 
September 2001 (9/11) incident (Bowen et al., 2012). However, this 
concern is not new. As early as 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 
stated that the nuclear fuel cycle was a source of nuclear proliferation 
risks. If nations engage in fuel cycle activities, it increases the risk of: 
 Spread of sensitive technologies from declared facilities, 
resulting in their illegal transfer to other entities, which is very 
dangerous if it falls in the wrong hands; 
 Diversion of nuclear materials from declared fuel cycle 
facilities into materials that could be used as weapons; 
 Running a military program at undeclared fuel cycle facilities; 
and 
 Breakout, which implies withdrawal from the NPT and the 
subsequent use of safeguarded nuclear facilities for military 
purposes (Diyakov, 2010). The most cited example is the 
North Korea, which has an active nuclear weapons program 
and tested nuclear explosive devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 
and twice in 2016 (NTI North Korea, 2016). 
 
From these concerns, many multilateral cooperation initiatives were 
designed to prevent nuclear terrorism, including: the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the G8 Global Partnership against 
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1373 and 1540, and the 
establishment of an Office of Nuclear Security at the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The latest was a politically notable 
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commitment by President Barack Obama, who initiated the Nuclear 
Security Summit (NSS) in 2010. This initiative has raised international 
awareness of the nuclear terrorism threat and sought to strengthen 
preventive efforts in this area (Bowen et al., 2013). The summit was 
repeated in 2012 in Seoul, then it was held in The Hague in 2014 and in 
Washington D.C. in 2016. Efforts to control nuclear weapon proliferation 
include control from an early stage. Accordingly, Daaldel and Lodal 
suggest a universal regime to account for and control fissile material of 
any kind would also have the added benefit of reducing the possibility 
that terrorists, who cannot build enrichment or reprocessing facilities of 
their own, could get their hands on the material necessary for 
manufacturing a nuclear device’ (Daalder & Lodal, 2008:13). 
 
However, safety concerns should not be the obstacles for the 
development of nuclear technology, which is a proven way to improve 
the quality of life. In this regard, many political observers agreed that 
multilateralism is an effective tool in nuclear cooperation (Muslim, 2010; 
see also Yudin, 2010; Yudin, 2011). The main challenge for Malaysia in 
nuclear energy development, as well as other SEA countries, is to 
access necessary materials and technologies. Malaysia lacks technical 
expertise in nuclear energy technology.  
 
There are several reasons why Malaysia and other ASEAN countries 
should consider multilateral nuclear cooperation, and nuclear energy 
cooperation (Aoki, 2010) in particular, based on the potential benefits 
that would be achieved through such cooperation: 
 
i. Newcomers have similar challenges at the same time, especially 
countries from the same region 
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- Many of newcomer countries have limited experience in 
managing radioactive waste and SNF. They also have limited 
information about available technologies and approaches for 
safe and long-term management of radioactive waste and 
SNF arising from power reactors. The lack of basic know-how 
and of a credible waste management strategy could present 
major challenges or even obstacles for countries wishing to 
start a nuclear power programme (Mele, 2014). Through the 
multilateral nuclear cooperation, participating states could 
share their common programmes, such as Environment 
Impact Assessment, their knowledge in nuclear education, 
codes, and operating experiences for technical support and 
exchange professional and technical development (IAEA, 
2012b; see also IAEA, 2016). 
 
ii. Cooperation can reduce the initial investment through regional 
cooperation 
-  For a first nuclear power program, the main issue is the front 
cost to develop all necessary infrastructure and facilities. 
However, through multilateral cooperation, participating states 
have potential to share the infrastructure. This step becomes 
easier if they share similar technology, for example, 
developing the same reactor technology. Newcomers from the 
same region also could share physical facilities, such as 
manufacturing facilities, major construction equipment, R&D, 
etcetera. 
 
iii. Savings in infrastructure costs  
-  Through the multilateral cooperation, participating states can 
share human resources, Knowledge and transportation 
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resources. Reprocessing plants are challenging and costly to 
inspect. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces 
technical and financial problems in ensuring timely detection 
of the diversion of significant quantities of weapon-usable 
materials for nuclear explosive purposes. 
 
iv. Reduction in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs  
-  Multilateral cooperation brings the opportunity for states 
sharing of O&M spares, workers for maintenance, training 
programmes, which could reduce O&M cost. 
 
v. Strengthening national and regional Safety, Security and 
Safeguards (3S)  
- Harmonization of safety standards and regulatory frameworks 
among participating states, which an advantage for SEA 
countries is because they share same interest and concerns. 
 
However, there are some costs that states might face if they decide to 
participate in multilateral cooperation (Aoki, 2010). Multilateral 
cooperation involves many nations with different domestic policy and 
foreign policy, and this possible delay of the project due to the 
coordination between partners, or conflict of requirements of common 
goals, services or resources. This is because, each involving party might 
have different national interest when joining the pact. Possible adverse 
effects of political or economic instability in the region also might delay 
any decisions in regard to the activities or framework of the pact. Other 
outlays that states might face are possibility of partner’s withdrawal, 
public resistance, political strings and limited access to the information 
due to the sensitive and strategic nature of nuclear technology (Aoki, 
2010). 
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These scenarios signalled many high-ranking officials and heads of 
government the importance of multilateral cooperation and trust. Ban Ki-
moon, in his speech during the 2009 European Forum, cited that 
multilateralism engages states and its core value is trust (Ki-moon, 
2009). Multilateralism implies coordination, common rules or principles, 
policies, equality and mutual obligations, same rights, responsibility and 
commitment for all members to protect sovereignty and states’ interests. 
Despites demonstrate peaceful use of civilian nuclear program and 
elevate trust among the NSG, MNA seems to be a good choice for 
Malaysia’s Nuclear Power Program. This is because multilateral 
cooperation such MNA would provide resilience and support, nurture 
innovation, and balance political sensitivities between partners, 
particularly ones related to non-proliferation and nuclear security. 
Nuclear cooperation would also assist participating states in improving 
its national safety practices and regulations through training and 
knowledge transfer / exchange (Platte, 2014). According to the 
literature, multilateralism builds reciprocal trust, which is important for 
successful cooperation between states. 
 
Another good example is the establishment of the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), an organisation that has controlled the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Europe, which was created based on 
the principle of multilateralism.  The success of Euratom could be a 
reference for the SEA countries to consider such regional institute in 
Asia, possibly known as ASIANTOM and this initiative is aligned with the 
NSG route for the policy of its nuclear technology transfer. A regional 
approach such Euratom could be applied in SEA or Asia to resolve the 
common problems each country is facing. Nevertheless, an 
institutionalized regional framework to solve nuclear issues in Asia is still 
lacking (Lee & Ginting, 2016) although in ASEAN there are fragmented 
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body such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), the ASEAN 
Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and the 
Asian Network for Nuclear Education and Training (ANENT). Such 
institutional likes the ASIANTOM is in addition to the solution for issue of 
North Korea’s nuclear program, where the future concerns and worries 
of Asia region extend to the issues of nuclear proliferation, nuclear 
safety and nuclear arms races. There have been a growing number of 
opinions that the only option for South Korea and Japan to deal with the 
threat of a nuclear North Korea is to develop their own nuclear weapons 
which will create a worst-case scenario for Northeast Asia: a nuclear 
arms race between the countries (Lee & Ginting, 2016). This indeed will 
also affected Asia region as a whole, especially along with the unsolved 
problem - Pakistan and India nuclear weapons program. Asia observers 
believe that the solution to overcome uncertain block of mistrust among 
Asia is through steps to build confidence in a bilateral setting that leads 
to multilateral talks for North Korea’s denuclearization (Lee & Ginting, 
2016). The MNA could be the centre of discussion, especially with the 
expansion of nuclear energy use and new interest in the region. Bernard 
Spinrad in 1983 suggested that institutional is the only effective barriers 
to non-proliferation, and he claimed that institutional factors have 
worked, and continue to work, toward making nuclear power an 
alternative to rather than a route to nuclear armaments (Spinrad, 1983).  
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Part 2: Four Potential Pathways 
Chapter 3 
The Foundation of Euratom and the Evolution of 
the Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Multinational 
Nuclear Agreement, MNA) was primarily initiated to allow states to 
enrich nuclear fuel without the need for them to possess so-called 
‘sensitive technology’, such as enrichment and reprocessing technology. 
Through this initiative, states that own the technology work together 
under the monitoring of the IAEA to develop a global system. This 
system features a small number of centres to cater for the sensitive 
steps of the nuclear fuel cycle without the need to transfer the sensitive 
technologies. It is owned, operated and managed by consortia of states 
or an international organisation. This way, all states are given the 
opportunity to participate and share profits that would provide a secure 
and sustainable supply of nuclear fuels (Pellaud et al., 2005). Another 
concept of the multilateral approach is that states with the relevant 
technology could supply enriched fuel in a "fuel bank", where other 
states could obtain fuel as an alternative if their nuclear fuel supply is 
disrupted due to exceptional circumstances. If nuclear fuel supply is 
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secured, it will reduce state’s interest to possess enrichment or 
reprocessing technology.  
 
The MNA regime was proposed in 1946 and was given a new hope in 
2003. Most proposals that have emerged since 2003 are focused on 
guaranteeing sustainable supply of nuclear fuel to states (Carrel-Billiard 
& Wing, 2010). These initiatives are still under discussion and being 
reviewed by nuclear experts, both the political and technical aspects. 
Since the MNA model is still uncertain, some states, including Malaysia, 
still have some reservations about its implementation.  
 
The implementation of MNA also raises a question of who decides 
whether a state is eligible to access the fuel assurance mechanism, and 
what are the criteria for eligibility. If supplier governments are providing 
fuel assurance, it is presumed that they would decide to whom this 
decision-making authority is delegated. If the IAEA is the guarantor, then 
decisions on eligibility would be given to the IAEA, within the context of 
guidelines from the board of governors (Carrel-Billiard & Wing, 2010). In 
defining eligibility, trust plays an important role in the implementation of 
the MNA. 
 
Chapter 2 explained the principles and concepts of multilateralism and 
in what manner it has been implemented among countries of South-East 
Asia (SEA). Multilateralism is implemented differently in SEA than in the 
West. SEA implements multilateralism through consensus, ‘soft’ 
diplomacy and non-binding commitments, and stresses that 
multilateralism should reflect local cultures and practices. In the Western 
countries, treaties and law come first when multilateralism is 
implemented. In Asia, multilateralism started for economic reasons, 
while in the West it evolved for military and security reasons. 
85 
 
 
In order to understand the concept and evolution of the multilateral 
approach to the nuclear fuel cycle to encourage developing countries to 
participate in such platform, this chapter discussed the foundation of 
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Along with the 
establishment of the Euratom, a treaty was formulated. The Euratom 
Treaty provides the legal framework to ensure a safe and sustainable 
use of peaceful nuclear energy across Europe and helps non-EU 
countries meet equally high standards of safety and radiation protection, 
safeguards and security (Garbil & Euratom Fission, 2017). The Euratom 
treaty was drafted to contribute to the formation and development of 
Europe’s nuclear industry, so that all Member States can benefit from 
nuclear energy. It also intended to enhance security of energy supply 
and guarantee high standards of safety for the public and workers as 
well to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from civil to military 
use (ENS, 2007).  This chapter will examine how the experience of 
Euratom might benefit either the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or 
regional security in Asia, as well as other aspects of Euratom that could 
be applied into Asia’s context. 
 
After reviewing the concept of multilateralism, it is necessary to assess 
the evolution of the MNA because few academic analyses of the 
processes surrounding the operation of MNA have been carried out.  
Likewise, academic articles and papers written on the subject of MNA 
participation, particularly on encouraging developing states from Asia-
Pacific, like Malaysia, to join the initiative are rather limited. Most 
analyses discuss the security and non-proliferation gains through the 
MNA, but not so much on the concept of multilateralism and trust 
surrounding the process of the MNA, especially within ASEAN. This 
chapter explores how multilateralism will impact and influence Malaysian 
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policy on the nuclear fuel cycle, predominantly in ensuring the 
sustainability of fuel supply and waste management. 
3.2 The Relations between Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): An Introduction 
In general, the nuclear fuel cycle involves uranium mining and milling, 
uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, uranium reconversion, fuel 
fabrication, the nuclear reaction, spent fuel storage, spent nuclear fuel 
reprocessing, and high-level nuclear waste disposal.  Among these 
stages, two technologies, namely the enrichment and reprocessing 
technology are capable of producing weapon grade uranium or 
plutonium. In this regard, states, which already are in possession of 
such technologies, have decided not to transfer any related knowledge, 
materials or equipment to any newcomer country interested in 
developing nuclear capacity.  
 
The decision to limit these technologies was triggered after the 
discovery of the illegal nuclear weapons development programmes by 
the Republic of Iraq and North Korea in the 1990s, followed by a 
declaration by Libya in 2004 that it would develop a uranium enrichment 
programme. The worries also amplified with the renewed interest among 
developing countries to launch nuclear power in meeting the national 
energy demand (Nikitin, Andrews & Holt, 2012). This escalating interest 
among Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) could potentially intensify 
their interest to procure the nuclear technologies necessary to develop 
nuclear weapons.   
 
Hence, the main challenge is to find ways to manage global nuclear fuel 
cycles that are available to all states on a non-discriminatory basis and 
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could reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation. One proposed solution to 
this problem is by constructing and operating the enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities under multilateral arrangements. One prominent 
proposal is to create the MNA. This scheme is generally viewed as an 
effective approach in ensuring safe and reliable access to nuclear fuel 
and services at competitive market prices, which at the same time 
strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
 
U.S. President Bush, in his speech at the U.S. National Defence 
University on February 11, 2004, urged the world to “close a loophole” in 
the NPT that allows states to legally acquire the technology to produce 
nuclear material which could be used for a clandestine weapons 
program. He urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to “refuse to sell 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state 
that does not already possess full-scale and functioning enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities. However, nuclear fuel service suppliers should 
commit to ensuring that the receiving states have reliable access at 
reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, as long as those states 
renounce their enrichment and reprocessing interest (Nikitin et al, 2012). 
The MNA proposal has come under considerable criticism from some 
non-supplier states. Yudin (2010) explains that the main fears and 
concerns expressed by states are that the proposal (i) might deny 
access to advanced technologies under the guise of non-proliferation; 
(ii) might attempt to create a supplier cartel to control the market; (iii) the 
scheme might be unreliable, especially in terms of fuel supply, and (iv) 
multilateral fuel cycle arrangements might infringe the inalienable right of 
NNWS under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) (Yudin, 2010; see also Muslim, 2010).  
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There is a concern that Article IV of the NPT might be misused to 
access the ‘sensitive technologies’ for the nuclear weapon development 
purposes. A typical example is the Rajasthan nuclear test in 1974, which 
was claimed by India as a peaceful explosion, but in fact the test 
accelerated India’s nuclear weapons capability (Bergkvist & Ferm, 
2000). 
This thesis is partially motivated by the fact that many states, including 
Malaysia, have shown interest in the utilization of nuclear energy. This is 
primarily driven by the need to ensure long-term energy security in view 
of diminishing energy resources, increasing dependence on imports of 
fossil fuels that are vulnerable to supply uncertainties and price 
fluctuation. The interest is also motivated by the fact that nuclear power, 
as a low carbon technology, has significant potential to contribute 
international’s efforts in addressing the climate challenge by reducing 
green-house gas (GHG) emissions (IAEA Director General, 2017). 
Due to these developments, many states have changed their policy 
towards nuclear energy, particularly among developing states with rapid 
economic growth, such as Malaysia. Subsequently, many states also 
consider developing their own fuel cycle facilities and nuclear know-how, 
to ensure security of supply in materials, services and technologies. 
Thus, this will give rise to challenges to the international nuclear 
governance. Since the Pakistan-India nuclear weapon race, North 
Korea’s nuclear test and the September 11 attack, nuclear security and 
non-proliferation became the main agenda in every nuclear discussion. 
Thus, these issues created a major dilemma in promoting nuclear 
energy because controls over nuclear technology transfer became 
increasingly stringent.  
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3.3  The Changing Geopolitics of Nuclear Programmes  
Many states have expressed an interest in a nuclear power programme 
as part of energy polices to address their energy security needs. This 
interest remains even after the Fukushima-Daiichi incident, although the 
rate of nuclear power expands at a slower pace globally. This is 
because global energy demand and climate change targets still need to 
be addressed. Thus, the interest to construct more new reactors is still 
strong in some states, such as China, India and South Korea. Japan, a 
nuclear power state, may also reconsider its plans to build new nuclear 
power reactors. Other nuclear power states have decided to end their 
nuclear power programme after the Fukushima-Daiichi incident. 
Germany announced its plans to phase out all of its nuclear power 
stations, as well as Switzerland (Royal Society, 2011).  
 
Interest in nuclear energy also has spread to the Middle East. In 2009, 
the United Arab Emirates awarded a South Korean consortium the 
contract to build four nuclear power reactors by 2020, and the 
programme is still continuing. Saudi Arabia has also recently announced 
it will build 16 nuclear power reactors over the next two decades. This 
was followed by Kuwait, which has plans for four nuclear power 
reactors, as well as Jordan for one reactor. This demonstrates that the 
Middle East could emerge as the second largest market for new 
reactors. By 2030, there could be up to more than ten new nuclear-
power states, including: Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, UAE and Vietnam (Royal Society, 2011).  
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3.4  The Challenges of Nuclear Civilian Programmes: Dual Use of 
Technology 
Since the Pakistan-India nuclear weapon race, the North Korea nuclear 
test, the 9/11 attacks in the US, the revelation of A.Q Khan’s clandestine 
nuclear black market to Iran and Libya (Yourish & D’Souza, 2004; see 
also ISS Strategic Dossier, 2007; Pollack, 2012), and the fear that Iran’s 
nuclear programme may be used for nuclear weapon development 
(Kemp et al, 2001; see also Kerr & Nikitin, 2008; Bruno, 2010), scrutiny 
of activities that are related to nuclear technologies, especially 
technology transfer, have become more stringent.  
 
Historically, states that developed technologies such as research 
reactors and fuel fabrication did so for the purpose of developing nuclear 
weapons or securing the option to do so (Pellaud et.al. 2005). More 
recently, however, many states have changed their energy policy 
towards nuclear energy, particularly developing states with rapid 
economic growth in Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
The interest on the utilisation of nuclear energy is primarily driven by the 
need to ensure long-term energy security in view of declining energy 
resources, and reliance on imports of coal and fossil fuels that are 
vulnerable to supply uncertainties and fluctuation of prices.  
 
However, this interest raises concerns among nuclear powers. When 
developed or developing states pursue nuclear power programme, 
problems related to costs, human capital constraints, nuclear waste, and 
most importantly nuclear non-proliferation and security issues emerge. 
Concerns also become intense when countries not only attempt to 
pursue a nuclear power programme but also show interest in developing 
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their own fuel cycle facilities and nuclear technology know-how, to 
ensure that supply of materials, services and technologies is secure.   
 
Capacity to cater to the full nuclear cycle may be required by no-supplier 
states for various reasons. First, carrying out entirely legitimate and 
peaceful energy programmes. Second, removing doubts about the 
reliability of fuel supply from foreign sources. Third, conserving nuclear 
fuel resources through reprocessing. Fourth, achieving the prestige of 
possessing advanced, sophisticated fuel cycle facilities. Fifth, benefitting 
from industrial, technological and scientific spin-offs. Seventh, selling 
enrichment or reprocessing services on the international market. And 
finally, this decision may be taken because the state considers it to be 
economically justifiable (Pellaud et.al. 2005). 
 
The international community fears that the increased interest among 
developing states to construct their own fuel cycle facilities might lead to 
the development of nuclear weapons. Technologies involved in the 
uranium enrichment and SNF reprocessing parts of the nuclear cycle 
present obvious risks of nuclear proliferation as they provide states with 
materials that are directly usable in a nuclear weapon or nuclear 
explosive devices, such as high enriched uranium (HEU) and separated 
plutonium. Thus, these parts of the nuclear cycle pose potential 
challenges to international security and to international nuclear 
governance. For these reasons, states with uranium enrichment and 
SNF reprocessing technologies have decided not to transfer them to 
states that do not have the technology. Chapter 4 will elucidate this 
statement through case study of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. 
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3.5 The History of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle  
During the early years, when nuclear technology was developed for 
military purposes, motivations to develop nuclear weapon arsenal were 
driven by the role of national pride and desire to preserve Great Power 
status (Pierre, 1972; see also Shinichi, 2001; Keck, 2013). The status 
was gained with the perception that it could be extended through the 
nuclear force that could enhance states’ leverage and bargaining power 
in the international affairs (Pierre, 1972; see also Tristan, 2017). This 
supports the ontology and epistemology of realism in international 
affairs. Nuclear weapon development is also motivated by the quest for 
national security because international security environment remains 
dangerous and unpredictable and has grown more complicated since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons remain an 
essential element in modern strategy (USA DOE, 2008). 
 
Concerned with these developments, political analysts suggested that 
the solution to reduce the possibility of a nuclear arms race was through 
monitoring the activities of the nuclear fuel cycle through multilateral 
approaches (Expert Group Report to the IAEA Director General, 2005). 
The multilateral approach was consistent with the proposal for nuclear 
non-proliferation after WWII, which signalled that nuclear technology 
could be used for non-peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, these efforts 
failed because of political obstacles (Schiff, 1984). From the research of 
this thesis, one of the reasons that previous proposals failed is because 
reciprocity norms in these proposals seems to be unbalanced: for 
example, more priority was given for inspections and safeguards over 
technical assistance. Nevertheless, this started to change when ‘Atoms 
for Peace’ was introduced by the former U.S. President Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly in New York City on 
December 8, 1953.  
 
The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military 
build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be 
developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The 
United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no 
dream of the future. The capability, already proved, is here today. 
Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and 
engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which 
to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be 
transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?...... 
 
I therefore make the following proposal. 
 
The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by 
elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint 
contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable 
materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would 
expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the 
United Nations…. 
 
Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be 
small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it 
can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions 
incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of 
world-wide inspection and control. 
 
The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the 
impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable 
and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide 
special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable 
material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure. 
 
The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency 
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would 
be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts 
would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of 
agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special 
purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the 
power-starved areas of the world (Eisenhower, 1953). 
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This speech became the root for the establishment of the IAEA as an 
autonomous organisation on 29 July 1957, after three years of long-haul 
diplomatic negotiations, and has assist its Member States through 
training and technical assistance (Buck, 1983). Since then, many 
countries, especially developing countries have benefitted from the 
peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear science and technology but in 
the same time preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, This global 
governance in nuclear energy began when eighty-one countries 
approved the charter of the IAEA, three years after Eisenhower had 
proposed creating such an organization to help realize visionary 
aspirations for nuclear energy (Hibbs, 2017). The success of the IAEA is 
lies by the statute of the IAEA which is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its members (Hibbs, 2017). 
 
The idea to create the MNA was not new, but has been discussed, 
negotiated and debated since 1945, from the time when the first two 
atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Early 
negotiations mainly involved protagonist countries namely the U.S. and 
the former Soviet Union (Schiff, 1984), along with the U.S. allies Britain 
and France. The initial period of nuclear negotiations was tough and 
challenging because of the divergent national interests over regime 
norms and differences over rules.  Britain, for example, had a series of 
serious and lengthy national debate about giving up their nuclear 
weapons and had a considerable influence upon the evolution of the 
concept of nuclear deterrence (Pierre, 1972).  
 
A number of illegitimate cases of nuclear proliferation demonstrated that 
the NPT alone was not enough. There are need for robust multilateral 
organizational efforts that will increase confidence in the system and 
help to move beyond mistrust and suspicion engendered by past failures 
95 
 
(The Stanley Foundation, 2006). Thus, several proposals were 
introduced and explored, including the MNA. The idea was to develop a 
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and managerial aspects of the nuclear 
fuel cycle. A number of proposals were forwarded and pursued, mostly 
by nuclear supplier states. However, these schemes were abandoned 
because of competing interests which were driven by the dynamics of 
the Cold War, nationalism, economics, mistrust and the limits of 
technology. 
 
In fact, efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons were first initiated 
by the scientific community. Their report, entitled A Report on the 
International Control of Atomic Energy but also known as the Acheson–
Lilienthal Report, was published in 1946. It proposed the creation of an 
international organisation to monitor all nuclear facilities that might have 
potential in producing materials that could be used as weapons (U.S 
Office of the Historian, 2014; Buck, 1983). Hence, the report proposed 
states to transfer their national ownership and control over dangerous 
nuclear activities and nuclear materials to a multilateral organisation 
(Kearn, 2010). 
 
Later, based on this Acheson–Lilienthal Report, in June 1946 the 
Baruch Plan was suggested by Bernard Baruch purposely to create an 
international organisation that regulated atomic energy. The Baruch 
Plan was adopted Acheson–Lilienthal Report but with two additional 
components which were on veto proof sanctions for violations, and 
another one is declaring that America would not renounce its atomic 
bombs until firm guarantees were in place that no other nation could arm 
itself with nuclear weapons capability. Additionally, the U.S. would be 
allowed to continue to develop nuclear weapons until the negotiated 
guarantees were in place and effective (Weiss, 2003). However, the 
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plan failed because political analysts perceived the proposal 
inconsistent with the political realm to emphasize cooperation. The deal 
seemed unfair because it created international controls after the U.S. 
had demonstrated their advances in nuclear weapons, whilst other 
countries had not yet acquired any of these technologies. Subsequently, 
the Soviet Union rejected the proposal because they believed that “the 
Baruch Plan was intended to ensure that the US would maintain its 
nuclear weapon monopoly, while others, including the Soviet Union 
could not possess it” (Tazaki & Kuno, 2012:1756).  
 
Dean Rusk, who was involved in the Baruch Plan negotiations, viewed 
the Baruch Plan as lacking reciprocity: one of the key principles in 
multilateral cooperation. He pointed out that the U.S. was demanding 
too much from the Soviets. In fact, it was beyond what the U.S. would 
probably accept if the situation was reversed (Rusk, 1990). Hence, it 
was no surprise when the Soviet Union rejected the proposal. Not only 
did this plan lack reciprocity, there were also no clear provisions under 
the Baruch Plan that mandated immediate destruction of the US nuclear 
arsenal. This destruction would only be sanctioned after complete 
implementation of Baruch’s provision by other nations.  
 
The Soviet Union argued that the Plan only served the US desire to 
preserve its nuclear monopoly, whilst proposing international inspections 
of other states’ domestic nuclear facilities. The Soviet Union also 
overruled the idea of ceding their veto power in the United Nations 
Security Council concerning the issue of sanctions against nations that 
engaged in nuclear prohibited activities or atomic energy violations 
(Atomic Energy Commission, 1947; see also Rydell, 2006). This was 
strongly cited because they argued that the council was already set in 
favour of the US and its allies (Goldschmidt, 1986).  
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Therefore, a number of lessons can be drawn from the Baruch Plan 
negotiations. A country might become agitated if there is an attempt to 
reduce its power; for example, the idea of ceding Soviet Union’s veto 
power in United Nations Security Council concerning the issue of 
sanctions against nations that engaged in prohibited nuclear activities. 
The fail of Baruch Plan also because lack of trust among states with 
nuclear weapon. Soviet Union was angered by the fact that the U.S. 
might have already gained support from its allied states, such as the 
British and Canada, before proposing the plan to Russia. The plan 
appears to be an opportunity for US leadership in the context of a United 
Nations to create an effective system that could address U.S. national 
interests whilst supporting international cooperation (Kearn, 2010). This, 
what political observer, Larry Gerber in 1982 concluded that Baruch's 
'realism' about U.S. national security as a world power, combined with 
his 'Wilsonian internationalism' aimed at a liberal capitalist world order, 
and supported by similar attitudes and assumptions of other American 
policymakers, 'prevented them from considering the possibility of 
agreement on anything but American terms' (Baratta,1985:592). Also, 
then came to the issue of decision who will first start the disarmament 
process. The U.S. should not expect other states to end their aspiration 
for nuclear weapons until it shows commitment to abolishing its nuclear 
arsenal. In fact, the U.S. still continued its nuclear weapon programme 
during the negotiation (Rusk, 1990; see also Rydell, 2006; Miasnikov, 
2016). As a state with nuclear weapon capability, it was predictable that 
the Soviet Union would not agree with the U.S. nuclear-weapon 
monopoly. The U.S., however, could not agree to carry out a complete 
nuclear disarmament until there was an effective international 
verification on fuel cycle management system in place (Muller, 2005). 
One more lesson-learned from the proposed initiatives, as suggested by 
political observers is that such approaches would be more attractive if 
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they came with development functions rather than only enforcement 
(Kearn, 2010). This demonstrated that the Baruch Plan was only a “one-
way” effort, which was about control but envisaged no effort for 
technological development cooperation or sharing of knowledge and 
experiences. Approaches proposed by the US also contravene and 
constrain a country’s sovereignty and rights because most of the nuclear 
energy activities were suggested to be under the jurisdiction of the 
Atomic Development Authority (ADA), including a monopoly of mining 
uranium and thorium, refining the ores, owning materials, and 
constructing and operating nuclear power plants (Barnard, 
Oppenheimer, Thomas, Winne & Lilienthal 1946). 
 
Although the Baruch Plan failed, the plans actually had initiated the 
world’s first attempt to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Later, the 
U.S Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) was developed and 
created U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE) which determined how the U.S. could control and 
manage nuclear technology (Weiss, 2003). The Act ruled that nuclear 
weapon development and nuclear power management should be under 
civilian, rather than military control (Miller, 1948). Alike the Baruch Plan, 
the McMahon Act was a result of the U.S. policy framework for dealing 
with the proliferation risks and the U.S., during that time wanted to 
secure its dominant position acquired during the Second World War by 
controlling access to uranium ore and by imposing restrictions on the 
technology transfer, even with its closest allies (Krige, 2014).This Act 
had established the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to 
implement this purpose. Then, the Act was re-enacted in 1954, which 
under Section 123 of the renewal Act, (Cooperation with Other Nations) 
established the legal framework for nuclear cooperation agreements, 
known as 123 Agreements. This provision gave the U.S. the ability to 
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control its original technology from being used for nuclear weapon 
development (Kerr & Nikitin, 2016; see also Mallard, 2010). 
 
Alternative proposals for international control over nuclear technology 
continued and among them was the Atoms for Peace programme. 
Compared to the Baruch Plan, the program was aimed at the promotion 
of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, while emphasising a commitment to 
peaceful use and non-proliferation (Weiss, 2003; see also Twigge, 
2016). This was implemented by engaging an international safeguards 
system for verification of compliance. This proposal led to the creation of 
the IAEA, which was accepted worldwide and where 168 states are now 
members. The Atoms for Peace programme led to a large-scale, 
worldwide transfer of nuclear technology towards peaceful purposes.  
 
However, in some cases, the IAEA cannot function as had been 
expected because some nuclear supplier states such as the US and the 
Soviet Union could provide nuclear technologies to their allied nations 
through bilateral cooperation. For example, the nuclear agreement 
between India and U.S. IAEA was accepted by many states because it 
offered help to improve their scientific and technological capabilities in 
the peaceful application of nuclear technology for national socio-
economic development and sustainability (IAEA, 2012b). The IAEA also 
was accepted because it not only contributed assistance with nuclear 
technology programmes but at the same time monitored for any 
suspicious nuclear activities. Since 1957, the IAEA has assisted its 
Member States through technology transfer, benefactor projects, 
knowledge management, training, capacity building, technical 
assistance, expert advice and much more (Barretto, 2016; see also 
IAEA, 2016). 
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Unfortunately, some countries were very determined to strengthen their 
military power, which created competition for supremacy 
in nuclear warfare. Among the most important crises in history that 
exemplified the danger of proliferation in the nuclear age was the 1962 
Cuban Missile crisis. That crisis was said by some analysts marked as 
closest to the world nuclear war (Smith, 2003; see also Norris & 
Kristensen, 2012). At the peak of the crisis, the U.S. had some 3,500 
nuclear weapons ready to be used on command, while the Soviet Union 
had perhaps between 300 and 500 (Norris & Kristensen, 2012). This 13-
day (28 October – 21 November 1962) political and military standoff 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union started when the it installed 
nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba just 90 miles from the U.S. shores 
(Smith, 2003). U.S. President John Kennedy imposed a naval blockade 
around Cuba and made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use 
military force if necessary to counteract Russia’s act that was clearly a 
threat to the U.S. national security (Smith, 2003). Subsequently, many 
feared that the world was on the edge of nuclear war. Fortunately, it was 
avoided when the Soviet Union agreed to remove the Cuban missiles in 
exchange for the U.S.’s commitment not to invade Cuba (Smith, 2003; 
see also Laffey & Weldes, 2008). The U.S. was also believed to have 
secretly agreed to remove missiles from Turkey (Laffey & Weldes, 2008; 
see also Swift, 2007). Later in 1964, China joined France, U.S., Soviet 
Union and British to become the fifth country to test a nuclear weapon 
(Heginbotham et.al, 2015). This again heightened international concerns 
over the importance of controlling the spread of nuclear knowledge and 
technology and preventing its misuse for non-peaceful purposes (Burr & 
Richelson, 2000/2001; see also Bergner, 2012). These developments 
gave a strong signal to the international community that there was a 
need to deal with these challenges.  
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Early drafts of the treaty focused on non-proliferation and verification. 
However, there is also a necessity for a treaty that included provisions 
for cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy to attract more 
participation from other countries. The treaty, known as the NPT had a 
provision on nuclear disarmament and technology transfer for 
cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear technology. After the NPT 
entered into force in 1970, some countries ended their nuclear weapons 
programmes. For example, the countries that had done so were 
Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa (United Nations NPT, 1995; see also 
Davis, 2009; Bergner, 2012) after they joined the NPT in the 1990s. This 
effort was followed by other countries, such as Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan, which had given up former Soviet nuclear weapons that 
were in their possessions after joining the NPT in the 1990s. This treaty 
also recognized only five nations as nuclear-weapon states namely 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. (United 
Nations NPT, 1995). 
 
The NPT stood on three pillars, namely nuclear non-proliferation, 
nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 
nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) 
faced different obligations under the NPT, often referred to as the ‘NPT 
bargain’. First obligation is an exchange for NNWS pledging not to 
acquire nuclear weapons, they were guaranteed “the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (NPT, Article IV-2); 
and second obligation is that the nuclear-weapon states agreed to 
“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament” (NPT, Article VI), and agreed not to assist the 
development of nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon state 
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(Kerr, Nikitin, Woolf, & Medalia, 2010; see also Bergner, 2012). Initially, 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union intended that the NPT be principally 
limited to its first three articles; that is, it should be a treaty prohibiting 
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II) and 
permitting its verification (Article III), although the NPT verification 
system (the safeguards) was limited to verifying non-diversion of 
peaceful nuclear technology to weapon purposes. But non-nuclear 
states had in 1965 put down a marker at the United Nations that a non-
proliferation treaty had to have obligations that were balanced between 
those of non-nuclear weapon states and those of nuclear weapon 
states. This led non-nuclear weapon states to want to impose nuclear 
disarmament obligations on the nuclear weapon states; NPT Article VI 
was the result (Graham, 2012:140). 
 
The NPT certainly reduced the nuclear weapon tensions of its time. 
However, it needed to evolve and adapt to counter modern and more 
complicated security threats, as the end of the Cold War had resulted in 
the rise of regional political security agendas (Burt, 2012). Furthermore, 
nuclear non-proliferation concerns re-entered the scene after three 
major events in 1989-1991: (i) the end of the Cold War, (ii) the 
demolition of the Berlin Wall, and (iii) the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Trenin, 2011; see also Segbers 2009; Orlov, Timerbaev & Khlopkov 
2002; Graham 2012). These major events had raised concerns because 
nuclear materials, such as HEU and plutonium, could be easily 
repossessed from nuclear weapons belonging to former states of the 
Soviet Union. Thus, many efforts were made in order to avoid any illegal 
production of HEU and plutonium from civilian reprocessing, and 
proposals on SNF management were suggested to overcome the 
issues.  
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Subsequently, more efforts were brought forward to create multilateral 
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle to control nuclear proliferation, 
either by the IAEA or by individual countries or regions. Between the 
years 1975 to 1977, IAEA initiated the creation of Regional Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Centres (RNFC). The project aimed to observe the aspects of 
economics, safety, safeguards and security of nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities that could benefit from being managed through a multinational 
approach (Tazaki & Kuno, 2012).  The concept of the centre was that 
several countries would join together to plan, build and operate the 
necessary facilities to service the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle 
(Meckoni, 1976).  The study was designed to be comprehensive, which 
included SNF storage, fuel reprocessing, plutonium fuel fabrication and 
waste disposal. The outcomes of the study brought encouraging results, 
which were debated from various perspectives, and outlined the 
potential benefits of the RNFCs. Firstly, the intergovernmental 
agreements suggested the RNFCs would support the efforts to 
strengthen the non-proliferation system. This could be applied through 
cooperation to enhance national safeguards and physical protection and 
improve siting of facilities. Secondly, RNFCs also could generate 
economic benefits from their operations, although the report argued that 
repositories would probably not be co-located with reprocessing and fuel 
fabrication plants (Meckoni, 1976).  
 
Although the study was well received by many states, no further actions 
and steps were taken to develop the concept. This was because there 
was no longer the same fear about the rise of the plutonium economy by 
the time this report was published (Tazaki & Kuno, 2012). This proposal 
was not carried forward after considering problems raised by the 
reprocessing of foreign SNF, either technological or affecting security 
(McCombie & Chapman, 2004). However, this concept would offer a 
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comprehensive framework to achieve the objectives of non-proliferation 
and safeguards. Moreover, it would offer an opportunity for participating 
countries to work together in planning nuclear fuel-cycle strategies 
which would meet their national needs on a sensible and economic 
basis (Meckoni, 1976). 
 
Thereafter, more modern initiatives were convened to investigate 
whether there were economic, logistical or strategic reasons for 
developing international arrangements for SNF storage, and how these 
arrangements might be set up. Amongst modern initiatives proposed 
Committee on International Plutonium Storage (IPS) from 1978 to 1982, 
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme (INFCE) from 1977 to 
1980, United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) in 
1987, Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) from 1980 to 1987, 
International Symposium on Nuclear Fuel and Reactor Strategies: 
Adjusting to New Realities (1997), Technical, Economic and Institutional 
Aspects of Regional Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (RSFSF) as reported 
in the 2003 IAEA TecDoc (Suzuki, 2010).  
 
Table 2: Summary of MNA initiatives during the Post-Cold War (Tazaki 
& Kuno, 2012). 
Year Initiatives Reasons for not implementing 
1990s International 
Monitored Storage 
System (IMRSS) 
Never negotiated 
1990s Wake Island / 
Palmyra Island 
Strongly opposed by the US which 
favoured more the proposal for 
Non-proliferation Trust 
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1994 to 
1999 
Proposal by 
Marshall Islands 
Strongly opposed by the US and 
other Pacific states to dispose of 
SNF and High-Level Waste (HLW) 
in Marshall Islands 
1998 Non-proliferation 
Trust 
Failed because Russia preferred 
reprocessing which others did not 
agree with. Likewise, Russia had 
proposed reprocessing and for that 
reason, the proposal weakened and 
lost its impetus 
1990-
2000 
Pangea Project  This proposal was abandoned 
because it was not agreed by 
Australia 
2001 Russian Technical 
storage / 
reprocessing 
facility 
The US, which controlled 80% of 
SNF never gave authorisation for 
US-origin SNF to be exported to 
Russia because they did not agree 
with Russia’s support for Iran’s 
nuclear programme and Russia’s 
reprocessing programme 
 
However, similar to previous efforts, these efforts were also 
unsuccessful. These proposals were unsuccessful largely because 
pertinent states were reluctant to give up their national controls on the 
nuclear fuel cycle and that in the short term, there would be no demand 
for international arrangements (Tazaki & Kuno, 2012) for there was no 
shortage of nuclear fuel supply. These MNA also never been realised 
because some countries feel that proposed MNA are double standards 
and in-equality, not enough transparency, conditions for fuel 
assurance/access to technologies are not clear, lack of effective 
106 
 
utilization of market mechanism and also difficulties of siting spent 
fuel/waste facilities are still remaining (Suzuki, 2010). 
 
Therefore, based on the analysis of these failed attempts, there are 
three major problems related to the current system that need to be taken 
into account in nuclear multilateral cooperation. First, some countries do 
not accept the restriction of nuclear weapons to a self-selected group of 
countries – especially as, for a long time, these countries show little 
signs of implementing the agreed reductions in their nuclear arsenals. 
Second, a growing fear of terrorism around the world has heightened 
the importance of nuclear security and the problems of protecting 
adequately and reliably against the threats when there are numerous 
fuel cycle facilities scattered across many countries. Third, the use of 
nuclear power implies that safe disposal routes must be available for the 
waste. This part of the fuel cycle has encountered major setbacks in 
every country and has not yet been internationalised (McCombie & 
Chapman, 2004).  
 
3.6  The Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA): 
Supporting the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Activities 
 
Consequently, the MNA was introduced to address a legitimate need for 
fuel for civil nuclear power programmes and to pursue efforts to reduce 
the risks of nuclear proliferation. In 2004, the IAEA Preliminary Views of 
the IAEA Secretariat outlined three major reasons why the nuclear fuel 
cycle needs to be managed through multilateral cooperation (IAEA, 
2004). First outline in regard to a concern that were raised regarding the 
adequacy and efficiency of international safeguards to detect and deter 
the misuse of nationally-controlled nuclear fuel cycle facilities for nuclear 
weapon programme. National controls over access to nuclear 
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technology were found to be still lacking and insufficient. Furthermore, 
some events showed there was a possibility that states which engaged 
in declared enrichment and reprocessing activities for peaceful purposes 
could potentially misuse the nuclear materials, knowledge or technology 
for the development of nuclear weapon programmes. Second outline, it 
was well-understood and recognized that nuclear power has the 
potential to play a critical role in long-term sustainable energy 
development. However, continuing nuclear expansion raised concerns 
about the possibility that some states would be tempted to use nuclear 
technologies for non-peaceful purposes (Muslim, 2010). Although in the 
context of nuclear proliferation it was the front end of the nuclear fuel 
cycle that was of the most immediate concern, a related issue was the 
accumulation, storage and disposal of separated plutonium and spent 
nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. In this regard, the international 
management of the storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste might also have non-proliferation benefits and provide economic 
benefits to states with small nuclear fuel cycles. In addition, an initiative 
of this kind would allow for the further access of developing states to the 
benefits of nuclear power (IAEA, 2004).   
 
Third outline is based statement by El-Baradei, the former IAEA 
Director-General, in The Economist of 16 October 2003, as well in his 
statement to the 58th regular Session of the UN General Assembly on 3 
November 2003, highlighted challenges in nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and recommended the international community to explore new 
measures to overcome these issues and challenges. He suggested 
three directions for further research and consideration namely; (1) in 
light of the increasing risk of nuclear proliferation, it is advisable to limit 
the processing of weapon-grade nuclear material such as separated 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes, 
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and the production of nuclear weapon-grade material through 
reprocessing and enrichment. Hence, these restricted operations would 
take place exclusively at the facilities under multinational control and 
accompanied by appropriate rules for the assurance of nuclear fuel 
supply to potential users (IAEA, 2004); (2) to design new nuclear energy 
systems with built-in design features that would prevent states diverting 
nuclear material to weapons production; prevent the misuse of the 
facilities and equipment for clandestine manufacture of weapon-grade 
nuclear material; and facilitate efficient safeguards to ensure continued 
peaceful use. The implementation of this concept was not a futuristic 
theory anymore because much of the technology for proliferation-
resistant nuclear energy systems had already been developed and 
actively researched; and finally (IAEA, 2004) and (3) to consider more 
closely multilateral approaches to the management and disposal of 
spent fuel and radioactive waste. As for 2010 approximately 190,000 
metric tons of high-level radioactive waste is now in temporary storage 
awaiting disposal (de Saillan, 2010), and during this study, over 50 
states have spent fuel stored in temporary locations, awaiting 
reprocessing or disposal (IAEA, 2004; see also Greene, 2018). Major 
obstacle in the management of disposal of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste is that not all states have appropriate geological conditions for 
such disposal. Moreover, for some states with small nuclear 
programmes, the cost and human resources essential for the 
construction and operation of a geological disposal facility are too high 
(Milanov & Stefanova,1994; see also Boyadjiev & Vapirev, 1994; de 
Saillan, 2010). Due to these issues, the MNA could benefit for domestic 
siting because by sharing nuclear facilities such as enrichment, 
reprocessing or spent-fuel facilities, it could provide viable alternatives 
for states, especially newcomers, which may, due to political, social, 
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geological, or other reasons, have few positive prospects for domestic 
siting of such facilities (Hippel, Hayes, Kang & Katsuta, 2011). 
 
Taken together, MNA has the potential to provide enhanced assurance 
to the international community that the sensitive stages of the civilian 
nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to proliferation (Muslim, 2010; see 
also Yudin, 2010; Yudin, 2011). If implemented, this arrangement could 
serve as the apparatus to facilitate the continued use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. It is worth exploring the MNA regime because of 
its potential beneﬁts, which could include the common understanding 
between participating countries. As a result, they could share and 
exchange knowledge and experiences among them, they could discuss 
on relevant scientiﬁc, educational, and technical matters. The 
multilateral cooperation also could assist states and ensure that they 
have a common understanding and knowledge of complex issues such 
as the fuel cycle issues (Hippel et al., 2011).  
 
Through an effort of sharing nuclear facilities helps assure that all 
participating states maintain their consistency in quality control practices 
and standards in managing and handling nuclear materials. In addition, 
it helps achieve consistent levels of nuclear safeguards, monitoring, and 
veriﬁcation, which will build conﬁdence among participating states as 
well as in the international community (Hippel et al., 2011). These 
indeed would significantly reduce nuclear proliferation risk because 
shared spent-fuel and reprocessing facilities can help limit proliferation 
risks by reducing the number of new nuclear facilities such as 
enrichment, reprocessing or spent-fuel facilities and to avoid 
unnecessary production of separated plutonium (Goldschmidt, 2010). 
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However, implementing an MNA regime for nuclear fuel cycle will likely 
involve overcoming some important obstacles. For example, on the 
ethical issues in the region. The public is very concerned if there is 
nuclear waste in their ‘backyard’ (“not-in-my-backyard” sentiment – 
NIMBY). Thus, in some countries, public consent is needed from the 
host country regarding storage and disposal of radioactive waste 
(Lidskog & Elander 1992; see also Jenkins-Smith, 2009; Mannarini & 
Roccato 2011). This argument raises ethical and fairness issues that 
would oppose the concept of a multinational reciprocity. Therefore, to 
achieve public and political support, any arrangement for a multinational 
repository should be based on a fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
between the host and other participating states (Hippel et al., 2011). 
 
The MNA will involve national policies in the management of spent fuel 
and high-level waste (HLW). This issue is bound to create complications 
because it involves many states with different policies. Participating 
states also have to abide by the nuclear law of the host country. 
Expectations from a multinational repository could also undermine 
national programmes for spent fuel and radioactive waste management. 
Adjacent to this, the multinational repository will involve extensive 
transportation of spent fuel and radioactive waste from participating 
states to a host country. This causes increased concern over nuclear 
accidents during transportation, which may lead to radioactive leaks into 
the environment. Frequent transportation may also increase proliferation 
risks due to diversion of materials during transport (Hippel et al., 2011). 
  
There are two suggestions for fuel assurances have been developed 
through multilateral cooperation that were reviewed by the IAEA and 
agreed by most of its Member States. These suggestions are: the IAEA 
LEU fuel bank which located at located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant 
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(UMP) in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in the East Kazakhstan region, and the 
project of a fuel reserve at Angarsk, in Russia. However, these two 
proposals do not provide a solution for the management of SNF but 
rather act as alternatives for fuel assurances. 
3.7  Modern Efforts towards a Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle 
Since more states began to show their interest in developing nuclear 
power programmes, several proposals have been put forward to reduce 
the risk of uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that can be 
misused for developing nuclear weapons. The proposals vary from 
guaranteed access to foreign nuclear fuel cycle facilities to the creation 
of nuclear fuel stockpiles, or a nuclear fuel bank, under the control of an 
international committee. El-Baradei in his address to the Carnegie 
Conference in 2005 said, 
 
By providing reliable access to reactors and fuel at competitive 
market prices, we remove the incentive or justification for 
countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In doing 
so, we could go a long way towards addressing current concerns 
about the dissemination of sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The 
key feature of such an arrangement is not simply availability, but 
reliability. For this assurance of supply mechanism to be credible, 
it must be based on apolitical, objective non-proliferation criteria. 
Under the IAEA Statute, the Agency is authorized to serve as the 
guarantor of two fuel cycle related services; the supply of fissile 
material for fuel, and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The IAEA 
could therefore act as the facilitator and guarantor of a virtual or 
actual fuel bank, as a supplier of last resort (El-Baradei, 2005).  
 
The MNA has been suggested mainly to ensure that the benefits of 
peaceful applications of nuclear technology are available to all states on 
an equitable and non-discriminatory basis, and at the same time 
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reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation (Yudin; 2010, 2011). In 2004, 
the Director General of the IAEA appointed an Expert Group to consider 
possible multilateral approaches to the front and back ends of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. The Group was mandated to identify issues and 
possible options in this regard. The IAEA Experts Group highlighted five 
options for multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (Pellaud et 
al, 2005): 
 
i. Reinforcing existing commercial market mechanisms on a case by 
case basis through long term contracts and transparent suppliers’ 
arrangements with government backing. Examples would be: fuel 
leasing and fuel take-back, commercial offers to store and dispose 
of spent fuel, and commercial fuel banks.  
 
ii. Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with 
IAEA participation. Different models should be investigated, 
notably with the IAEA as guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as 
administrator of a fuel bank. 
 
iii. Promoting the voluntary conversion of existing facilities to the 
MNA regime, and pursuing them as confidence-building 
measures, with the participation of NPT-signatory NNWS and 
NWS, and non-NPT States.  
 
iv. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, 
multinational, and in particular regional, MNA regimes for new 
facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-
management for front end and back end nuclear facilities, such as: 
uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; and disposal and storage 
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of SNF (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power 
parks would also serve this objective. 
 
v. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the 
world might call for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle with 
stronger multilateral arrangements, whether by region or by 
continent, with a broader cooperation, involving the IAEA and the 
international community. 
 
In relation to this proposal, experts suggested three types of MNA 
including assurances of services not involving ownership of facilities, 
conversion of existing national facilities into multinational facilities and 
construction of new joint facilities (Yudin: 2010, 2011; Goldschmidt, 
2010). 
 
So far, most of proposal for the MNA focuses on providing assurances 
of services that do not involve ownership of facilities. Assurances could 
be categorized in two groups. First group is Assurance of Supply which 
emphasis on the supply of nuclear fuel. In June 2006, six countries from 
the supplier group; namely France, Germany, Russia, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the U.S. proposed a Six-Country Concept. 
This model can be conceptualized as two-tiered model which are a 
commercial market and the IAEA as the guarantor for the fuel supply 
assurance mechanism. A commercial market model was not designed 
to disrupt the existing market but as a backup mechanism. Meanwhile, if 
commercial supply arrangements were interrupted for reasons other 
than issues linked to non-proliferation obligations and could not be 
restored through normal commercial processes, the recipient country 
could use the second model, by approach IAEA to seek assistance 
through the mechanism (Timbie, 2006). This model was intended to 
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provide an alternative assurance of nuclear supply as part of the 
incentive for consumer countries, so that they would voluntarily choose 
not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing. The Six-Country Concept 
suggested an alternative to recipient countries in case of the event that 
they most fear – supply interruption, by naming the IAEA as the 
guarantor. Then the IAEA would determine whether the recipient country 
could use the backup mechanism, provided that they meet the 
necessary criteria (IAEA, 2006). Criteria for this backup mechanism are 
included introducing a comprehensive safeguards agreement and 
additional protocol and having no exceptional safeguards 
implementation issues outstanding with the Agency. This backup 
mechanism also adhering to international nuclear safety standards and 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities and choosing to obtain supplies on the international 
market and not to pursue sensitive fuel cycle activities. However, this 
proposal was based upon a dichotomy: between supplier countries with 
closed fuel cycles exporting enriched uranium and recipient states 
(AEC, 2006). Therefore, this proposal might not be suitable to cater for 
countries with NPP that produced enriched uranium for domestic use 
(AEC, 2006).  
 
Realising this, Japan proposed a system to prevent any isolation of a 
member state from the international nuclear fuel supply market. The 
system was known as the IAEA Standby Arrangement System. The 
IAEA Standby Arrangement System (SAS) for Nuclear Fuel Supply was 
proposed in September 2006. Japan claimed that this proposal was a 
missing piece in the Six-Country Concept with several additional 
working principles (AEC, 2006). This proposal was suggested through 
three roles of involving parties, the roles of Member States, the roles of 
Participating States and the roles of the IAEA. The roles of Member 
115 
 
States to voluntarily notify the IAEA as the depository organisation, of 
their intentions to participate in the system by registering their nuclear 
fuel supply capacity in terms of current stock and supply capacity, which 
includes uranium ore supply capacity, uranium reserve supply capacity, 
including recovered uranium, uranium conversion capacity, uranium 
enrichment capacity, and fuel fabrication capacity (AEC, 2006).  
  
Meanwhile, the Roles of Participating States to report the level of 
availability of such capacity annually, which was classified by three 
levels. Level 1 involves state that already started commercial activities 
and was providing products and services domestically, but not providing 
products or services to foreign countries on a commercial basis. 
Therefore, it had the willingness to cooperate with the emergency 
request to supply although the quantity might be limited, and 
considerable time might be required to start the supply. Level 2 
implicates state that already started exporting products and services to 
foreign countries on a commercial basis. Therefore, in the case of 
receiving the emergency request to supply, it had the willingness to do 
so as soon as possible within the range of available capacities. 
Meanwhile level 3 include state that had reserves that could be exported 
at short notice. Then the third is the role of the IAEA which was to 
conclude bilateral “standby arrangements” with respective participating 
States by receiving Letters of Intent and to administer the overall 
system. The IAEA was also to manage and analyse the database of 
relevant information that had been provided by participating countries 
and other information gathered by the Agency. The database was 
intended to prevent the occurrence of market failure through analysis of 
the database on the situation on the world nuclear fuel supply market. 
This was also part of efforts to contribute to the improvement of the 
transparency of the nuclear energy market. The foremost role of the 
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IAEA proposed in the Japan’s proposal was to fulfil an intermediary 
function when disruption of fuel supply occurred in a participating 
country. However, like the Six-Country Concept, no further action has 
been taken on the proposal (AEC, 2006).   
 
However, these two initiatives, the Six-Country Concept and The IAEA 
Standby Arrangement System (SAS) for Nuclear Fuel Supply, paved 
way for the Group 2 proposals, which are fuel bank proposals. In 
essence, this group of proposals focused on creating a joint contribution 
of uranium and fissionable materials stockpiles. Several proposals were 
put forward such as the U.S. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP), IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank Proposal and Russian LEU Reserve 
Proposal (IUEC). 
 
The GNEP was initiated by the U.S. on February 6, 2006, and this plan 
was part of the U.S. Advanced Energy Initiative. It was a mechanism 
planned to form an international partnership to expand the use of 
nuclear power to help meet growing energy demand in a sustainable, 
safe and secure manner (Lindemyer, 2009; see also Finck, 2008). 
Sixteen countries joined the U.S. in signing the Statement of Principles 
for GNEP in September 2007, and Italy, Canada, and the Republic of 
Korea have joined the partnership since then. Since February 1, 2008 
the total number countries that joined GNEP was 20, but there were 
none from Southeast Asia. This plan was suggested to be accomplished 
through two approaches, namely technology and establishment of an 
International Market and Supply Framework. The GNEP encouraged 
research and development for more robust nuclear technology such as 
deployment of advanced fast reactors that consumed transuranic 
elements from recycled spent fuel, more proliferation-resistant nuclear 
power reactors and the development of advanced technologies for 
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recycling spent nuclear fuel for deployment in facilities that did not 
separate pure plutonium. GNEP also aimed at establishing international 
supply frameworks to enhance reliable, cost-effective fuel services and 
supplies to the world market. The suggested framework was designed to 
provide options for generating nuclear energy and fostering 
development while reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. This would 
create a plausible alternative to acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle 
technologies (Lindemyer, 2009).   
 
However, the future of GNEP was uncertain following a change in the 
US government policy on commercial reprocessing and the budget 
having been cut to zero (World Nuclear News, 2009). Later, in 2007, a 
panel of the US National Academy of Sciences decided that the 
commercial-scale reprocessing facilities envisaged under GNEP were 
not economically justifiable (World Nuclear News, 2009). Despite the 
change in policy and budget, the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) still 
continued with their R&D in proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste 
management strategies.  
 
The next approach is the establishment of IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank 
Proposal which started in 2006. This proposal was initiated and 
financially supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) with a USD50 
million contribution in 2006. The milestone fund for the initiative to 
become reality was USD150 million. The latest contribution by Kuwait 
had supported the initiative to reach its funding goal and added to 
contributions made by Norway (USD5 million), the U.S. (USD50 million), 
the UAE (USD10 million) and the EU (€25 million) (IAEA, 2009b). El-
Baradei had outlined that a nuclear fuel bank under the IAEA auspices, 
should be based on three principles (IAEA, 2009b) that guided by the 
principles of multilateralism. He stated that any such mechanism should 
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be non-political, non-discriminatory and available to all states in 
compliance with their safeguards obligations. This proposal also will not 
require any of it Member State to give up its rights under the NPT 
regarding any part of the nuclear fuel cycle. During the implementation 
of this initiative, any release of material should be determined by non-
political criteria established in advance and applied objectively and 
consistently. In order to make this initiative into reality, the government 
of Kazakhstan has approved a draft agreement with the IAEA to 
establish a physical reserve of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU Bank), or 
'fuel bank', in Oskemen. The agreement was later signed on 27 August 
2015, between the IAEA and the Republic of Kazakhstan (NTI, 2015). 
This ‘fuel bank’ in Kazakhstan, would reinforce the Iran deal and reduce 
the risk of nuclear proliferation. In addition, observers believed that this 
Kazakhstan-based nuclear fuel bank would provide supply guarantees 
to particularly vulnerable civil nuclear power states (Riley, 2015).  
 
Another initiative that is positively be implemented is the Russian LEU 
Reserve Proposal (IUEC). Russian President Vladimir Putin announced 
Russia’s intent to establish a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centre as 
part of the Nuclear Fuel Bank during the EurAsia Economic Community 
Summit in St. Petersburg on January 25, 2006 (Yudin, 2011). Later, in 
September 2007, the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) 
located at the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine was established. 
The center was a joint venture between two major nuclear fuel cycle 
service providers, Russia's TekhSnabEksport and Kazakhstan's 
Kazatomprom (Loukianova, 2008). With the establishment of this center, 
Russia became the first country to bring the MNA into reality; regarding 
the creation of a system of international centers providing nuclear fuel 
cycle services, including enrichment, on a non-discriminatory basis and 
under the control of the IAEA (IUEC, 2014). The IUEC’s key objective 
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was the provision of guaranteed uranium enrichment services to its 
shareholders through guaranteed access to enrichment and conversion 
capacities of all Russian enterprises and currently has been joined by 
the Republic of Armenia and Ukraine (IUEC, 2014).   
 
Russia already make considerable profit from the IUEC and there 
seems that the Russians are advancing others supplier states marketing 
enrichment services internationally and would pose tough competition in 
the international market. Russia’s nuclear industry had an additional 
advantage because they are enjoying government involvement and 
backing (Hund et al., 2007). 
3.8  Impact of the MNA Regime on Countries with Nuclear Power 
Programmes That Do Not Have Reprocessing or Enrichment 
Technology 
Although the MNA regime is not expected to be implemented in the 
immediate future, its potential impact, effectiveness and reliability have 
already been studied in countries that have nuclear power programmes. 
This is because not all countries with NPP have enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities. Most of them only have nuclear fuel fabrication 
facilities to fabricate raw uranium whether from their own uranium 
mining operations or imports from foreign countries. 
 
Firstly, the level of foreign dependency on energy security will be higher. 
Recipient countries will be relying fully on the supply cartel consisting of 
a few suppliers for uranium and uranium enrichment services. In the 
early implementation of the MNA regime, it is possible that the supply of 
uranium or reprocessing and enrichment services is given at cost 
equivalent to or lower than the market price in order to attract voluntary 
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participation from as many nations as possible. However, when the 
MNA regime is stable and the market for uranium and enrichment 
services are formed, it cannot be assumed that such a price policy will 
be maintained in the long run (Moon, 2012).  
 
Secondly, without reprocessing and enrichment services, the export 
competitiveness of NPP countries can be affected. Currently, upon 
exporting a nuclear power plant, its nuclear fuel supply is guaranteed by 
the exporting country. However, if the MNA is still not implemented, NPP 
countries that do not have reprocessing and enrichment services will be 
less favourably treated as compared to other export countries such as 
the US, Russia, and France that can provide nuclear fuel services 
independently. This is because the importing countries would likely 
prefer a country that can provide a nuclear plant together with 
reprocessing and enrichment services as part of its nuclear fuel security. 
This fact would challenge the future export competitiveness and profit 
structure of their nuclear power program (Moon, 2012). 
 
Reprocessing and enrichment technologies are not only for nuclear fuel 
security but also for better environment. These two technologies help 
decrease nuclear waste by reducing the percentage of remaining waste 
materials (such as fission products and transuranic elements) and are 
treated as high-level nuclear waste (Goldberg, 2012; see also Choppin, 
2006; Rosner & Goldberg, 2013). However, since there are institutional 
and technical problems to be solved regarding the process and disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel, the existing MNA proposals do not propose the 
back-end fuel cycle services. Thus this might impact the national policy 
to expand nuclear energy (Moon, 2012).  
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Increasing the number of nuclear power plants means increasing spent 
nuclear fuel. If a country joins the MNA, this means that the country 
agrees to temporarily forgo its right to develop reprocessing and 
enrichment facilities. However, until now, the MNA regime is not 
complete in providing the total services for the back-end nuclear fuel 
cycle. Therefore, this will become a big issue since the state cannot 
manage spent nuclear fuel according to its own will. This might influence 
the national policy of expanding nuclear energy for ensuring national 
energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Moon, 2012). 
3.9 The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): A Case 
Study of a Successful Multilateral Nuclear Institution 
The aim of this case study is to review and analyse the establishment of 
one of the multilateral organisations that is cited as a successful 
multilateral institution in nuclear cooperation (ENS, 2007). The 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was created to ensure 
that the nuclear market in Europe keeps growing and that it could 
guarantee the security of energy supply in Europe. This Chapter 
discusses the success story of Euratom through the Euratom strategic 
processes before and after it was established. This study gives an idea 
about how multilateralism is being implemented in an organisation that 
handles highly sensitive nuclear technology, could attract many member 
states and provide them with important benefits. The case study will also 
assess whether the concept of Euratom might be a possible model for 
the implementation of MNA for ASEAN through the creation of a 
regional multilateral institution that is meant to manage nuclear business 
in ASEAN, similarly to what Euratom does for the EU.  
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In 1955, at the Messina Conference, Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, 
France, Germany, and Belgium created an Intergovernmental 
Committee known as the Spaak Committee. This working group was 
tasked to sketch the future of European Economic Community (EEC) 
and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). In 1956, the 
committee produced the Spaak Report. The document emphasized that 
the Western Europe faced the growing power of the U.S., its foreign-
policy positions weaken, its influence deteriorate, and production 
capacity diminish in its component countries. The report also argued 
that even the six-member countries of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) were not capable of the massive research and 
development effort and investments required to initiate the technological 
revolution to benefit, among other things, from peaceful use of atomic 
energy. These developments were hindered by the narrow and separate 
European markets. Therefore, the Report urged to bring the nuclear 
industry under one supervisory authority and to create a general 
common market. The Spaak Report also emphasised the urgent need 
for the Six Countries to pool their research and investment efforts 
(CVCE, 2012).  
 
Following this, the committee drafted the Community Treaties, which 
proposed the creation of Euratom. The idea was to focus on common 
control and development rather than focusing on military affairs. During 
that time, the peaceful use of nuclear energy seemed a more promising 
way to create close partnership among these six nations (Hahn, 1958). 
The treaty that established Euratom entered into force on 1 January 
1958 and since then has remained unchanged. It was used as the basis 
for legislation on nuclear safety and security. This treaty covered all civil 
nuclear activities in the European Union and allowed the establishment 
of networks with other countries to promote progress in the peaceful use 
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of nuclear energy (Europa, 2007). The treaty was designed to provide a 
common market in nuclear materials, to guarantee a supply of nuclear 
fuels, and to ensure that nuclear materials were not diverted from their 
intended purpose (Europa, 2007; NTI, 2011). The activity of Euratom 
had five main aims namely the development of research and exchanges 
of information, establishment of control and safety standards, 
development of investments and joint facilities, supply of ores and 
nuclear fuels; and establishment of a common market for the nuclear 
industry (Europa, 2007; see also CVCE, 2016). The establishment of 
Euratom, assisted by an Economic and Scientific Committee and in 
liaison with the existing research institutions, would create a research 
centre and colleges to train specialists. Public or private research 
institutes or the industry itself in each country will continue to conduct 
the main research in the field. In order to facilitate the coordinated 
development of research, the European Commission would have to 
establish indicative production targets for nuclear energy, which would 
define the scale of the effort to be made within the context of actual 
requirements. The arrangement reconciled the rights of inventors or 
proprietors of discoveries with the interests of the Community through 
voluntary cooperation, for example by promoting agreements on the use 
of patents. The second activity is established control and safety 
standards for absolute protection of the workforce and the general public 
from the risks posed by radioactivity (Europa, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, the role of Euratom with regard to investment would be 
analogous with the role it was to play in the realm of research, making it 
possible to create installations that would be beyond the means of 
companies or any of the individual states. In regard to the supply of ores 
and nuclear fuels: Euratom would be given first option on the purchase 
of uncommitted resources from the member countries or their overseas 
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territories. This preferential purchasing right had implications. On the 
one hand, if purchase prices could not be set on a purely contractual 
basis, the European Atomic Energy Commission, assisted by a joint 
committee of producers and users, had to arbitrate on the prices, 
although its decision could be contested before the Court of Justice. On 
the other hand, the producers’ commercial negotiations had to be 
accompanied by political negotiations conducted by Euratom and 
focusing particularly on the security guarantees given by external 
purchasers. The arrangements under which ores and nuclear fuels were 
made available to user installations had to meet the requirements of 
equal access to resources and control of their use. To perform these 
supply-related functions, the Spaak Report recommended that the 
Commission set up a trade-management agency, which would enjoy 
financial autonomy but be under the direct authority of the Commission 
(CVCE, 2012). 
 
Most important activity of Euratom is the establishment of a common 
market for the nuclear industry: the Spaak Report expressed the view 
that the establishment of a common market for specialised materials, 
supplies and equipment, the application of special facilities for capital 
investments in the nuclear industry and the free movement of specialists 
must be supported, because all of these issues were directly linked to 
the development of nuclear energy in Europe. 
 
Creating and making Euratom work was not an easy task because it 
was a political project involving many countries (Kobia, 2009). 
Mathijsent defined Euratom as “a union of sovereign states, based upon 
an international treaty, with institutions of its own, acting independently 
from the Member States, endowed in the field of nuclear energy with 
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powers not only within the Community, but also competent to act as an 
international legal person” (Mathijsent, 1961).  
 
Before Euratom was created, the ECSC was established in July 1952, 
and acclaimed as the first great achievement of multilateralism in 
Europe whereby the six Community members surrendered part of their 
national sovereignty to the Community (Hahn, 1958). The ECSC was an 
integration of six nations including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxemburg and Netherlands that was created for the purposes of 
economic expansion, growth of employment and rising standard of living 
through equal access to the sources of production, the establishment of 
the lowest prices and improved working conditions, accompanied by 
growth in international trade and modernisation of production (Europa, 
2010). This system, known as the common market, was introduced by 
the treaty and implemented through the free movement of products 
without customs duties or taxes. The common market prohibited 
discriminatory measures or practices, subsidies, aid granted by States 
or special charges imposed by States and restrictive practices (Europa, 
2010). 
 
The main focus of the 1956 Spaak Report was to coordinate the nuclear 
industry under one authority and to create a general common market 
(CVCE, 2012). The report was then used as the foundation for the 
creation of Euratom, which consisted of three parts; (i) common market, 
(ii) Euratom and (iii) areas where urgent action was needed. The 
proposals in the Spaak Report constituted a specific action plan that 
could be used as a basis for the negotiation of future treaties (CVCE, 
2012). On 29 May 1956, the Spaak report was approved and during a 
meeting in Venice, all the foreign ministers decided to open 
intergovernmental negotiations with the conclusion to draft two treaties 
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instituting EEC and Euratom. Euratom was officially established under 
the European Commission after the Euratom Treaty was signed in 
Rome on 25 March 1957, alongside the EEC Treaty, and both treaties 
were known as the Treaties of Rome (Cohen, 1959). The signing of the 
treaties displayed the moving spirit of unification and following on the 
success of the ESC, demonstrated the feasibility of building the 
European project (Efron and Nanes, 1957). 
 
The establishment of Euratom has verified that political commitment is 
strongly needed to promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology by 
sharing resources and knowledge, with financial support.  This includes 
promoting research, establishing uniform safety standards for the health 
protection of workers and the public, ensuring that supply of nuclear fuel 
is not disturbed, assuring nuclear materials are not misused, and 
fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through cooperation and 
partnership, as stated under Article 2 of the treaty (Cohen, 1959).  
 
There are several benefits gained by European countries from the 
creation of Euratom. Euratom could secure Europe’s energy 
independence and lay the foundation of the EU (Kobia, 2009). Concerns 
about energy independence had been triggered by the 1956 Suez 
events and increased oil prices. When Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser took over the Suez Canal Company in 1956, he indirectly 
obstructed Europe’s access to the Middle East oil fields (two-thirds of 
Europe’s oil was imported via the Canal).  Euratom has benefitted its 
members by broaden trade through the elimination of all protective 
measures that limit trade among European countries. This borderless 
system has increased the nuclear market in Europe. The proposal of 
Euratom also was stimulated by the intention to reduce nuclear supply 
dependence on other major nuclear suppliers, such as Britain and the 
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U.S., and become part of the major distribution networks in the nuclear 
industry and the creation of Euratom seemed an advantageous platform 
for Europe to pool knowledge and financial resources. This will help 
Europe to create a bigger market. Euratom would be managed by public 
authorities, which also would be accompanied by a military phase of 
nuclear development. This would demonstrate transparency and would 
create a bigger market. 
 
Whereas absolute control by the public authorities accompanied the 
military phase of nuclear development, the time has now come when the 
rise of the industry will depend on the skill and the perseverance with 
which the public authorities and the common organisation are able to 
create the basic conditions permitting industry as a whole and free 
initiative to play their essential role (Euratom, 1956:2) This also would 
help Europe to create a new economy, broaden the market and 
opportunities for Europe that at the same time could help boost 
underdeveloped states in Europe. The immediate consequence of this 
conclusion is that the development of atomic energy must not be limited 
to a few establishments; on the contrary, an effort must be made to 
adopt the broadest and most flexible system in order to ensure the 
largest possible number of European industries benefits from these 
technical advances (Euratom, 1956:2). The establishment of Euratom 
also illustrates European support for the Atoms for Peace programme, 
which was initiated by the US in response to the military nuclear race 
(Kobia, 2009). Euratom would play a role as a vehicle for Europe to 
move forward in nuclear technology.  
 
Moreover, the atomic energy field is evolving extraordinarily rapidly, and 
whatever is to be undertaken might prove in vain if begun too late. Any 
delay would mean letting a new period of development pass by without 
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taking part, and the appearance of new techniques in the subsequent 
period would find the European countries without the experiences, the 
means and the technicians necessary for meeting the challenge. 
Hesitation would be all the more unjustifiable since in this field there are 
still few positions and vested interests or artificial barriers. The longer 
the wait the more difficult it will be to take action……“If Europe does not 
act urgently to overcome the serious delay that it has faced from the 
beginning, its share in this development may well be permanently 
jeopardized (Euratom, 1956:2). ASEAN, would face same faith if not 
taking any advantages from the nuclear technology, in particular nuclear 
energy technology. 
 
Initially, Euratom‘s function was to coordinate the Member States' 
research programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and create 
a specialised market for nuclear power in Europe; distributing it to its 
member states and exporting energy excess to non-member states (NTI 
Euratom, 2011). But today, the function of Euratom has been widened 
for the quick establishment and growth of nuclear industries by focusing 
on pooling knowledge, infrastructure, and funding of nuclear energy. 
This was to ensure that the safety and security of atomic energy supply 
falls within the framework of the centralised monitoring system to 
guarantee that nuclear materials are used for peaceful purposes only 
(NTI Euratom, 2011; Kuske, 2012). Thus, Euratom has gained trust 
among participating European countries as the organisation because its 
contributing to the development of Europe’s nuclear industry which all 
Member States can benefit from nuclear energy (European Institution, 
2007). The trust also gains when Euratom is enhancing security of 
nuclear materials resource and energy supply and ensuring equal 
access to sources of supply and fair trade through a common market 
through the Common Market, trade barriers between Members States 
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are eliminated (Mathijsent, 1961). Free trade has played an important 
role in international development because in most cases, free trade 
results in an efficient allocation of resources and, therefore, maximizes 
the value of those resources globally. The abolition of restrictions based 
on nationality and the free movement of capital mean that human 
resources, especially experts and professional workers, and assets are 
permitted to move freely within the boundaries of the community (Kent, 
2004; see also Drozdz & Miškinis, 2011). These help to bring down 
barriers, create more jobs and increase prosperity in the EU. In terms of 
international trade, this provision demonstrates perfectly mobile labour 
across borders or within sectors, which will reduce barriers or friction. 
This benefits Euratom because it can pool skilled labour, which is of 
paramount importance in the nuclear industry, especially in a nuclear 
power programme. Another value of this free mobility is the knowledge 
or technology spill-over that can reduce costs. 
 
 A common market also profits the Member States in terms of 
tariff union, for tariffs that are imposed on Member States are 
lower than for non-members.  A common market also gives 
advantages by harmonizing the legal frameworks and 
infrastructure, eliminating of non-trade barriers; and establishing 
a free market for capital, labour and services as stated under 
Chapter 9, Title II, of the treaty (Mallard, 2008; see also Gupta, 
2015; Drozdz & Miškinis, 2011). 
 guaranteeing high standards of safety for the public, workers and 
environment;  
 ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted from civil to 
military use. (European Institution, 2007; see also Mallard, 2008).  
 widening European nuclear market. When Euratom was created, 
its significant advantage was concentrating nuclear materials 
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purchasing and selling functions in the hands of the Europen 
Commission (EC). This promised the EC major prospective 
buyers from the global market (Hahn, 1958). This plan was 
aligned with the foremost objective of Euratom, which was to 
create and accelerate the development and expansion of the 
nuclear industry, as clearly specified in Article I of the Euratom 
treaty. 
 
Although none of the ASEAN Members States has a nuclear power 
program, a regional institute to handle nuclear matters would be 
beneficial to ASEAN (Mallard, 2008). Presently, ASEAN has established 
various fragmented platforms, such as the ASEAN Network of 
Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), the Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation Sub-sector Network (NEC-SSN), Asian Network for 
Education in Nuclear Technology (ANENT), and the Asian Nuclear 
Safety Network (ANSN). These platforms may be integrated under one 
institutional ‘umbrella’, like Euratom, to avoid overlaps and duplication in 
handling nuclear issues. Once ASEAN starts its nuclear power program, 
the institution would be ready to handle any related nuclear issues. 
ASEAN also should benefit from capabilities and capacities that Asia 
has, just like Europe, in terms of nuclear fuel cycle technology, for 
example in China, Japan, and South Korea. Therefore, it would be 
possible to create an institution in Asia similar to Euratom because 
some Asian states possess advanced nuclear technology, including 
China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Asia could take advantages on 
the geography and geo-politics of Asia, which is comprised of many 
states interested in nuclear power program development, could expand 
Asia’s nuclear market and in addition, Asia has states with largest 
uranium reserves, such as Kazakhstan. Theoretically, currency costs in 
Asia are not as high as in Europe and America; therefore, if nuclear 
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market is operating among Asian states, the operational cost are 
expected to be low and acceptable. Therefore, Asia’s nuclear activities 
will be more competitive. 
 
Ultimately, MNA could be created regionally, which would benefit 
newcomer states, such as Malaysia and other ASEAN Members. 
Through the regional cooperation, participating states could create an 
economic integration. The theory of economic integration is defined as 
the commercial policy of reducing or eliminating trade barriers (technical 
and non-technical barriers) between the joining states (Mwasha, 2015). 
3.10 Conclusion  
When cooperation on nuclear energy involves not only technological 
challenges but also issues of terrorism, proliferation concerns, 
environmental and safety risks of nuclear power, multilateral cooperation 
seems to be a promising way forward. The risks are primarily grouped 
around the dual-use nature of nuclear technology, which makes possible 
its misuse for the purposes of building nuclear weapons. Since 1940s, 
many countries, expressed grave concerns in nuclear weapon 
proliferation. Building a nuclear weapon represents for many states a 
guarantee their national security against external threats in an inherently 
anarchical international system (Futter, 2015). Other states, which felt 
no or less threat to their national security choose not to build nuclear 
weapons. This model certainly has some validity, and it is difficult to cite 
any case of nuclear acquisition, or even potential acquisition, that was 
not driven by some aspect of national security (Futter, 2015). Nuclear 
weapon development started during Second World War by the US with 
aim to end the war. Then the Soviet Union built the bomb because it felt 
threatened by the US’s nuclear weapon capability. Then this has 
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motivated the United Kingdom and France because they felt threatened 
by the Soviet Union. Same as China, also built the bomb because it felt 
threatened by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This chain not just 
stop here when Israel too developed nuclear weapon capability because 
of the threat from its Arab neighbours. India did likewise because it felt 
threatened by China. Then this has driven Pakistan to build the bomb 
because it felt threatened by India. Latest, North Korea followed suit for 
fear of attack by the U.S. These consequences have triggered Iran that 
might be building nuclear weapons because it also fears attack from the 
U.S. and possibly Israel (Futter, 2015).  
 
Andrew Futter also agreed with Scott D. Sagan (1996) who pointed that 
for a state, possession of nuclear weapons exceeds concerns of 
national security. Nuclear power is also of considerable importance as 
political object in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles; 
it can also serve as an international normative symbol of modernity and 
identity. Scott argued that limiting the cause of nuclear weapon 
proliferation only to national security considerations is inadequate 
because nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more provincial 
and less obvious objectives (Sagan, 1996). An example here would be 
Indonesia’s policy on nuclear weapons during Indonesia’s former 
President Sukarno in the mid-1960s, which is further discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The MNA regime also has the potential to reduce the costs of nuclear 
energy which might attract nuclear energy newcomers, especially 
among developing countries. Most of the suggested MNA are originally 
from nuclear supplier states. It started after the Acheson–Lilienthal 
Report and since then a number of proposals have been initiated.  
Nonetheless, these early proposals and initiatives generally failed 
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because of (i) Cold War tensions, (ii) states disagreed on the non-
proliferation commitments and conditions to participate in the multilateral 
activities, (iii) different views between countries with no plans to 
reprocess or recycle plutonium and countries that were interested in 
doing so, (iv) the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents, which 
reduced interest in nuclear activities, thereby limiting the spread of 
reprocessing facilities (Yudin, 2009). 
 
Studies only briefly addressed the challenge of dispute settlement 
system in the MNA. Dispute settlement would be one of the most 
important systems in this multilateral cooperation linked to the 
indivisibility principle of multilateralism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
indivisibility is a multilateral principle on how cooperation works as one 
whole system, so it means that one action by one party will affect others 
(Winter, 2000). Also, fewer studies or research discussed the MNA from 
the perspective of countries that do not yet have nuclear power program 
but have the intention to develop one in the future.  
 
Most of the commentaries are from the perspective of countries with 
NPP, and their consent on nuclear security is based on speculation. 
This has resulted in uneasiness among developing countries since they 
sense that any such approaches are only meant for control rather than 
assistance. The logic can be traced in the implementation of the NPT, 
where non-weapon States are urged to implement all measures in the 
NPT, but nuclear-weapon States still do not act on their responsibility to 
reduce the nuclear weapon stockpiles and facilities. Trust is again the 
major component limiting the transfer of technology in the nuclear power 
programme of NNWS. Even if the MNA comes into force, the difficulty 
with trust may remain if there is no effort shown by the NWS to reduce 
their nuclear weapon stockpiles and facilities. 
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Currently, the Nuclear Fuel Bank has been suggested as part of MNA 
implementation. The first Nuclear Fuel Bank operated by the Republic of 
Kazakhstan which has started its operation in 2017. This IAEA LEU 
Bank will act as a supplier to the IAEA Member States in case they 
cannot get fuel from the global commercial market. This is good news 
for newcomers and future nuclear energy users, like Malaysia. However, 
the mechanism of implementation should be clear and not discriminate 
between participating countries.  
 
Although the Nuclear Fuel Bank is under the IAEA, no decisions should 
be influenced by any individual country that may have disputes with the 
country requesting the fuel. The decision to supply the fuel back-up also 
must be quick and the request to the Fuel Bank should be from the 
suppliers because it is their responsibility to guarantee that fuel supply is 
non-disruptive. This is to ensure that no additional cost accrues to 
consumer states and there is no interference in the generation of 
electricity. A country like Malaysia could not bear any interruption of 
nuclear fuel supply because it does not have any uranium resource. So, 
if the supplier group decides that the newcomers of nuclear power 
programme cannot re-process its nuclear wastes to produce fuel, the 
supplier should guarantee a long-term supply of nuclear fuel or easy 
access to the fuel bank through MNA.  
 
In the nuclear business, an important challenge that has affected 
nuclear negotiations since World War II is the line between civilian use, 
military purposes, and terrorism. Many efforts and controls are created 
to ensure that nuclear technology is not abused. The major achievement 
in this regard is the establishment of IAEA in 29 July 1957. As of 
February 2016, the IAEA has 168 Member States (IAEA, 2016). 
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However, the complexity of nuclear issues has created several other 
mechanisms and institutions that are initiated regionally, such as 
Euratom. In comparison with Euratom, the proposal for the creation of 
MNA should centralise the mechanism and lead to egalitarianism in 
nuclear supply, economic and policy decision-making. Euratom, which 
has been established from the positive results of the ECSC and the 
failure of the EDC, demonstrates that economic factors are a more 
favourable factor for stimulating participation compared to the initiative 
that would confer national military powers to an interstate agency (Hahn, 
1958).  
 
The establishment of Euratom was motivated by the benefits members 
can gain from pooling nuclear economic, technical and commercial 
resources. Nonetheless, non-proliferation is still the main criterion in 
shaping significant nuclear arrangements. Indeed, it is a highpoint factor 
in pressuring states to accept some limitations on national decision 
making, authorizations and restrictions on the transfer of technology, 
which is principally for commercial reasons. Therefore, non-proliferation 
and economic factors should concur with each other and be mutually 
reinforcing. A state can accept restraints in order to achieve a technical 
or resource benefit and at the same time work to the advantage of non-
proliferation (Scheinman, 1981).  
 
The dual-use nature of nuclear material has raised concern in the 
international community and made nuclear trade transactions comply 
with a high level of security and control measures. Multilateral 
cooperation appears as an encouraging alternative that can solve the 
world’s non-proliferation problems especially when nuclear disputes are 
blended with other transnational issues such as terrorism, environmental 
and safety risks of nuclear power. Therefore, nuclear matters are 
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political matters. The question is how to balance between nuclear 
economy the 3Ss (safety, security and safeguards) and nuclear politics. 
 
After World War II (WWII), having nuclear technology was exclusive to a 
small group of nations: Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the U.S. 
However, realising the mass destruction it could cause, many initiatives 
have been proposed. The Baruch Plan was the first formula that 
proposed nuclear activities be conducted under international ownership 
and control rather than at the national level, as this might leave 
potentially dangerous nuclear activities unmonitored or misused 
(Baratta, 1985; see also Weiss, 2003; Mallard, 2010). However, during 
that era, the proposed institutional arrangements only highlighted 
political commitments and safeguards verification, rather than 
organisational strategies designed to curtail the spread of national fuel 
cycle facilities. These efforts were accompanied by the determination to 
strengthen the non-proliferation regime, which centred on the problem 
posed for non-proliferation policy after India’s 1974 nuclear test, which 
challenged the effectiveness of the NPT. Scheinman suggested that the 
problem could be approached in three ways which are technically, 
institutionally and a combination of mutually reinforcing technical and 
institutional measures. Example in technically approach is research on 
the modification of nuclear materials or facilities to neutralize their 
proliferation threat; or identifying alternative fuel cycles which might 
avoid or limit access to sensitive materials. Proliferation issues also 
could be approached through institutionally by establishing rules and 
arrangements to reduce the risks associated with deployment of 
sensitive technologies, including where to locate and operate the 
sensitive facilities; and impose conditions on the use of the material they 
produce (Scheinman, 1981). 
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In fact, Euratom had implemented these approaches before India‘s 
nuclear test through their activities, which include (1) promoting 
research; (2) ensuring that nuclear materials are not diverted to 
purposes other than those for which they are intended; and (3) 
establishing relations with other countries and international 
organisations to foster progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
These activities have assisted Europe in ensuring that nuclear power 
serves only peaceful purposes and helped boost nuclear development in 
Europe. 
    
Euratom was presented as a peaceful and supra national venture that 
easily turned Euratom into an instrument of “Cold War politics” when 
associating closely to the US and European nuclear civilian industries 
(Mallard; 2014). However, during its early negotiation, creating Euratom 
was not considered an easy task because it involved multinational 
foreign policy dealing with the most sensitive high-tech materials. 
Euratom slowly disintegrated because it picked up the wrong economic 
field at a time when energy sources cheaper than nuclear better covered 
European energy needs (Mallard, 2008:460). Though, along with the 
time, nuclear matters become more complex and not only is about 
economic, but also nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and 
terrorism, Euratom become an important regional institution. Euratom 
has succeeded to attracted states to join without upsetting national 
interests and with their sovereignty still intact, and yet they could still 
implement their national policy. Today, Euratom is a mature 
multinational institution that successfully implements multilateral 
principles. 
 
Ruggie has listed three principles in multilateral cooperation: non-
discrimination, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. How does Euratom fit 
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into these principles? Euratom has demonstrated that through the 
multilateral institution, all aspects of nuclear management and 
controlling could be engaged in the non-discrimination manners. This for 
example through the implementation of common market provision that 
offers fair trade among the Member States. A common nuclear market in 
the EU was created by the Euratom Treaty. An Agency, ESA, is 
established as set in Article 2(d) and 52 of the Treaty and responsible to 
ensure that the supply of nuclear fuels to the EU users is sustainable 
and equitable. This policy is based on the principle of equal access to 
sources of supply, which is aligned with the principle of multilateralism. 
All members are treated fairly and unbiasedly, whether they are 
advanced in nuclear technology or not, because the objective of 
Euratom is to boost the nuclear industry among member states. In 
second principle of multilateralism, indivisibility is implemented when 
Euratom strengthens nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the region 
because nuclear transactions are managed by all Member States 
through a common legal framework. This is for the reason that 
“institutions could address different level of the problem-control over 
misappropriation of nuclear material and technology, rather than the 
detection of such misappropriation, which is the central thrust of 
international safeguards today” (Scheinman, 1981:80). This is another 
advantage of Euratom, where member states cannot breach 
agreements or rules without facing consequences. Another provision of 
the treaty designed to ensure that all member states abide by the rules, 
is Article 103 of the Title II: Provisions for the encouragement of 
progress in the field of nuclear energy. This provides that Member 
States shall communicate to the Commission draft agreements or 
contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a national of 
a third State to the extent that such agreements or contracts concern 
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matters within the purview of this Treaty (Euratom Treaty, 2010:42; see 
also NTI Euratom). 
 
The third principle of multilateralism, diffuse reciprocity, could be applied 
through the provision of a common market that offers free movement of 
expertise and professional workers, definitely benefitted Member States 
as they can gain advantages from the expertise and knowledge, as well 
sharing their experiences and lessons learned in solving relevant 
nuclear problems. Member states also benefitted from the ESA which is 
responsible for managing nuclear transactions, the nuclear materials 
market and prices, concluding supply contracts for nuclear material, and 
monitoring transactions involving services in the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Therefore, the system designed by Euratom benefits its member states 
by handling economic issues, the 3Ss (safety, security and safeguard) 
and nuclear non-proliferation under one common nuclear policy, legal 
framework and management. 
 
Euratom has succeeded in validating its role in the European nuclear 
economy by recommending the EU to operate nuclear power plants that 
maintain nuclear material stocks and protect their needs by entering into 
long-term contracts with diversification of their sources of supply. 
Although only EU members participate in Euratom, it is also open to 
nuclear cooperation with states from other regions, which has widened 
Europe’s nuclear market. So Euratom might be an example for other 
regions such as Asia, which requires steady and sustainable supply of 
energy. 
 
The MNA might have a potential if it is created among Asian states, 
because several countries from Asia such as China, India and Japan 
have the full fuel cycle set-up, including enrichment and reprocessing 
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facilities. Implementation of the MNA through a regional initiative may 
attract participation from Asia-Pacific countries because of Asian 
cultures and practices as reflected in Chapter 2, though such an 
initiative would cause uneasiness among Western states, especially the 
US. Such arrangement would change the economic paradigm in Asia, 
particularly as it might offer a monopoly to China and India.  
 
Malaysia as well as other ASEAN countries that are interested in 
nuclear power programme, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, need 
assurance for their future nuclear power programmes. As newcomers to 
nuclear power programmes, Malaysia and ASEAN would need to team 
up with other supplier states or international institutions to ensure that 
their nuclear programmes run smoothly. Euratom, which has functioned 
for more than 50 years, is a mature and stable multilateral organisation 
for handling nuclear economic transactions – and it would be a good 
example of how to implement multilateral nuclear cooperation.  The 
MNA also should be more focused on reproducing the economic 
incentives delivered by Euratom, which has been established to promote 
nuclear energy development. The most important requirement of the 
Euratom Convention is to guarantee nuclear materials supply by the 
member states and the safeguard system is to ensure that the nuclear 
materials within Euratom are to be used only for peaceful purposes 
(Kuno, 2013). The Euratom experiences provide lesson-learnt that could 
be applied to Asia and could be an advantage for ASEAN. As proven in 
Europe although there was a high level of tension and distrust after 
World War II, a regional nuclear cooperation could still be established 
and has contributed to confidence and trust-building in the Europe (Lee 
& Ginting, 2016). If similar institution is about to be established in Asia, a 
discussion need to be initiated with the aim to debate and examine 
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common goal for regional security in Asia based on mutual trust, 
benefits and responsibility.  
 
This will convey to the next chapter that discussed on mutual trust 
between Nuclear Supplier Group and recipient states. The study is 
focussing Iran and United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
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Part 2: Four Potential Pathways 
Chapter 4 
The Nuclear Supplier Group and Recipient States: 
A Focus on Iran and the United Arab Emirates 
4.1  Introduction 
Trust can only be established and increased when promises are kept 
(Ruzicka & Wheeler, 2010). As discussed in Chapter 2, trust is a very 
important two-way relationship in nuclear cooperation, and exceedingly 
so in multilateral cooperation because it involves multiple nations with 
various policies and national interests. In nuclear matters, multilateral 
disarmament is essential because it tackles the central concerns that 
everyone shares: global nuclear dangers and arms racing arising out of 
security dilemmas (Williams, Ingram & Pedersen, 2017).  
 
This study is pertinent to Malaysia’s nuclear fuel cycle policy, based on 
the sentiment by Malaysia towards the West. Malaysia prefers to ‘wait 
and see’ and is reserved when there are nuclear cooperation proposals 
from western states, especially from the U.S. Malaysia’s starting point is 
that some proposals need to be thoroughly studied to ensure that they 
do not infringe Malaysia’s sovereignty, or be used to control Malaysia’s 
activities. National sovereignty has always been a central agenda in any 
cooperation negotiation. National sovereignty has emerged as a concept 
of Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty which was originally formulated by 
William Walker (2010), and later developed in collaboration with 
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Nicholas Wheeler (2013) (Williams et al., 2017). Responsibilities 
required a level of state transparency and structures of accountability 
(Williams et al., 2017). Numerous types of responsibilities, which are 
often interrelated have been identified and these occurred because 
states are not homogenous entities, but they comprise various actors, 
institutions and emergent forces that exist in a state of tension. One of 
the responsibilities is trustworthiness as responsibility (Williams et al., 
2017). In statecraft, a degree of deception and manipulation is generally 
understood to be fair game. However, too much manipulative behaviour 
undermines states’ trust and ability to cooperate. What is understood to 
be an appropriate and responsible level of deception varies from state to 
state, much as families might permit vastly different levels of dirty play 
around the Monopoly board. This view of responsibility incorporates a 
state’s accountability to the commitments it makes, such as to legal 
treaties, holding it to account to explain why it does not or cannot meet 
obligations and to find some way of compensating. An example might be 
states’ nuclear modernisation plans, which have frustrated the 
international community, appearing at odds with the spirit of the NPT 
(Williams et al., 2017:7). 
 
Two countries have been selected for this study, namely Iran and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The selection of these two states were 
based on their geopolitics. Both being situated in a region noted for a 
long period of conflicts and neighbouring countries that are currently 
involved in security issues such as terrorism, extremism and internal 
conflicts, namely Iraq, Libya, and Syria. In addition, it is claimed by 
western countries that the Middle East is actively linked to terrorism and 
extremism activities. The political analyst, Barzegar argued that the 
Middle East is facing terrorism that act beyond national and regional 
boundaries which gives global impact and constitutes a direct threat to 
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global peace and security (Barzegar, 2005). This contrasts to the past 
terrorism, which was linked to terrorist activities that only had internal or 
regional dimensions, functioning in specific spatial and time domains, 
and had less negative impact on the international community (Barzegar, 
2005). Despite these circumstances, the UAE has been trusted by the 
international community to pursue NPP and has been recognized as the 
golden model for newcomers in the nuclear power programme by the 
U.S. and reflected the UAE as a good example for newcomers in 
nuclear power programme cooperation. Meanwhile, Iran was given 
conditions before they could start their nuclear power program. Factors 
that bring the conclusion to the Iran’s nuclear deals might provide a 
precedent or lessons for Malaysia in order to maintain and increase its 
trustworthiness in nuclear cooperation.   
 
Another factor that was considered during the selection is that both 
countries are Islamic countries, which is similar to Malaysia where the 
majority of its people are Muslims. However, both received different 
feedback from the international nuclear community when they 
announced their intention for nuclear power programmes. The aspects 
that caused these differences and lessons learnt from history, and 
current nuclear policy of both countries, are potentially beneficial in 
marking the Malaysian nuclear power programme as genuinely 
peaceful. 
 
4.1.1 Research Design and Hypothesis 
 
In this Chapter, two clusters of case studies have been carried out. The 
first cluster focused on the establishment of the Nuclear Supplier Group 
(NSG) to understand their objectives and principles, with the intention of 
identifying their main concerns in balancing nuclear business and 
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nuclear proliferation. Factors obtained from the study could be used to 
promote trust between Malaysia and nuclear suppliers. Even if the 
nuclear power programme is a profitable industry, security and nuclear 
proliferation are still the top priority of the group. Among the main 
players in the NSG is the U.S. because most of the technology in 
nuclear power programme originates from the U.S. Thus, in the case of 
any agreement, which involves technology originating from the U.S., 
even if the supplier is from another country, the newcomer must 
conclude an agreement with the U.S., known as a 123 agreement. This 
leads to the second cluster of the study. Research on the relationship 
between these two countries with the U.S. is important for Malaysia to 
establish trust with the US. The UAE is known as pro-U.S., whereas Iran 
is branded as a problematic country by the U.S. Therefore, it is essential 
to observe and study national policies on the nuclear power programme 
and foreign policies of selected countries, which will be the third cluster 
of this study.  
 
The study also includes observation on the history of both countries’ 
nuclear activities and policies. It is expected that these studies would 
provide some knowledge about the state leader’s notion with regards to 
their state’s identity that drives their choices for nuclear technology - 
whether for energy or weapons. According to Hymans, if a political 
leader embraces a conception of their nation’s identity that leads them 
to desire nuclear bombs, such leaders can be expected to turn that 
desire into state-policy (Hymans, 2006). The following main questions 
are addressed: 
i. What is the main factor/s for successful nuclear energy 
cooperation for a country like the UAE, in a region that is well 
known as a hub of tension and insecurity over the past 50 years?  
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ii. Why is Iran struggling to get reliance from nuclear supplier 
groups, in particular the U.S., even though Iran has followed rules 
like other IAEA member states and is a member of the NPT?    
iii. Do Arabs trust the supplier group to join MNAs to ensure long 
term sustainability for their future nuclear energy and fuel 
resource?  
  
To answer these questions, four hypotheses were considered: 
i. Nuclear Supplier states have a preference for newcomer states 
that involve international companies from supplier countries in 
particular; during the nuclear power planning, management and 
operation of their new nuclear power programme, as it would 
facilitate transparency.  
ii. A country that has clearly surrendered their interest to construct 
reprocessing and enrichment facilities is easily accepted and 
would facilitate their nuclear energy negotiations.  
iii. Oil and gas is a long-time industry in the Middle East especially in 
relationships with the western countries. These long-standing 
business relationships were based on trust. Hence, when Arab 
countries such as the UAE become interested in nuclear energy, 
western countries trust that the interest in nuclear programme is 
genuinely for civilian uses. Vice versa, the Arabs also trust their 
business partners and any proposal from western countries is 
accepted and agreed with the conditions, as long as their interest, 
in this case the security of nuclear fuel supply, can be fulfilled by 
the supplier.  
iv. As a newcomer into the industry, the UAE recognises assistance 
from countries with experience in nuclear safety, security and 
non-proliferation. So, any proposal such as MNAs is an 
advantage for this country to ensure that their nuclear energy 
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programme could be quickly realised as planned; to save time 
and cost; and to ensure the security and sustainability of nuclear 
fuel supply.   
4.2 The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG): The Background 
The NSG was established following the nuclear test by India in 1974. 
The Indian test demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for 
peaceful purposes could be misused for developing WMD. The NSG is 
a group of nuclear supplier countries, which was formed to contribute to 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by ensuring that nuclear 
energy technology is only used for energy security, social, economic 
development, and environmental protection (Kimball & Davenport, 2007; 
see also IAEA, 2012a). All Member States voluntarily coordinate their 
export controls by governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and 
nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon 
states. The NSG put into place a common set of guidelines governing 
exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and agreed to 
exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear facilities, technology 
and weapon-usable materials and to establish special controls on 
exports of enrichment and reprocessing technology (McGoldrick, 2011). 
The NSG Guidelines that were adopted in 1994 contain the so-called 
“Non-Proliferation Principle”, which, apart from other provisions in the 
NSG Guidelines, authorises suppliers to transfer only when they are 
satisfied that this would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Meanwhile, potential recipients are expected (King, 2009): to 
have physical security measures in place to prevent theft or 
unauthorised use of their imports; to ensure that nuclear materials and 
information will not be transferred to a third party without the permission 
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of the original exporter; and to ensure that final destinations for any 
nuclear transfer must have IAEA safeguards in place.  
 
The NSG was created with the idea that when suppliers coordinate their 
nuclear export control policies, fewer channels will exist to transfer 
sensitive items for proliferation activities. Thus, members could decide 
to make the NSG more universal and open membership opportunities to 
nearly all states, whatever their export control policies, with the condition 
that the new members support the principle of controlling exports to halt 
nuclear proliferation activities. As of January 2015, the participating 
Governments were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the U.S. (NSG, n.d.). 
 
Factors taken into account for membership include the following: the 
ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the annexes 
to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG guidelines; adherence to the Guidelines and 
action in accordance with them; enforcement of a legally based 
domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to 
act in accordance with the Guidelines; adherence to one or more of the 
NPT, the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty such as the Treaties of 
Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok or an equivalent international 
nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and full compliance with the 
obligations of such agreement(s); and support of international efforts 
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towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their 
delivery vehicles (NSG, n.d.). 
 
4.2.1 History 
 
Soon after the entry into force of the NPT in 1970 and after a series of 
nuclear tests by non-weapon states, various multilateral consultations 
on nuclear export controls were negotiated and led to the establishment 
of two separate groups for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger 
Committee in 1971 and the NSG in 1975 (Kimball & Davenport, 2007). 
Apprehension on nuclear proliferation issues was also raised due to the 
challenges to control abandoned nuclear materials after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 (U.S. Congress, 1993). The problem 
became crucial due to the economic downturn at that time, and the 
possibility that military personnel in ex-Soviet states might sell nuclear 
material on the black market (Lee, 2003). 
 
It all started when India conducted its first nuclear detonation at 
Pokharan in the desert in Rajasthan on May 18, 1974. India described 
the test as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) (Bhumitra. 2005; see 
also Abraham, 2006). However, the international community was quite 
sceptical, since India had an on-going strained relationship with a 
nuclear weapon state, China, over border disputes and there were fears 
about a second war with China. Moreover, India, which refused to sign 
the 1968 NPT, also had an even more tense relationship with its 
neighbour, Pakistan (Bhumitra, 2005). These situations gave enough 
reasons for India to actively seek the development of a nuclear deterrent 
in the early 1970s. This situation made the international community 
realise that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could 
be misused for a non-peaceful agenda. 
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Following the nuclear test by India, a series of meetings were held in 
London from 1975 to 1978. This is where the NSG was born, also 
known as the “London Club” due to the series of meetings in London 
(Anstey, 2018).  It has also been referred to as the London Group, or the 
London Suppliers Group. Following these meetings, they agreed to 
develop guidelines for nuclear transfers that incorporated a trigger list 
developed by the Zangger Committee to ensure that such transfers 
were only for peaceful purposes and would not be diverted to an 
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities (Anstey, 
2018). Later, in 1978 the IAEA published the NSG Guidelines as IAEA 
document INFCIRC/254 which was subsequently amended, based on 
current issues and development on nuclear matters. However, between 
1978 and 1991, the NSG was not active, even though its Guidelines 
were in place (IAEA, 2000).   
During the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the committee reviewed the 
implementation of Article III.2, which had a significant impact on the 
NSG’s activities in the 1990s. The committee made a number of 
recommendations which including commitments by each State Party to 
the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to 
any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source 
or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards 
required by this article (United Nations, 2005:2). 
 
The NSG has developed several systems and mechanisms for 
strengthening the implementation of NSG business which included 
(NSG, n.d) the establishment of Guidelines in 1992 for transfers of 
nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items 
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which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications). The NSG 
arrangement covered exports of dual-use because it was recognized as 
making a significant contribution to development of nuclear weapons. At 
the 2004 NSG Plenary held in Göteborg decided to adopt a “catch-all” 
mechanism in the NSG Guidelines; to provide a national legal basis to 
control the export of nuclear related items that are not on the control 
lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with 
a nuclear weapons programme (IAEA, 2015). The 2005 NSG Plenary 
held in Oslo adopted a decision that supplier and recipient states should 
elaborate appropriate measures to invoke fall-back safeguards if the 
IAEA can no longer undertake its Safeguards mandate in a recipient 
state (IAEA, 2015). To keep up with advances in technology, market 
trends and security challenges, the 2010 NSG Plenary held in 
Christchurch agreed to establish a technical group to conduct a 
fundamental review of the NSG’s Trigger and Dual-Use Lists (IAEA, 
2015; see also NTI Euratom, 2011). The technical working group was 
called the Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) (IAEA, 2015; 
see also NTI Euratom, 2011). The 2011 NSG Plenary held in Noordwijk 
agreed to strengthen the NSG Part 1 Guidelines on the transfer of 
sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies (Onishi, Abe & 
Pujol, 2016). Finally, the 2012 NSG Plenary held in Seattle approved an 
amendment to the NSG Part 1 Guidelines, which added a new 
paragraph entitled “Support for Access to Nuclear Fuel for Peaceful 
Uses” (Onishi et al, 2016). 
 
4.2.2 Principles, Guidelines and Good Practice 
 
The NSG has developed Guidelines with the aim to ensure that nuclear 
trade is only for peaceful purposes that does not contribute to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
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However, these guidelines should not hinder or discriminate the process 
of international nuclear trade and nuclear cooperation but facilitate the 
development of nuclear trade and be consistent with international 
nuclear non-proliferation norms and obligations. This could be realised 
through the implementation of NSG Guidelines for nuclear exports and 
other nuclear-related activities. There are two parts in the Guideline. 
Part I deals with materials and technology designed specifically for 
nuclear use include fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, 
and reprocessing and enrichment equipment. Part II, established in 
1992, deals with dual-use goods, which are non-nuclear items with 
legitimate civilian applications that can also be used to develop weapons 
that also included machine tools and lasers. Part I was introduced in 
1978 as a result of India's diversion of nuclear imports that were 
supposedly for peaceful purposes but were used to conduct a nuclear 
explosion in 1974. Meanwhile, Part II was published after it was 
discovered that Iraq had illicitly employed dual-use imports with the 
intention of using them for a nuclear weapons programme before the 
1991 Persian Gulf War (King, 2009). 
 
The NSG Guidelines were developed in such a way that it is in 
accordance with Participating Government’s national laws and practices, 
where any decisions on export applications comply with national export 
licensing requirements. The NSG Guidelines are also consistent with, 
and complement, various legally binding international instruments in the 
field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the NPT, and the NWFZ 
such as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone 
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-
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Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk) (King, 2009). 
Hence, the NSG helps to strengthen and cover the grey areas that may 
occur in the NPT and NWFZ, which may not of its own accord be a 
guarantee that a State will consistently share the objectives of the 
Treaty or remain in compliance with its Treaty obligations. 
 
It is observed that the principles and guidelines developed are based on 
fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls, which were 
constructed by three issues in nuclear activities, namely: the transfer or 
export of nuclear materials; transfers of nuclear-related dual-use items 
including equipment, materials, software, and related technology; and 
brokering and transit/transhipment. These three issues needed close 
cooperation with recipient countries through their strong export control 
law and security port system. Thus, as long as the recipient country 
could convince the suppliers’ group that fundamental principles of 3Ss, 
namely safety, security and safeguards can be met, nuclear cooperation 
was welcomed.  
 
4.3 The Influence of the United States in International Nuclear 
Cooperation    
 
It is important for Malaysia to develop the international community’s trust 
so that there are no additional conditions that might delay Malaysia’s 
nuclear programme, which in turn would involve additional costs. This is 
especially true in view of Malaysia’s history with revelations of the A.Q. 
Khan Proliferation’s network that involved a Malaysian company 
(Albright & Hinderstein, 2005; see also Futter, 2015; Corera, 2006; 
Tertrais, 2006). In addition, Malaysian policy towards nuclear 
cooperation with the US is unpredictable because of the sentiment of 
‘being bullied’ and controlled by the US. This sentiment also exists 
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because there are many control systems that were imposed by the US 
on developing countries. Amongst the mechanisms are the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 
Megaport Initiative. Although Malaysia has signed these initiatives, it 
took some time for Malaysia to make the decision. Malaysia would only 
respond to initiatives proposed by international organisations in which 
Malaysia participates, but not initiatives from individual countries. This 
policy was implemented especially during the time of Malaysia’s former 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, and the development of the ‘Look 
East Policy’ under his leadership. Under the Mahathir leadership, 
Malaysia had close relations with Northeast Asia, namely Japan and 
South Korea (Khalid, 2010). 
 
As stated earlier, the U.S. has widened its security system outside the 
U.S., including enforcing an arrangement to any states that use U.S. 
originated technology, particularly nuclear power technology. This 
arrangement is a prerequisite, even if the supplier is from another 
country but offers U.S. original technology to other nations. This type of 
agreement, known as 123 Agreements, is in implementation of Section 
123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, entitled 
"Cooperation with Other Nations". This section was created to establish 
an agreement on nuclear cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals 
between the U.S. and any other nation. It is an agreement between one 
country and the U.S., whereby the U.S. could assist that country to set 
up facilities for civilian nuclear use. Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 specifies the necessary procedures for engaging in 
nuclear cooperation with a foreign country (USNRC, 2002): 
 
a. Section 123a stipulates that the proposed agreement is to include 
the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation 
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and lists nine criteria that the agreement must meet. It also 
contains provisions for the President to exempt an agreement 
from any of several criteria described in that section and includes 
details on the kinds of information the executive branch must 
provide to Congress. Section 123a, paragraphs (1) through (9), 
lists nine criteria that an agreement with a non-nuclear weapon 
state must meet unless the President of United States determines 
an exemption is necessary. These include guarantees that 
(USNRC, 2002): 
i. Safeguards on transferred nuclear material and equipment 
continue in perpetuity; 
ii. Full-scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards are applied in non-nuclear weapon 
states; 
iii. Nothing transferred is used for any nuclear explosive 
device or for any other military purpose; 
iv. The US has the right to demand the return of transferred 
nuclear materials and equipment, as well as any special 
nuclear material produced through their use, if the 
cooperating state detonates a nuclear explosive device or 
terminates or abrogates an IAEA safeguards agreement; 
v. There is no retransfer of material or classified data without 
U.S. consent; 
vi. Physical security on nuclear material is maintained; there is 
no enrichment or reprocessing by the recipient state of 
transferred nuclear material or nuclear material produced 
with materials or facilities transferred pursuant to the 
agreement without prior approval; 
i. Storage for transferred plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium is approved in advance by the U.S.; and 
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ii.  Any material or facility produced or constructed through the 
use of special nuclear technology transferred under the 
cooperation agreement is subject to all of the above 
requirements. 
 
4.3.1 When there is a Trust, There is a Will: The case of U.S.-India 
Nuclear Deal 
 
The U.S.-Indo nuclear deal was seen by political analysts as a turning 
point in the U.S.-India relationship and has introduced a new aspect in 
the nuclear non-proliferation efforts. However, some U.S. political 
experts argue that this deal essentially has reversed U.S. non-
proliferation efforts to discourage states like Iran and North Korea from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, which may potentially contribute to a 
nuclear arms race in Asia (Bajoria & Pan, 2010). India is not a NPT 
Signatory State, with a history of having carried out nuclear tests in 1974 
and 1998 and it was quite controversial when the U.S. agreed to 
conclude the agreement with India on nuclear energy and satellites, 
blessed by other 45 members of the NSG after under the pressure of 
Bush administration (Doyle, 2009). Many political experts observed that 
the U.S. violated the foremost aim of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
when it concluded nuclear agreements with India, which could make 
other countries such Pakistan, Iran, Libya and North Korea would like to 
have same kind of nuclear cooperation (Ramana, 2008). The U.S.-India 
agreement makes the NPT look less like a reciprocal bargain and more 
like a discriminatory trap for those NNWS parties prohibited by their NPT 
membership from following the Indian example and obtaining both 
nuclear weapons and civil nuclear cooperation (Kittrie, 2007:398). This 
cooperation also as an example of sly civility and the paradox of 
equality/inequality in the nuclear order (Mathur, 2016). This is differing of 
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what NPT is formulated for, which is to discourage nations from 
developing nuclear weapons through twofold promises; that those 
nations that possess nuclear weapons will gradually give them up, and 
that these same nations will refuse to share nuclear technology and fuel 
with countries that refuse to sign the NPT. The government of India use 
significant racial signifier to justify and defends its actions with regard its 
decision to nuclearize in 1998 and this is what scholars called it as 
nuclear apartheid (Biswas, 2001). 
 
Another concern following the U.S.- India deal is the possibility that 
India’s long-time foe, Pakistan, would increase its uranium and 
plutonium production, which may lead to a bigger nuclear weapons 
arsenal. Political analysts also worry that by granting India access to 
uranium, the deal would allow India to divert its indigenously mined 
uranium to military applications without detracting fuel from the civilian 
programme. One of the deals is to supply India with uranium, and for 
that the U.S. has pressured the Nuclear Suppliers Group to withdraw 
long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Since then, 
Australia, France, Russia, and Kazakhstan have committed to provide 
India with uranium (Etzioni, 2015)   
 
Unlike critics from other countries (Ramana, 2008), the U.S. had seen 
an opportunity that could be gained from the deal. Recognising that 
India is not yet a Member State of NPT, the U.S. believed that this deal 
could be part of efforts to monitor India’s nuclear activities, as observed 
by Ambassador C. Schaffer, in making India a more durable and reliable 
nuclear partner, a lot more could be achieved from what has agreed 
between both countries (Bajoria & Pan, 2010). In the agreement, India 
agrees to allow inspectors from the IAEA to access its civilian nuclear 
programme (Behrens, 2006). India also assured that by March 2006, 
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fourteen of its twenty-two power reactors will be placed permanently 
under the IAEA safeguards and this as well for all its future civilian 
thermal and breeder reactors. However, military facilities and stockpiles 
of nuclear fuel that India has produced up to now will be exempt from 
inspections or safeguards. This in fact is the prime deal of the 
agreement, which could encourage India to accept international 
safeguards on facilities that were not previously allowed to be inspected 
by India. However, this deal does not oblige India to curb the number of 
its nuclear weapons and its fissile material production. Through the 
agreement, India also commits to signing an Additional Protocol, which 
allows more intrusive IAEA inspections of its civilian facilities (IAEA, 
2009a). Relevant to this, India has signed the Additional Protocol in May 
2009 and ratified it in July 2014 (Bajoria & Pan, 2010). In addition, India 
agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies to other states that do not possess the technologies as part 
of supporting international non-proliferation efforts. Another bonus to the 
international community from the agreement is that India agrees to 
suspend its nuclear tests, commits to strengthen the security of its 
nuclear arsenals and India works together with the UN toward 
negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) with the aim of 
banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. As for 
the U.S., the government of India allows U.S. companies to build 
nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy 
programme (Bajoria & Pan, 2010). 
 
Political analysts see this deal as a strategy by the US to counter-
balance the relationship between India and Russia, where historically 
India had been orientated toward Russia since the 1960s, with most of 
its weapons purchased from Russia, and it had an apparently socialist 
economic regime (Etzioni, 2015). Observers also believe that this 
159 
 
agreement is an effort by the US to lure India into the West’s clique and 
draw on it to help contain the rise of China (Etzioni, 2015). The efforts 
were started during the George W. Bush administration, including offers 
to Indian civil nuclear technology and access to uranium. Later, the 
government of India agreed to sign a 123 Agreement, which was 
approved by the U.S. Congress on October 2008. The Bush 
administration believed that India could be a driving force for political 
stability in the South Asia region and what Washington perceived as 
convergent geo-political interests, and thus, the U.S. initiated actions to 
elevate India as its strategic ally (Singh, 2000). Nonetheless, the deal 
ended in deadlock because of a variety of factors that India found 
concerning, including liability, threats to Indian sovereignty, and the 
potential of intensified control over India by the U.S.  However, this was 
resolved during the Obama administration (Etzioni, 2015). For western 
countries, the US-India deal in 2005 has partially shifted their view that 
India is a rogue state for its non-membership of the NPT and later its 
nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Also, some to have (for many, 
wrongfully) legitimised India as responsible for nuclear power, but others 
viewed this as a smart plot that imposed nuclear responsibilities on India 
(Williams et al., 2017). 
 
In conclusion, this agreement seems to be an illustration of the U.S.’s 
dominance within the Nuclear Suppliers Group and can be cited as an 
example of U.S. control at the international level. This has indeed raised 
concerns by some countries that the nuclear security regime, which is 
frequently highlighted by the U.S. and its allies, is only used as a red 
herring for preventing access to nuclear materials and associated 
technologies. This is because nuclear security appeared to be a tool to 
widen U.S. dominance (ICSA, 2012).  
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4.3.2 The Impact of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act on International 
Decisions on Nuclear Power Programmes 
 
Any country interested in developing a nuclear power programme must 
undergo a process of negotiation with the Government of the U.S. to 
sign an agreement as required by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to the 
International Decision on Nuclear Power Programme. For example, in 
the case of the UAE’s NPP, the Government of the UAE awarded the 
contract to build its first nuclear power plants to a South Korean 
consortium. However, because the South Korean consortium used NPP 
technology which originated from the U.S. for the project, an agreement 
was signed between the Government of the U.S. and the Government of 
the United Arab Emirates - Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy. This corresponds to Provision 123d of the United States Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 - “there is no retransfer of material or classified data 
without U.S. consent”. This indicates that gaining the trust of the U.S. is 
essential for newcomers to initiate cooperation to access nuclear power 
technology. Vietnam also signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in 
May 2014 under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This 
“123 agreement” is necessary for the export of nuclear reactors and 
components and the U.S. also can assist Vietnam to facilitate the 
transfer of nuclear energy technology.  
 
With regards to the 123 agreements, the U.S. Government clarified that 
renouncing a domestic fuel-making capability would not be a 
prerequisite when concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement for all 
countries, and each potential partner country is considered individually. 
In fact, a commitment to forgo enrichment and reprocessing technology 
is not required for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements under U.S. 
law or the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition, the U.S. 
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emphasises that besides ensuring that civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreements are one possible way to discourage newcomers from 
developing their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities, the U.S. also 
advises newcomers to join other incentives, such as multilateral fuel 
banks, to toughen their confidence in fuel supply. Assistant Secretary of 
State Thomas Countryman stated,  
 
Make no mistake, our policy is to pursue 123 agreements that 
minimise the further proliferation of ENR technologies worldwide. 
The US wants all nations interested in developing civil nuclear 
power to rely on the international market for fuel services rather 
than seek indigenous ENR capabilities. These capabilities are 
expensive and unnecessary, and reliable supply alternatives are 
available in the global fuel cycle market (Nikitin, Holt & Manyin, 
2014). 
 
However, this was treated differently for Iran after they announced their 
interest to pursue a nuclear power programme. Despite the lack of 
support from many countries, Iran continuously defends its right to 
embark on a nuclear power programme, as stipulated in the NPT and 
the IAEA Statue. For a solution, the P5+1 group has developed a long-
term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Thus, the 123 Agreement 
policy is not applied to all countries and there are more factors implied in 
nuclear technology cooperation, besides signing relevant nuclear 
security, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties or conventions.  
 
In some way, the 123 Agreement provides advantages to both 
countries, especially to newcomers (U.S.-UAE Business Council, 2009). 
For example, the signing partner has access to some of the world’s 
safest and best nuclear energy technology. In addition, there are 
strategic beneﬁts for both countries. By signing a 123 Agreement, both 
countries will further bolster a dynamic partnership especially in energy 
and construction. Thus, the U.S. will indeed collaborate with its partner 
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by focusing on stability and security, confronting terrorism and 
extremism, and encouraging global trade to ensure that their investment 
in their partner country is secure. This was acknowledged by UAE 
Ambassador to the U.S. and Mexico, H.E. Yousef Al-Otaiba, who has 
said that the relationship between the UAE and the U.S. has been 
positive and productive, and the UAE has witnessed an exponential 
growth in military, security, economic, and cultural relations. This 
partnership is important for the UAE, given its geo-political situation in a 
volatile and dangerous region.  
 
A 123 Agreement can also work as a tool for an enhanced Export 
Control System. This has clearly been materialised in the case of the 
UAE. After signing the 123 Agreement, the UAE has worked closely with 
the U.S. to craft and create a new export control law in 2007. The new 
law has strengthened the UAE’s ability to ban the transfer of goods, 
which threatened the UAE’s national security and/or foreign policy. As a 
result, the UAE reported that they have shut down 40 Iranian companies 
based in Dubai, either because of export-control violations or a lack of 
proper licenses (Katzman, 2016).  
 
Finally, a 123 Agreement can be used to improve global non-
proliferation benchmarks. A signatory state must provide assurances 
about its peaceful goals to develop a nuclear energy policy that commits 
to the highest standards of non-proliferation, safety, security, and 
operational transparency. This is because the 123 Agreement sets a 
gold standard for how to prevent proliferation or militarisation, and 
civilian nuclear energy programmes for newcomers are designed with 
unparalleled operational transparency. This will ensure that technology 
received by the signing partner is not transferred to another country 
illegally. It seems that a 123 Agreement could be an opportunity and a 
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milestone for a developing country such as Malaysia to speed up its 
nuclear energy project. This is also because of the influences from the 
U.S. to convince other nuclear supplier states to support its agenda, 
such as in the U.S. - Indo Deal. 
 
After understanding the influence of nuclear supplier group with 
particular reference to U.S. and its allies, in the area of nuclear 
cooperation, the next section will study how the relationship between 
UAE and U.S., as well other supplier states. This case study is 
significant to identify what are the factors that UAE is trust by the U.S. 
and its allies which Malaysia may use these factors as guidelines or 
strategies for its nuclear power program. 
 
4.4 Case Study 1: United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
 
4.4.1 Country Profile 
 
The UAE is an Arab country in the southeast region of the Arabian 
Peninsula, comprising seven states, also known as emirates. Each of 
these are governed by a hereditary Emir, and together form the Federal 
Supreme Council.  Abu Dhabi is the federal capital of UAE, whilst Dubai 
is the UAE's largest city. As of June 2016, the population of the UAE 
was approximately 9.5 million (UAE World Population Review, 2018). 
 
The UAE escaped the "Arab Spring" in March 2011, which spread 
elsewhere in the Middle East, where political activists and intellectuals 
signed a petition calling for greater public participation in governance 
that was widely circulated on the Internet. In an effort to curtail potential 
further conflict, the government announced a multi-year, USD1.6 billion 
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infrastructure investment plans for the poorer northern emirates and 
aggressively pursued advocates of political reform (CIA UAE, 2014). 
 
The UAE’s decision to choose nuclear power, even though it has 
extensive oil and gas reserves, is driven by the increase in demand for 
electricity from its expanding industries. Projections show that, with 
current electricity demand against current production capability, the 
UAE’s reserves will be outstripped between two and three-fold by 2020. 
The problem is aggravated by the huge ﬁnancial and environmental 
impact caused by the increased burning of crude oil to generate 
electricity. The UAE is confident that investment in nuclear energy is the 
most environmentally promising and commercially competitive option to 
meet future electricity demand (U.S.-UAE Business Council, 2009). The 
decision for nuclear energy was based on the UAE’s energy projection 
and recent analysis conducted by official UAE entities, which concluded 
that national annual peak demand for electricity is likely to rise to more 
than 40,000 MW’s by 2020, reflecting a cumulative annual growth rate of 
roughly 9% from 2007 onward. Thus, the UAE’s interest in evaluating 
nuclear energy is motivated by the need to develop additional sources of 
electricity to meet future demand projections and to ensure the 
continued rapid development of its economy (UAE, 2008). 
 
4.4.2 United Arab Emirates’ Foreign Policy 
 
Since its formation on December 2nd, 1971, the UAE has adopted the 
principles set by the late Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan as key 
guidelines of the country's foreign policy. The policy was developed with 
the aim to become a role model to other countries in representing 
wisdom, balance and temperance, without compromising rights and 
justice. Thus, the foundations of UAE foreign policy comprise good 
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neighbourliness, understanding, and non-interference in internal issues, 
as well as the amicable resolution of disputes. The outcomes of this 
policy were mutual openness between the UAE and the world, and 
strategic partnerships on the political, economic, trade, cultural, 
educational, scientific, and health levels with many countries in all 
continents, asserting the prominent position the country has gained in 
the international community. Several aspects of the UAE’s foreign policy 
lead to the success of their nuclear power agreements with nuclear 
supplier states (UAE, n.d.). The UAE also ascertained that openness 
should bring opportunities and good prospects to the UAE, in particular 
foreign investments, trade and business. Besides in economy, defence 
is also the priority in the UAE foreign policy. Progressively, the UAE is 
becoming active both regional and international level to establish 
regional security and stability, once championed by the Saudi Arabia. 
The UAE is showing signs of becoming an important ally for Washington 
by building diplomatic ties including with Russia (Mason, 2018). 
Significant of military power also due to the episode of ‘Arab Spring’ that 
swept through the Arab region at the end of 2010. The UAE together 
with the Saudi Arabia are among the most active players in the region, 
not only succeed avoiding the wave of changes sparked by the Spring, 
but active interfering foreign policy in some Arab countries that they 
distinguish as a threat to their national security and their role in the 
region (Ragab, 2017). 
 
Beside bilateral cooperation and partnerships, the UAE is also active in 
multilateral and regional cooperation. The UAE is one of the founders of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which implies its commitment and 
determination to ensure the member countries enjoy excellent high-level 
relations and has played a major role in the council concerning efforts to 
enhance cooperation, appreciating the integrated political, economic, 
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security and social goals. To reach these goals, the UAE has been 
working closely with other members in the GCC, the Arab League and 
other groups to support all efforts and diplomatic moves, particularly with 
containing conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf Region. The UAE 
also continuously emphasised the importance of good faith in dispute 
resolution and fully supports the GCC common work and developing 
mutual relations with member countries through bilateral agreements, 
communicating, and consulting through mutual visits on all levels. 
 
Another important element in the UAE’s foreign policy is the tolerance 
and co-existence between people and nations as a requisite for the 
stability and prosperity of the region. This is a principle that constitutes 
an important angle in its foreign relations policy on the external and 
internal levels, for the near and short term. For this reason, the UAE has 
set a social development pattern as an example of tolerance and 
coexistence, through an educational and cultural project with the specific 
aim to deepen values in the younger generation and society. It was 
started by updating and modernising educational systems to cope with 
the latest technologies and respond to the needs and requirements of 
development that is driven by a strong belief that education should be 
provided to everyone. This of course will require the dedication of all 
resources, since the educational process is the best and ultimate 
weapon against poverty and ignorance that represents fertile soil for 
extremism and terrorism. This was also a lesson learned from the 
impact of social media in the Arab World that led to the Arab Spring. 
Moving in the direction of implementing this, the UAE has developed a 
concept called “the World is one global village” and has rolled out a 
series of initiatives, such as ‘Dubai, the City that Cares’, which has 
provided educational services to more than four million children from 14 
countries in Africa, Southern Asia and the Middle East, through 
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partnerships with several organisations around the world. The purpose 
is to provide the opportunities and services of basic education to all 
children in the world, regardless of their nationality and race. 
 
Finally, in order to maintain its stability and peace, the UAE is very clear 
in their foreign policy towards terrorism and extremism. Regional 
security continues to be a top priority and the UAE has engaged 
internationally in efforts to respond to the rising conflicts in the Middle 
East and the North African region. In this regard, the UAE Minister of 
Foreign Affairs stressed in his speech during the 69th UN General 
Assembly on September 27th, 2014, that the UAE is committed and 
willing to cooperate with all efforts aiming at exterminating terrorism in 
all forms, including financing terrorist activities, 
 
I once again reiterate the UAE’s firm position towards renouncing 
terrorism and extremism in all their forms and whatever their 
sources are. My country is fulfilling its responsibilities and is 
committed to participate constructively at the national, regional 
and international levels to combating violent extremism, and 
affiliated beliefs and terrorist acts.  The UAE, through its 
membership in the Global Counterterrorism Forum, coordinates 
with other international organizations and concerned countries to 
ensure that their territories are not exploited in facilitating or 
executing terrorist acts, as well as other related crimes such as 
financing terrorism, human trafficking and recruitment of people 
for committing such egregious crimes. Through hosting the 
Hedayah Center for training, dialogue and research to combat 
violent extremism, the UAE continues to support the international 
community in building capacities and exchanging the best 
practices on this issue. 
 
My country also continues to develop its national policies and its 
legislative and executive systems in order to deter and confront 
all acts of terrorism, eradicate its roots and protect our youth from 
being lured into the circle of extremism and violence. To this end, 
the UAE recently adopted a federal law on combating terrorist 
crimes, which contains strict penalties against those found guilty 
of inciting terrorism or committing terrorist acts. The UAE is also 
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strengthening preventive policies by establishing centres for the 
rehabilitation of people influenced by extremist and terrorist 
ideologies (AlNahyan, 2014). 
 
In addition, during the UN General Assembly on September 27th, 2014, 
Abdullah Zayed also stated, “The UAE also denounces the brutal 
methods used by such groups in the name of Islam, as Islam rejects 
such crimes, which are inconsistent with the moderate approach of 
Islam and the principles of peaceful coexistence among all people” 
(AlNahyan, 2014). 
 
4.4.3 Relationship between the US and the United Arab Emirates 
 
The US and the UAE have a long-standing relationship (Ibish, 2017) that 
started with a shared declaration to promote peace and security in the 
Gulf, counter extremism and deter threats to regional instability (UAE, 
n.d).  However, in recent years the interest has expanded into trade and 
economics, and cultural partnerships. Since then, the UAE has 
developed a good relationship with the U.S. and the UAE became the 
largest export market in the Middle East for the U.S. (UAE Embassy, 
2012). In relation to this positive development, the UAE and the U.S. 
established an Economic Policy Dialogue, which is a formal 
government-to-government programme with the intention of facilitating 
bilateral business and increased investment, as well as enhancing the 
role of the private sector to promote economic growth in both countries. 
The unique regional model of tolerance and free markets introduced by 
the country also aided the UAE’s economic growth, which have attracted 
many investors (UAE, n.d). Cooperation between these two countries 
was later strengthened by the visit of His Highness Shaikh Mohammad 
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme 
Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, to Washington, in April 2015. 
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The meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama mainly discussed 
strategic relations and regional developments with a focus on issues in 
the Gulf region, including negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme 
(UAE WAM, 2015). 
 
Moreover, to ensure that economic growth continued and to protect their 
interests, the UAE needed to resolve some conflicts, instability and 
threats in the region such as nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism 
and extremism, unwelcome aggression against other nations, and risks 
to vital sea-lanes. These have led to the next steps in their cooperation, 
where the UAE is working closely with the U.S. to continually improve 
national security. Among other activities in UAE-US Strategic 
Partnership (UAE, n.d) is through strengthening the safety and security 
of UAE ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Both ports are essential to the 
U.S. naval operations because these ports are the only deep harbours 
in the Arabian Gulf accessible to U.S. aircraft carriers. In fact, more U.S. 
naval vessels visit UAE ports than any others outside of the U.S. 
Cooperation agreements included the Memorandum of Understanding 
between Abu Dhabi Port Company (ADPC) and Virginia Port Authority 
(VPA), U.S. in 2011 (UAE, n.d).   
 
The Gulf War has led the UAE to initiate a security relationship with the 
U.S. and this was demonstrated through the signing of the US-UAE 
Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in 1994 that remains in effect 
by mutual agreement. Under this pact, about 5,000 U.S. military 
personnel are stationed at UAE military facilities, as well other western 
forces including France (Katzman, 2017). This military cooperation then 
continued until now through regularly cooperate on both training and 
operational missions and exercises to strengthen their military strategic 
partnership. In order to strengthen their military strategies, the UAE 
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expanded collaboration on military technology with the U.S., for 
example, the UAE is the only Arab nation to participate with the U.S. in 
five alliance actions over the last 20 years, including a ten-year Special 
Forces deployment with NATO in Afghanistan and Libya. The UAE and 
U.S. forces also participate regularly in military joint training exercises, in 
order to improve coordination and interoperability. In December 2012, a 
multinational initiative to counter and deter terrorism and extremism in 
all of its forms and manifestations through training, dialogue, 
collaboration, and research has been established by the UAE. This 
initiative is known as the Center for Countering Violent Extremism or 
known as Hedayah (Hedayah, 2015) 
 
Analysts observed that the U.S. motivation for maintaining a strong 
relationship with the Gulf Arab countries stems from two primary 
considerations. First, many of these countries, including the UAE, are 
major energy producers that collectively possess a significant 
percentage of the world’s proven oil and natural gas reserves. Second, 
but closely related, these countries are strategically located in the Gulf 
region: The majority of the world’s exported petroleum must pass 
through the Gulf waters en route to the global marketplace and many of 
the most significant U.S. trading partners, particularly in South and East 
Asia. This oil has long been the metaphorical lifeblood of the 
international economy (Ibish, 2017:7).  
 
A long-standing relationship between the United Arab Emirates and the 
U.S. in economic and strategic partnership also made nuclear 
cooperation easier. The involvement of the UAE in bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives that were designed by the U.S. to enhance nuclear 
safety and control processes were also factors in this good relationship. 
The UAE has participated in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI), 
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a security regime that includes a team of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers permanently stationed inside Dubai's ports, working 
closely with Dubai Customs to monitor containers destined for the US. 
Additionally, the UAE is working closely with the U.S. Department of 
Energy to implement the Megaports Initiative, a cooperative effort aimed 
at deterring terrorists from using the world's seaports to ship illicit 
materials; detecting nuclear or radioactive materials if shipped via sea 
cargo; and interdicting harmful materials so they cannot be used by 
terrorists.  Furthermore, ports operated by Dubai Ports World participate 
in the Security Freight Initiative, an initiative by the U.S. to screen U.S.-
bound cargo for radiation (UAE Embassy, 2015). The UAE also 
participated in the U.S.-led PSI as part of efforts to stop proliferation-
related trade in WMDs, related materials and delivery systems through 
ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation 
purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern (PSI, 
2015). A major agreement in nuclear cooperation with the U.S. is the 
123 Agreement. The U.S. also sees this agreement as an opportunity 
for U.S. Businesses. 
 
The U.S. and the UAE can advance critical security, economic 
and commercial goals with the 123 Agreement, while also 
creating a signiﬁcant number of jobs. U.S. companies would have 
access to an important and potentially large market—and better 
position themselves as a global nuclear energy market continues 
to develop. The U.S. government would gain a greater role in 
supporting the UAE’s model for the development of peaceful, 
civilian nuclear energy. Moreover, the UAE would have access to 
some of the world’s safest and best nuclear energy technology 
(U.S.- UAE Business Council, 2009). 
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4.4.4  UAE’s Nuclear Power Programme 
 
The states in the Arab world that possess no developed nuclear 
infrastructure include Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Most of them have engaged in 
several technical-cooperation projects with the IAEA, with a particular 
focus on nuclear medicine and radiation protection. Several have also 
expressed an interest in nuclear power. In late 2006, the six-member 
Gulf Cooperation Council announced that it would undertake a study for 
a collective nuclear-energy programme, but little has transpired from this 
study yet.  Among the national plans, only the UAE has moved forward. 
In December 2009, Abu Dhabi contracted with a South Korean 
consortium to construct four nuclear power reactors, which are 
scheduled to be in operation by 2020. Up to 2,300 staff will be required 
to operate the plants, of whom 60% or more are supposed to be UAE 
citizens eventually. In the meantime, like other newcomers in nuclear 
power programmes, the UAE nuclear programme will depend heavily on 
foreign expertise. Another example is the USD20-billion worth mega 
project contracted to the South Korean-led consortium with participation 
also from Westinghouse to build four nuclear reactors for commercial 
energy generation in the UAE. The UAE believes that the most 
environmentally friendly and most sustainable solution to its energy 
requirements is electricity generated by nuclear plants. Therefore, 
nuclear reactors will become the UAE’s second most important source 
of energy after natural gas, producing about 25 per cent of the country’s 
electricity by 2020 and ensuring the continued economic development of 
the nation (UAE, 2008).  
 
The UAE has embarked on a programme to build civilian nuclear power 
plants and is seeking cooperation and technical assistance from the 
173 
 
U.S. and others. Congress approved a U.S.-UAE bilateral agreement on 
peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA) of 1954. The then U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice signed the proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear 
cooperation with the UAE on January 15, 2009. Deputy Secretary of 
State James Steinberg signed a new version of the agreement on May 
21, 2009; the Obama Administration submitted the proposed agreement 
to Congress the same day (Blanchard & Kerr, 2010).  
 
In 2009, highly important milestones were achieved in the country’s 
nascent civilian nuclear programme. Most significantly, UAE President, 
H.H. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, issued a decree on 23 
December 2009 that formally established the Emirates Nuclear Energy 
Corporation (ENEC) as the entity in charge of implementing the UAE’s 
nuclear programme (UAE, n.d.).  In an address on the occasion of the 
UAE’s thirty-eighth National Day, Sheikh Khalifa explained the UAE’s 
approach to nuclear energy: 
 
“Our interest in renewable energy is inseparable from our project 
to develop a peaceful programme of nuclear energy to meet our 
growing energy requirements, based on the highest standards of 
transparency, safety and nuclear security, in accordance with 
international laws, and in full cooperation with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency… The model we have adopted is 
consistent with our support of and conformity with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and our rejection in principle to the existence 
of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, calling on 
Israel to dismantle its military nuclear facilities and join the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to 
international inspections. We also urge Iran to continue 
cooperation with the international community to allay fears and 
doubts about the nature of its nuclear programme. We call on the 
parties concerned to reach a peaceful agreement on this to 
ensure the security and stability in the region and its peoples 
(UAE, n.d.).” 
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H.H. Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
described the UAE's nuclear programme as “an example of 
transparency in providing the energy needs by commitment towards non 
enrichment or recycling, with the help of some governments and 
institutions of other countries, and under the supervision of IAEA (MOFA 
UAE, 2016).” 
 
4.4.5 Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and 
Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy 
 
The UAE emphasises that their intentions in pursuing the NPP are 
genuinely for energy and peaceful purposes. This was demonstrated 
through the endorsement of the Policy of the United Arab Emirates on 
the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy 
as evidence of their transparency to the international nuclear 
community. This policy was formulated based on a study of viable 
options to meet future energy needs and focused on the potential 
benefits of nuclear power for the UAE people, the environment, and the 
economy (IAEA, 2013). The policy transpired UAE’s commitments to the 
highest standards of safety and security, complete operational 
transparency, and non-proliferation (Kaabi, 2011). Perhaps this policy is 
the most important step for UAE’s nuclear power program which outlines 
the governments approach to civilian nuclear power (Kaabi, 2011). This 
is because, it is importance for the UEA to gain trust and support from 
the public and the international nuclear community in order to ensure the 
success of its NPP, by affirming it is committed to complete operational 
transparency. This was implemented through the establishment of the 
Nuclear Programme Implementation Organization (NEPIO) and an 
independent and effective regulatory authority. Besides being 
established as an independent entity with its own legal personality and 
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directed by a board of directors with representation from relevant 
bodies, The UAE also has formed an international advisory board as 
part of developing trust and as a transparent organization. Also, as part 
of its effort to demonstrate transparency, the UAE also offered joint-
venture arrangements to foreign investors for the construction and 
operation of future nuclear power plants to provide a continuous and 
fully transparent window into the UAE nuclear sector (UAE, 2008; see 
also Kaabi, 2011). 
 
Another important element when a country decided to embark nuclear 
power program is its commitment to conclude all required international 
instruments and abide strictly by the obligations. As of today, the UAE 
displays its commitments to the Non-proliferation instruments such as 
IAEA Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995), IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (2003), IAEA Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2003), UN Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (2000), UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and UN 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (2005). Other related non-proliferation instruments to be 
concluded by the UAE, if it decided to deploy nuclear power plants, are 
the IAEA Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA 
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection, which will be 
concluded concurrently with the UAE’s evaluation of peaceful nuclear 
energy.  
 
The most important element in the Policy of the United Arab Emirates on 
the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy is 
the renounce by the Government of UAE to develop a domestic 
enrichment and reprocessing capability and undertaking to source fuel 
from reliable and responsible foreign suppliers (UAE, 2008; see also 
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Early, 2010; IAEA, 2013). The UAE also has announced for a possibly 
participating in the IAEA initiated multilateral fuel-assurance network. 
The decision to take the step to withdraw their right to develop domestic 
capabilities in those areas, not only renouncing it as part of its 
evaluation of nuclear energy but also as a component of its future 
nuclear programme. As an alternative, the UAE prefers to conclude 
long-term arrangements with reliable and responsible governments and 
contractors to secure supply of nuclear fuel. This decision was made 
after realising that the decision will ensure the safety and security of 
transportation. 
 
Pathway for the UAE nuclear power program is not easy. Although the 
UAE has a reputation of a stable, progressive, and economically modern 
country, it still faces significant difficulties in convincing supplier states to 
provide it with nuclear assistance. This is because, observers and 
analysists have singled out the UAE as a major proliferation threat due 
to its close commercial relationship with Iran, its past record as a hub for 
the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and its weak export control system 
(Early, 2010). In 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce even 
considered categorizing the UAE as a ‘‘diversion risk’’ state before the 
country passed an export control law regulating dual-use commodities 
(Early, 2010:260). This situation is similar to Malaysia. Therefore, what 
are the factors that Malaysia could learn from the UAE as outlined for its 
nuclear strategy and policy. 
 
4.4.6  Factors for the success in United Arab Emirates’ nuclear 
energy cooperation 
 
As a country that is currently developing a nuclear power programme, 
the international nuclear community refers to the UAE as a model for 
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nuclear newcomers (Early, 2010; see also IISS, 2010). This has 
transpired through several engagements by the UAE, which answers the 
question as to what the main factor/s are for successful nuclear energy 
cooperation for a country like UAE, in a region that is well-known as hub 
of tension and insecurity over the past 50 years. The UAE is working 
closely with western allies particularly Britain, France and the U.S. in 
military, security, trade and economic, and cultural partnerships. These 
longstanding relationships reflects the UAE’s role as a regional leader in 
terms of economic reform, openness to international trade and 
investment, and political stability (UAE, 2015). Observance through this 
economic strategic, supports the fact that western is trusting the UAE. 
 
The UAE achieve making a commitment to the international community 
by announcing its intention to permanently forego the acquisition of 
uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. Most 
significantly for advocates of non-proliferation, it was written into the 
UAE October 2009 domestic legislation and this commitment is reflected 
in its 123-nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. that was signed 
in 2009, which is often termed by the US government the "Gold 
Standard" for nuclear non-proliferation (Dirioz & Reimold 2014). The 
UAE also fully supports any initiatives to strengthen nuclear security and 
non-proliferation. This has presented a good image for the UAE, as Jim 
Hoagland said in his report titled Countering Iran in Gaza and Beyond to 
The Washington Post in 2009 that the UAE approach provides a model 
which other nations interested in developing nuclear energy should 
follow. 
 
Furthermore, the UAE continuously shows their commitment towards 
non-proliferation by financially supporting/ contributing USD10 million in 
their efforts to develop an IAEA fuel bank. In another attempt to 
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strengthen national security and safeguards system, the UAE has 
signed major treaties and conventions including the NPT and the 
Additional Protocol, which also part of the requirement needed if a 
country wishes to embark on NPP. This indicates that the UAE is a 
decent country based on their good standing in all of the relevant non-
proliferation treaties and regimes and is not known to possess 
programmes for the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons, or their delivery systems (NTI UAE, 2015).  
 
The UAE is a member of the IAEA since 1976, and Signatory Member to 
the NPT since 1995. Then the UAE signed safeguards agreement in 
2002 and entered into force in 2003. Also, towards their plan for nuclear 
power, the UEA undertaking all of the relevant non-proliferation treaties 
and regimes and implementing them through their legal framework. The 
western countries are also content with the commitments made by UAE 
to ensure that all relevant legalities and regulations are in place and they 
are convinced that the UAE is ready for their NPP. This was shown in a 
statement by Richard Olson, a former US Ambassador to the UAE,  
 
The UAE is committed to preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; it endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative in 
early 2006. In August 2007 the UAE passed a comprehensive 
export control law empowering the federal authorities to take action 
against companies or shipments threatening UAE national security. 
The US has actively engaged Emirati authorities via the Export 
Control and Related Border Security programme to provide training 
and discussed ongoing issues of bilateral concern via the bilateral 
Counter Proliferation Task Force (UAE, 2015).  
 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy in their 2008 report stated 
that,  
 
“The UAE has been particularly willing to take on difficult challenges 
in this area [terrorist financing].  … The UAE was forward leaning in 
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its attempts to tackle these issues. … More recently, the UAE also 
launched an initiative to try to regulate the many brokers located 
there. … The UAE has taken some other important steps recently to 
more closely regulate its business sector” (UAE, 2015). 
 
With regards to the UAE’s NPP plan and management, they have been 
very transparent and committed to prove that their interest in nuclear 
energy is genuinely for socio-economic purposes. For example, the UAE 
international advisory board has been established, which comprises 
international experts in the fields of nuclear regulation, safety, security, 
non-proliferation, the development of human resources in the nuclear 
sector, and waste management. This international advisory board, which 
appeared as a complement to the comprehensive national capability, is 
responsible for providing high-level guidance to the UAE’s nuclear plan, 
management and operation. 
 
The UAE’s foreign policy clearly states their firm position in standing for 
peace and against terrorism and extremism. The principles used to 
construct UAE’s Foreign Policy are clearly enlightened - peace, mutual 
respect and good neighbourliness along with the Islamic belief of peace 
and tolerance, which were implemented through mutual openness 
between the UAE and the World. This included developing strategic 
partnerships in the political, economic, trade, cultural, science and 
technology, education and health. These ethical standards have brought 
many interested investors, in particular from Western countries such as 
the U.S., to participate in the UAE’s economy. Thus, the long-standing 
relationships in economic cooperation and strategic partnership with 
nuclear supplier states such as France and the U.S. have built trust 
between them. This is supported by the UAE’s policy that clearly states 
their firm position on peace and against terrorism and extremism. In 
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November 2008, the Office of the Spokesman from the U.S. State 
Department stated,  
 
The U.S. and UAE are allies and partners in the continuing struggle 
against terror and extremism. The UAE provides the U.S. and Coalition 
forces access to its ports and territory and other critical and important 
logistical assistance. The UAE and the U.S. continue to work together to 
undercut the violent ideology used to justify extremism and prevent 
terrorist attacks against our people and common interests and the 
terrorist financing that supports terrorist organizations. The UAE also 
enhances global security by actively participating in various initiatives to 
counter illicit shipments of dangerous goods and materials (UAE, 2015). 
This supported by the statement of Bill Clinton in April 2013, who 
mentioned, 
 
Places that have come back from the tough economic crisis the 
best and the quickest are the ones which have an operative 
model which creates cooperation across all sectors of society, 
races, religions, and ethnic groups, where people find a way to 
celebrate and are proud of their differences and they work 
together in shared responsibility. Dubai and the UAE show that a 
“model of shared prosperity is more important today than ever 
and an inspiration to many countries in the Middle East (UAE, 
2015). 
 
The UAE also strongly supports and fully enforces UN sanctions with 
regards to any breach in nuclear activities. As a case in point, the UAE 
has expressed deep concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities. They 
believe that the Iranian programme is not transparent and has not 
adhered to international regulatory standards and agreements.  The 
UAE fully supports and enforces UN resolutions barring shipment of 
sensitive materials and technologies to Iran. Showing their support on 
this matter, and in order to crack down on Iranian front companies, the 
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UAE in 2008 drastically reduced the number of business licenses and 
work visas to Iranian citizens. This is also as part of the UAE’s efforts to 
implement their new export control laws as recommended by the U.S. 
Again, it is clear that the U.S. plays a vital role in the UAE’s decisions 
(UAE, 2015). 
 
Given these factors, the UAE is succeeded escalated its confidence-
building measure in pursuit of transparency and public relations to 
pledge the international community that the program is genuinely for 
peaceful purposes (Dirioz & Reimold 2014; see also Shraideh, Banna & 
Fakhoury, 2016). In addition, through incorporating its participation in 
various multilateral nuclear-related agreements and their contribution 
USD10 million to develop the IAEA fuel bank (Rauf, 2017), these 
support the point that the international community trusts the UAE with its 
nuclear power programme. When the UAE clearly stated in its policy 
that it would not build enrichment or reprocessing facilities and also 
announced that the UAE will join MNA for its security of fuel supply, this 
indicates that the UAE trusts the supplier group to join MNA to ensure 
long term sustainability for their future nuclear energy and fuel 
resources. 
 
The next section is discussed Iran’s nuclear power program to 
understand Iranian nuclear inspirations and factors that give implication 
to Iran’s nuclear power program, especially relationships between Iran 
and nuclear supplier group. The next section also significant because 
Iran is in the same region as UAE. Thus, a comparison of both 
motivation for nuclear power program will gives us a knowledge about 
their inspiration towards nuclear weapon development, whether there 
will be another “India-Pakistan” relation. 
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4.5 Case Study 2: Iran 
4.5.1 Country Profile and Iran’s Foreign Policy  
  
Iran was selected for a comparison with the UAE because both have 
interest in nuclear power program, in the same region, with monarchy 
system, similar culture, same language and religion and both main 
economy is oil and gas. However, Iran is presented as a proliferation 
threat and was voted for sanctions by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) for its breach to non-proliferation regimes. Meanwhile, 
the UAE, on the other hand, is partnered with many supplier group and 
have good relations with them because of the UAE’s policy towards 
promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Pelopidas, 2012). 
Economy of Iran also far from UAE, even though both are oil and gas 
producer. Iran GDP per capita for 2016 was USD 5,038 meanwhile the 
UAE was USD 37,622 (Country Economy, 2018a). Factors for nuclear 
weapon inspirations is mixed but it close by economy, military and 
national pride as defined through Sagan’s three theoretical models, 
namely the security model, the domestic politics model, and the norms 
model (Sagan, 1996/1997; see also Ji,2009). For example, China 
developed nuclear weapon because it wants a safer world for China by 
reduced risk of tension and conflict from outside, so that it can restrain 
its defence budget and concentrate resources on domestic economic 
reform, reconstruction and modernisation (Klintworth, 2013).  While 
North Korea, which characterized as threatened militarily, isolated 
politically and ailing economically, stated that the development of a 
nuclear weapons program has been a priority for North Korea (Ji, 2009; 
see also Anderson, 2017). In 2006, North Korea declared that its 
nuclear power program officially stated that “the development of nuclear 
weapons is for national’s dignity and pride (Ji, 2009). In term of 
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economy, China is far better than North Korea, which has GDP per 
capita of USD 8,123 compare to North Korea with GDP per capita of 
USD 619 (Country Economy, 2018b). 
 
Before examining the Iranian nuclear programme, it is important to 
understand the politics of Iran, which affects the decisions of the country 
and their policy towards a nuclear power programme. Iran's economy 
relies on oil and gas exports, and possesses significant agricultural, 
industrial, and service sectors. But it is marked by inefficiency, 
corruption, and is distorted because the Iranian government directly 
owns and operates hundreds of state-owned enterprises and indirectly 
controls many companies associated with the country's security forces, 
and this has caused inflation, price controls, subsidies, and a banking 
system holding billions of dollars of non-performing loans (Cordesman & 
Burke, 2018). These issues have undermined the economy and the 
potential for private-sector-led growth. The Iranian economy deteriorated 
following the expansion of international sanctions in 2012 on Iran's 
Central Bank and oil exports that significantly reduced Iran's oil revenue, 
forced government spending cuts, and sparked sharp currency 
depreciation. Iran’s economy continued to suffer as more international 
sanctions were placed on Iran as punishment for its uranium enrichment 
and reprocessing activities and to make it comply with IAEA obligations 
and responsibilities. Nevertheless, in 2013 the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and Germany, (P5+1) reached a set of initial 
understandings that halted the progress of Iran's nuclear programmed 
and rolled it back in key respects. This joint plan with Iran relaxed 
international pressure on the country and was seen as taking positive 
steps toward transparency of their nuclear programme (White House, 
2015). Following this agreement and the lifting of sanctions resulting the 
nuclear agreement has the potential for Iran to reinvigorate growth 
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which many steps taken over the past few years have helped contain 
inflation, reduce some subsidies, and achieve a degree of exchange 
rate stability with some growth (Iqbal, 2016). In lieu of the standoff with 
the world powers over its nuclear activities was equally crucial for Iran 
because it bring an end to sanctions, allow the Iranian economy to grow 
again, integrate Iran into the international community, and address Iran’s 
other differences with U.S. and the West (Litwak, 2015). Still, the Iran’s 
economy remains weak and unemployment rate remains high (Rahimi, 
2010; see also Iqbal, 2016) 
 
Political turmoil in the Middle East region as the preamble to a 
democratic transition, such as Arab Spring (Mather, 2014; see also 
Salamey, 2015). Western analysts focus on Iran largely in terms of its 
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and see other Gulf States as 
involved in a dispute with Iran over its nuclear programme status. 
However, political analysts have suggested that the region is actually 
facing more complex issues than the Iranian nuclear programme and 
believe that the disturbances in the Arab world have been the prelude to 
chaos, instability, and regime change, and have created more than 
violence and weakened the economy (Salamey, 2015; see also Iqbal, 
2016; Cordesman, & Burke, 2018). In fact, the tensions between Iran 
and other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia reflects a broad regional 
power struggle that focuses on internal security and regional power - not 
only nuclear forces. It is a competition between Iran and the Arab Gulf 
states that affects the vital interests and survival of each regime 
(Cordesman, 2014). However, through Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
for Arab and African Affairs, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, reaffirmed that 
Iran is willing to meet and have a political dialogue with Saudi Arabia to 
discuss the future of security in the region. Iran strongly voiced that they 
welcome any cooperation in fighting terrorism and extremism in the 
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region and urged Arabs not to pursue a policy based on force and 
military actions in the crisis area of the region (Iran, 2015).   
 
Iran’s foreign policy is much more than the nuclear program and could 
be explained by three factors - ideological foundations, both Islamic and 
revolutionary, a strong anti-Western (in particular anti-American and 
anti-Israel) and nationalism (Adebahr, 2017). These are factors that play 
important roles in explaining Iranian relationship with supplier group that 
majority are western. This also explained why previous Iran’s nuclear 
cooperation are with Russia, China and Pakistan and their inspiration for 
nuclear power also influence by the sentiment of anti-Israel. 
 
4.5.2  Relationships between Iran and the US 
 
U.S.-Iranian relations became tense when a group of Iranian students 
seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and held embassy 
personnel hostages until mid-January 1981 (Houghton, 2001; see also 
Gordts, 2017). Following the event, the U.S. cut off diplomatic relations 
with Iran in April 1980. Between the years 1980-88, Iran had an 
indecisive war with Iraq, which in due course was expanded into the 
Persian Gulf and led to clashes between the U.S. Navy and Iranian 
military forces. Iran has also been designated as a state that sponsored 
terrorism for its activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the world (CIA, 
2015). 
 
The relationship between Iran and its neighbour country such as Saudi 
and UAE, as well U.S. and its allies, is apprehensive because of the 
Iranian view that the U.S. is relentlessly antagonistic and will never 
accept the Iran, especially with the constant sanctions imposed on Iran 
by the U.S. and its allies (Barzashka & Oelrich 2012; see also Vatanka, 
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2016). The hatreds increased when the U.S. helped Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
war. The Iran-Iraq War taught the Iranian that, to survive, it must adopt a 
vigilant defense posture and must maintain its ability to be self-sufficient 
to protect its territory and people. Sadly, Iran found itself alone and 
either international organizations or other states were unreliable to help 
them (Tabatabai, & Samuel, 2017). Iranians also claimed that Iran is a 
peaceful country and only interested in a peaceful nuclear program. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. views Iran as a dangerous state which sponsors 
terrorism, threatens Israel, disrupts the region and has history of 
violating many agreements (Bunn, 2015). 
 
4.5.3  Iranian Nuclear Programme’s evolution 
 
Shahram Chubin has marked the Iranian nuclear program as more to 
the persistence and perseverance by determination rather than urgency 
(Litwak, 2015). Iraq’s invasion to the country in 1980 and used chemical 
weapons against Iranian forces has gave Iran the immediate strategic 
rationale for nuclear weapons (Litwak, 2015; Aderbahr, 2017). Back in 
2005, renowned French strategic thinker and nuclear expert Thérèse 
Delpech distinguished three potential rationales behind Iran’s nuclear 
program - producing genuine civilian nuclear fuel, using the nuclear 
program as an influential power, or acquiring the nuclear weapon 
(Aderbahr, 2017). 
 
Iran publicly announced its pursuit to acquire peaceful nuclear energy to 
serve a population that has doubled since the 1979 revolution and 
strongly denies any interest in developing a nuclear weapon, even 
though it did show an interest in obtaining and developing enrichment 
technology (Shahram, 2010). This has heightened unease, especially 
within the U.S., Israel and Arab states concerned about the military 
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potential of Iran’s nuclear programme, especially when Iran explained 
their intention of having enrichment facilities as part of their nuclear 
power programme. As a result, the UNSC issued two resolutions in 
2006, namely Resolution 1696 and Resolution 1737, as well some 
additional restrictive measures by the UNSC, including an arms 
embargo, a prohibition on all kinds of financial aid or loans (except for 
humanitarian or developmental purposes), and freezing valuable assets 
owned by twenty-eight government officials and institutions connected to 
Iran’s nuclear programme. The UNSC gave the Iranian government sixty 
days to comply with all requirements stipulated in the resolution or face 
additional sanctions (United Nations, 2010).   
 
Nonetheless, the Iranian government stayed by its decision and 
neglected the requirement by the UNSC for the reason that Iran has a 
right to develop the enrichment technology as stipulated in the NPT. 
This supports findings in 2006, when in its report, the IAEA’s reported 
that they were still unable to verify that the Iran’s nuclear programme 
was genuinely for peaceful uses as the country still continued with its 
uranium enrichment programme and proceeded with the construction of 
heavy water reactors, although was inform to reconsider the 
construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water (IAEA, 
2006; see also IAEA, 2007). The USA also sceptical on Iran’s nuclear 
program and assessed that Iran is keeping the option to develop nuclear 
weapons and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is 
essentially reversible (Hund, 2007; see also Kerr, 2012; Tarock, 2012). 
Consequently, the five permanent members of the UNSC namely China, 
France, U.S., Russia, and British together with Germany (P5+1) agreed 
to draft a new resolution on Iran (Kroenig, 2018). Iran stood firmly by its 
position that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), all Members have the right to develop any nuclear technology. In 
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general, Iran does not yet need enrichment facilities since Russia is 
providing sufficient fuel for the new reactor, which was built in Bushehr 
(Ningthoujam, 2016), but Iran states that the reason for developing 
enrichment capability is because Iran would like to be less dependent on 
foreigners for fuel (Shahram, 2010). Ironically, the regime received a 
blanket approval from the U.S., which extended to the construction of a 
light-water reactor at Bushehr that Washington being approved during 
the Shah’s reign in 1976 (Ningthoujam, 2016). From the international 
point of view, Iran’s nuclear programme was vague because Iran only 
presented a rationale for energy, but no clear policy to demonstrate that 
they have no intention of developing nuclear weapons.  
 
The international pressure on Iran has turned the programme into a 
major political issue domestically, which was already tense after the 
disputed 2009 presidential elections (Shahram, 2010). The pressures 
made Iran’s nuclear programme a political issue between conservatives 
and the Green Movement opposition. The Green Movement is a new 
opposition born after the disputed 2009 presidential election who are 
demanding the democratic rights originally pursued in the 1979 
revolution - the rights that were taken away by radical clerics (Milani, 
2010). Later, after President Hassan Rouhani won the election in 2013, 
the Iran nuclear programme seemed to have a better future and led to 
more than 18 months of nuclear talks with the world’s six major powers 
(P5+1), which was eventually supported by Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei (Shahram, 2010).   
 
However, at first, Iran did not trust the U.S. and rejected any offers from 
the West for direct talks on Iran’s nuclear program, the Additional 
Protocols and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi in 2013, stating 
that Iran would talk to the West if the US silenced its threatening rhetoric 
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(Shwayder, 2013). Khamenei once said in a speech to Iran’s Air Force 
Academy, 
 
Some naive people like the idea of negotiating with America; 
however, negotiations will not solve the problem,” "If some 
people want American rule to be established again in Iran, the 
nation will rise up to face them. American policy in the Middle 
East has been destroyed, and Americans now need to play a 
new card. That card is dragging Iran into negotiations.” "You take 
up arms against the nation of Iran and say, 'negotiate or we fire,'” 
he continued. “But you should know that pressure and 
negotiations are not compatible, and our nation will not be 
intimidated by these actions (Shwayder, 2013:1). 
 
The evolution in Iran’s nuclear programme could be understood in 
several periods, based on events that initiated the progression of the 
nuclear programme. 
 
Time of consent [1950s to 1988] 
 
Iran's interest in nuclear technology started in the 1950's during the 
reign of Mohamed Reza Shah, which was initially for the diversity of 
national energy sources (Shahram, 2010). Iran began receiving 
assistance for its nuclear programme through the U.S. Atoms for Peace 
programme. In 1967. The U.S. supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research 
Center (TNRC) with a small 5MWt research reactor, fuelled with highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) (Ningthoujam, 2016). Recognising the potential 
of nuclear technology, in 1973, the Shah of Iran declared his ambitious 
plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the 
century and instructed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to 
study this option (University of Washington, 2016; see also 
Ningthoujam, 2016). Within five years Iran had concluded several 
nuclear technology related contracts with foreign suppliers, which 
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included investment in Eurodif's Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in 
France (Gulphe, 1984). By the time of the 1979 revolution, Iran had 
developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear technologies. 
However, during the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic leader, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini who disapproved of nuclear technology, overthrew 
the Shah’s reign. Subsequently, many of Iran's nuclear experts fled the 
country, which resulted in the near collapse of Iran's nuclear 
programme. Many nuclear projects, started during the Shah’s rule, such 
as the construction of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, were 
suspended (Bruno, 2010). It became worst after conflict with Iraq which 
began in 1980 that expended resources and damaged Iran's existing 
nuclear infrastructure. The two power reactors under construction at 
Bushehr were bombed several times by Iraqi Air Force, 2 months after 
Russia visit the site (Smedts, 2012). 
 
However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed new interest in nuclear power, 
and looked for assistance from international companies to complete the 
delayed NPP at Bushehr. After the war with Iraq ended in 1988, Iran 
under the Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency, started to build up its 
social economy, and also started rebuilding its nuclear programme. By 
the early 1990s, as Iran recovered from the war with Iraq, its nuclear 
program was once again moving forward, through assistances from 
Russia, China and Pakistan. That time, China viewed Iran as a source 
of Chine’s export revenue because Iran developed as an oil supplier, 
and also as a counter to be used against U.S. interests in the event of a 
dispute over China-Taiwan. China’s nuclear assistance to Iran abided by 
IAEA guidelines, but it’s bringing Iran closer to nuclearization (Schofield, 
2014). Pakistan was the first country to sign a long-term nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Iran in 1987 after the war with Iraq.  
Besides the agreement on technical cooperation in the military-nuclear 
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field with Pakistan, Iran also concluded an agreement with Argentina for 
the supply of uranium enriched 20% for small Tehran research reactor 
and to train Iranian nuclear scientist at Argentinian nuclear centre 
(Hashim, 1994).   
 
Time of concern [1989-2002]   
 
Unlike Israel, Pakistan and India, Iran signed the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. This may 
perhaps demonstrate that Iran has long searched for access to nuclear 
technology generally as a key for development and as a means of 
restoring its former status as a centre of scientific progress. 
Consistently, the U.S. and its allies believe that Iranian interest in a 
nuclear programme is due to nationalism, and partly due to a quest for 
international status and respect (Shahram, 2010). The suspicions of 
Iran’s nuclear programme were in full swing in the 1990s when Iran 
began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by 
developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with 
uranium conversion and enrichment. The concern escalated after the 
disclosures of Iran’s secret nuclear facilities between 2002 and 2009 
which were uranium enrichment site at Natanz and a heavy-water 
production plant in Arak (Shahram, 2010; see also Kerr, 2012; Smedts, 
2012). 
 
For these reasons, the U.S. intended to block Iran’s access to certain 
nuclear technologies, in particular enrichment and reprocessing 
technology. As a result, Iran’s programme progressed slowly because of 
the problems of getting access to the technology.  Despite the distrust 
by the Western bloc, Iran continued to sign long term agreements with 
several countries for its nuclear programme. For example, in 1990, Iran 
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signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with China to train 
Iranian personnel, and also to provide Iran with a 27KW miniature 
neutron source reactor and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors. Russia 
and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 1995 for 
the construction of a light water reactor at Bushehr under IAEA 
safeguards (Albright, 1995; Ningthoujam, 2016). Three years later, 
another bilateral agreement was signed between Iran and Russia to 
complete construction of the Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant with an 
additional offer to supply Iran with a large research reactor, a fuel 
fabrication facility, and a gas centrifuge plant. The U.S. expressed its 
concerns about the activities of technology transfers by Russia and was 
suspicious of Russian scientists and institutes that assisted Iranian 
engineers in the sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the 
construction of a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak (Albright, 
1995). This concern stimulated Russia to review the Russian-Iranian 
nuclear cooperation. 
 
Time of controversy [2002-2006] 
 
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the 
existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including the Natanz 
Enrichment Complex, a heavy water production plant under construction 
at Arak that was operated by the Kalaye Electric Company, along with 
several names of individuals and front companies involved with the 
nuclear programme. These exposures coincided with U.S. concerns 
about the spread of weapons of mass destruction to undesirable people 
or countries (Chubin, 2010). In addition, the US and its allies strongly 
believed that Iran may have nuclear weapons ambitions and they 
suspected that despite appearing to be within the nuclear treaty such as 
NPT, they are also interested in maintaining the option of a weapons 
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programme. This is because they believe that the Iran’s nuclear 
weapons programme was part of an attempt to become more self-reliant 
in arms and technology following Iran’s struggle to acquire arms to fight 
Iraq, which allegedly used chemical weapons and had developed a 
nuclear weapons programme (Shahram, 2010). Later, in November 
2003, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming 
Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend its 
enrichment activities. 
 
Then, in that same year, the IAEA carried out a number of inspections 
and interviewed Iranian officials to track the history of Iran's nuclear 
programme. In a related report, IAEA concluded that Iran has failed to 
meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the 
reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that 
material and declaration of facilities where the material was stored and 
processed (IAEA, 2003). However, the IAEA found that Iran's previous 
and new declarations contradicted the Agency's previous information on 
its nuclear programme. Therefore, the IAEA requested that the IAEA 
take all necessary steps to confirm that Iran's past and present nuclear 
activities were recorded and truthful. As a result of these discoveries, 
Tehran was placed on the list of distrusted governments (IAEA, 2003). 
 
Several proposals and diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Iranian 
nuclear issue have been suggested to find a best solution or to build 
confidence between Iran and the international community. Nonetheless, 
none of those proposals have succeeded and efforts to address Iran’s 
nuclear programme still continue. According to Tim Guldimann, former 
Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran proposed negotiations to the U.S. in 
May 2003 on a variety of political issues between the two countries 
(Maloney, 2008; see also Parsi, 2012). This proposal, contained an 
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outline of proposed U.S. – Iranian negotiations on the entire array of 
issues at stake from Washington’s standpoint: weapons of mass 
destruction, support for terrorism, and Iran’s stance toward Iraq and the 
peace process. This proposal known as the Spring 2003 Proposal, listed 
a number of agenda items for negotiation and proposed the creation of 
three parallel working groups to carry out negotiations on disarmament, 
regional security, and economic cooperation. Key agenda items 
included release of all U.S. sanctions on Iran, cooperation to stabilise 
Iraq, full transparency over Iran’s nuclear programme, cooperation 
against terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Mujahedin-e Khalq 
Organization (MEK), Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land 
for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine and Iran’s full access to 
peaceful nuclear technology, chemical and biotechnology (Parsi, 2012). 
 
However, the Bush administration rejected the proposal in order to pile 
additional pressure on Iran to suspend their nuclear programme 
(Maloney, 2008; Parsi, 2012; Davenport, 2014). However, it was a 
mistake done by the U.S. Outrage and frust with the decision of Bush 
administration, Iran opted to pursue a more aggressive policy, 
challenging U.S. interests and expanding its nuclear enrichment 
program. The U.S. and international community was incapable of 
stopping Iran from expanding its influence and reach in the region 
(Parsi, 2012). The trust of the international community and the U.S. went 
away completely after Iran’s nuclear activity increased dramatically in 
2002, especially after an exile group revealed that Iran had secretly built 
a facility in Natanz, which had a capability of enriching uranium for use 
in nuclear weapons as well as civilian nuclear power reactors (Hadley, 
2010). 
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Iran then agreed to negotiate with Britain, France and Germany, known 
as the EU+3 negotiation, following a threat to bring the enrichment 
issues to the UN Security Council (Cronberg, 2017). The negotiation led 
to the temporary suspension of Iranian conversion and enrichment 
activities and the country also agreed to sign the Additional Protocol in 
2003. However, Iran exploited vagueness in the definition of 
"suspension" and continued to produce centrifuge components and 
carry out small-scale conversion experiments. Frustrated with this 
development, Iran was given an option between facing renewed 
sanctions or to completely stop the enrichment and conversion 
programme.  Soon, Iran agreed to conclude the Paris Agreement with 
the EU-3 on 15 November 2004 and to continue the temporary 
suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, and they committed 
to work with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic 
solution (Cronberg, 2017). 
  
Negotiations between the two sides continued and Iran has presented 
four proposals during the course of these negotiations. Alongside the 
discussed issue on Iran’s nuclear programme, the proposals also 
covered subjects such as Iran’s support for terrorist organisations, 
regional security issues and economic cooperation. However, no 
proposal by Iran met the main objectives of the negotiation, which were 
to suspend Iranian conversion and enrichment activities. Later, in 
August 2005, the three European countries presented their proposal for 
a long-term agreement. Amongst the proposals were the arrangements 
for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water 
reactors constructed in Iran, arrangements for Iran to return spent 
nuclear fuel to supplier countries, a commitment by Iran not to pursue 
fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years and a legally binding 
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commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of 
the Additional Protocol. 
 
As expected, Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did 
not recognise Iran’s right to enrichment. Then in 2005, newly elected 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was supported by Iran’s 
supreme leader, notified the IAEA that Iran would resume its uranium 
enrichment and rejected the EU-3's Long Term Agreement, because 
they felt that the proposal did not incorporate Iran's proposals and 
violated the Paris Agreement. This caused a dead end in the deal 
between Iran and the EU-3. Iran was also non-compliant with its 
Safeguards Agreement and as a result, the IAEA Board of Governors 
responded by adopting a resolution on Iran and voted to bring Iran's 
case to the UNSC.  
 
After that in June 2006, the EU-3 together with the US, China and 
Russia (P5+1), in reference to the permanent five members of the UN 
Security Council plus Germany, offered similar comprehensive 
proposals to Iran. The P5+1 offered Iran an advanced civilian nuclear 
technology with the condition that Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment 
activities and resumed implementation of the Additional Protocol  The 
proposal mirrored some of the previous offers for negotiations and 
included Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing 
activities, an establishment of a mechanism to review this suspension, 
Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol and postponement of 
the discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the UN Security Council 
(Davenport, 2014). 
 
Yet again, it was rejected by Iran due to the condition that Iran should 
suspend its enrichment-related activities and reiterated that Iran nuclear 
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programme was not a threat to the international community (CNS, 
2015). In response to this reaction by Iran, the UNSC firmly passed 
Resolution 1696 in July 2006, which demanded that Iran suspend 
enrichment activities, or Iran would face economic and diplomatic 
sanctions. President Ahmadinejad ignored this demand and solidly 
declared that Iran would continue with the enrichment activities. This 
was proven when in the same month, Iran installed a heavy water 
production plant at Arak, which led to another UNSC resolution, 
Resolution 1737, which was imposed but again ignored by Iran. Once 
more, the international nuclear community was challenged when in 
November 2007, Iran admitted to have connection with the A.Q. Khan 
network linked to a Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q Khan, who is known 
for his central role in the nuclear black market network (Futter, 2015). 
 
Efforts and determination to stop Iran’s move towards enrichment 
activities never ended and offers and incentives from P5+1 were 
delivered by the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, in June 2008. 
The package offered economic incentives, access to LWR technology, 
and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply if Iran agreed to stop its 
enrichment efforts. This new package revised the 2006 proposal 
concurred with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1803, the 
third UN sanctions resolution on Iran. 
 
Time of awaken [2009-2012] 
 
Two factors spurred intense repercussions and a reaction from the 
Iranian people (Shahram, 2010). First, the UN imposed a series of 
resolutions and sanctions between 2006 and 2010 that included punitive 
sanctions. The U.S. and the EU imposed even tougher unilateral 
sanctions. For the Iranian public, the costs of continued defiance 
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became increasingly clear and complicated in daily life. Second, Iran’s 
disputed 2009 election that was won by Ahmadinejad, amid widespread 
allegations of fraud, sparked the largest protests against the regime 
since the 1979 revolution. This was when a new Green Movement 
opposition emerged (Addis, 2009). Many conservatives also had 
growing concerns about their President - especially his economic 
mismanagement. Iran’s new political chasm quickly began to play on the 
nuclear issue. Four months after the election, Ahmadinejad agreed to a 
U.S.-backed interim agreement designed to ease tensions and open the 
way for broader negotiations on Iran’s long-term programme. Leaders of 
the Green Movement as well as key conservatives publicly criticised the 
deal with the sole purpose of opposing Ahmadinejad and preventing him 
from taking credit for ending tensions with the outside world. Iran soon 
walked away from the deal (Shahram, 2010).   
 
By 2010, the divide over Iran’s nuclear programme had more to do with 
domestic politics and very little to do with what many of the key players 
actually wanted to see happen. Ahmadinejad’s policies produced high 
inflation, low growth, and massive government corruption. Thus, the 
actual threat to Iran is not from the U.S., which calls for regime change, 
but from popular dissatisfaction caused by conflict that was deepened 
by the Arab Spring, and reformists such the Green Movement which has 
been intensified by the impact of sanctions imposed by the UN and 
some states such as the U.S. (Shahram, 2010; see also Kurzman, 2012; 
Nabavi, 2012).   
 
Time of Anticipation [2013-2015] 
 
In the presidential elections of 2013, several candidates criticised the 
government for not being serious about a diplomatic solution regarding 
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Iran’s nuclear issues. President-elect Hassan Rouhani linked the 
nuclear issue to domestic frustration. He stated that Iranians needed 
more than centrifuges spinning for their well-being. Rouhani an Iranian 
Muslim cleric supported his statement, though he was careful to balance 
between reformists and hardliners. This change of mind-set has made 
the P5+1 Negotiation on Iran Nuclear Programme succeed and was 
concluded (Shahram, 2010). Hassan Rouhani once make a remark that 
Iran believes that a state’s survival can only be assured through 
deterrence power, and that war and aggression are imposed on weak 
countries - thus Iran will continue to maintain its power to safeguard its 
security (CIA Iran, 2015; see also Takeyh, 2015). 
 
4.5.4 The P5+1 Negotiations on Iran Nuclear Programme 
 
The P5+1 Negotiation on Iran Nuclear Programme is the cornerstone for 
ensuring that Iran’s nuclear programme will genuinely not be diverted to 
develop nuclear weapons. After months of diplomacy negotiations, the 
P5+1 group that consists of the U.S., United Kingdom, France, China, 
Russia and Germany, have achieved a long-term comprehensive 
nuclear deal with Iran (Mousavian & Mousavian, 2018). The deal is to 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and would guarantee that 
Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful. This deal stands 
on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in 
November 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) was announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 (White 
House, 2015; see also Kroenig, 2018; Mousavian & Mousavian, 2018). 
Under this agreement, through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
that was agreed in Vienna 14 July 2015, Iran restates that under no 
circumstances will it seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons 
(Iran, 2015) 
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During the negotiations, Iran is believed to possess uranium stockpiles 
that could develop eight to ten nuclear bombs. As a result, the deal is to 
ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively for peaceful 
use and prevents Iran from obtaining capability in nuclear weapons. This 
was to be achieved by blocking four ways that could be used in 
developing nuclear weapons. First, the production of highly enriched 
uranium at the Natanz facility by keeping its level of uranium enrichment 
at 3.67%, which is significantly below the enrichment level needed to 
create a bomb. Iran was also required to reduce its centrifuges from 
20,000 to 6,104 for the next ten years. Second, the production of highly 
enriched uranium at the Fordow facility. Under this deal no enrichment 
will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all in future, and Iran is only 
allowed to use its old or least efficient models of centrifuges. Third, the 
production of weapon-grade plutonium at a heavy-water nuclear reactor 
in Arak. Through this deal the Arak reactor will be redesigned so that it 
cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. In addition, all the spent 
fuel rods will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists. 
Iran is also prohibited from the build-up of any single heavy-water 
reactor for at least 15 years. This deal was formulated with the purpose 
that Iran would no longer have a source for weapons-grade plutonium. 
Finally, the fissile materials (White House, 2015; see also Katzman & 
Kerr, 2017). 
 
This deal is important to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons 
secretly whereby, under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to 
extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection by the 
international inspectors from the IAEA. The IAEA inspectors have the 
right to a physical or technical presence in all of Iran’s nuclear sites and 
will conduct regular monitoring of Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle and 
supply chain, from uranium mines and mills to centrifuge production, 
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assembly, and storage facilities. These inspectors will not only be 
continuously monitoring every element of Iran’s declared nuclear 
programme but will also be verifying that no fissile material is moved to 
a secret location to build a bomb. Iran has also agreed to implement the 
Additional Protocol of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which allow 
inspectors to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious for 
illegal nuclear activities. This deal appears to be aligned with the effort 
to make the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone through proposed 
measures including no separation of plutonium, no use of highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment 
plants (Hippel et al., 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3: the summary of P5+1 and Iran Agreement (White House, 
2015) 
 
4.5.5  Factors affecting Iran’s Nuclear Cooperation 
 
Iran is presumed to be a rogue country (Chomsky, 2000; see also 
Malici, 2009; Rose, 2011; Tsui, 2013), and not to be trusted when it 
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declares that their nuclear programme is genuinely for energy. This is 
based on the history of Iran’s nuclear programme, domestic politics and 
its policy on enrichment. Considering the history of Iran’s relationship 
with other western countries, for example the relationship between Iran 
and US, which was tense since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Not only 
that, Iran also has stressful relationships with other countries in the 
middle-east such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, which one of the reason 
UAE has developed a strategic alliance with the U.S. (Sadjadpour, 
2011). Mistrust also based by the announcement of Iran to proceed with 
enrichment technology and Iran once had an interest in maintaining the 
option for a nuclear weapons programme as part of an attempt to 
become more self-reliant in arms and technology (Barzashka & Oelrich 
2012). This intention was following Iran’s struggle to acquire arms to 
fight Iraq, which had used chemical weapons and allegedly had 
developed a nuclear weapons programme (Tabatabai, & Samuel, 2017). 
The factor also influences from the unstable domestic politics where the 
government and the opposition have different views on nuclear 
technology, and Iran has been linked to terrorism for its activities in 
Lebanon and elsewhere in the world. 
 
The above-mentioned factors were the answers to why Iran is struggling 
to win the trust of the nuclear suppliers’ group, particularly the U.S., 
even though Iran has followed rules like other IAEA member states and 
is a member to the NPT. However, after the election of Iran’s new 
president in 2013, Hassan Rouhani whose background is a lawmaker, 
academic and former diplomat, there is a hope for Iran’s nuclear 
programme after they agree with conditions and abide by decisions to 
conclude the P5+1 Agreement. This new development in the P5+1 
Agreement was motivated by several factors such as the influence and 
support from Ali Hosseini Khamenei, who is the most respected cleric in 
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Iran. Motivation comes after a series of UN resolutions between 2006 
and 2010 that included punitive sanctions. The U.S. and the EU 
imposed even tougher unilateral sanctions. For ordinary Iranians who 
suffered from the effect of the international sanctions on their economy, 
the costs of continued intransigence became increasingly painful and 
complicated their daily life, and they urged the government to do 
something. Resulting this, Iran’s disputed 2009 election won by 
Ahmadinejad during which there were widespread allegations of fraud, 
sparked protests against the regime, which claimed to be biggest since 
the 1979 revolution. As a result, a new opposition was born known as 
the Green Movement. Many conservatives also raised concerns about 
the extreme populist president, particularly concerning Iran’s economy. 
Iran’s new political party began to play on the nuclear issue which 
started to focus on the economic motivation rather than strategic and 
military motivation. In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2013, 
several candidates criticised the government for not being serious about 
a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues which had make Iranians paid 
for the consequences. Hassan Rouhani linked the nuclear issue to 
domestic dissatisfaction and clearly remarked that Iranians need to 
increase their economy for well-being and not only champion in nuclear 
issues (Chubin, 2010). 
4.6 Conclusion 
It is clear, upon examining the case studies detailed in this chapter, that 
participating in nuclear regimes and treaties is not enough to prove 
transparency of a country’s nuclear activities. However, the history of 
the state regarding their motivation for supremacy, country’s nuclear 
policy and willingness to cooperate with the international community 
would be additional mode to understand a country’s trustworthiness and 
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believability in nuclear diplomacy. As highlighted many times in this 
thesis, cooperation means that the participating countries are 
developing trust between them. Thus, good previous cooperation and 
relationships do affect nuclear cooperation, particularly regarding 
policies on certain nuclear sensitive technology such as enrichment and 
reprocessing. 
 
It is implicit that negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 over the 
nuclear issue will put an end to Iran’s sanctions and Iranians hope it will 
enable them to recover their economy and be a progressive regime like 
before. Some political analysts may see the P5+1 agreement as a good 
compromise by Iran; that will benefit the stability of the region and a 
stable strategic relationship with Iran seems to be possible (Jokar, n.d.). 
The deal will also reduce the chance for Iran to build nuclear weapons 
or at least lower the probability that the world will face an Iranian nuclear 
weapon for the next 10-20 years (Bunn, 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, there is still an atmosphere of distrust between Iran and 
other Arab states, considering the history of Iran posing a range of 
serious military threats from asymmetric forces to a capability of 
acquired nuclear-armed missile forces. Iran also may be motivated to 
develop nuclear weapons based on certain factors such as a sentiment 
of enhancing prestige and regional status through a possession of 
nuclear weapons. The motivation is also driven by a thought that nuclear 
weapons are of strategic and political value: both could provide 
deterrence against nuclear threats or attempted intimidation by other 
powers and reducing military arrogance by other states such as US and 
its allies (Morris & Naylor, 2015). Another factor is that the possession of 
nuclear weapon can balance regional nuclear politics between Israel 
and the Islamic world (Hashim, 1994). For Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, 
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the key threat for the region was Iran and Iranian influence in Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and allegedly even within Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain themselves (Ryan, 2015). For Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this 
deal was never really about Iran’s nuclear program. They viewed that 
the deal would strengthen Iran’s regional position, which it almost 
certainly will. Their basic assumption is that this deal is bad - whatever’s 
good for Iran will, somehow, come at their expense. In 2011, analysts 
were pointing to Iran’s weakening, in that it has been isolated from the 
world. Though the Iranian regime had failed to take advantage of the 
Arab uprisings and its firm support of a brutal Assad regime was bare for 
all to see. Since this time, Iran has recovered very well. The P5+1 deal 
coming so soon after Hassan Rouhani’s surprise victory continues to 
undo the damage, strengthening Iran’s economic state at home and 
rehabilitating the country in the eyes of the international community. 
Politic analysts debated that the two top security priorities in the region 
are Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. If 
the Iranian problem can be resolved through this deal, this gives the 
U.S. one less threat to worry about. Then the U.S. could refocus its 
attention on other neglected regions. Of course, that’s exactly what the 
Gulf countries, as well as Israel, are worried about (Hamid, 2013). The 
distrust between Arabs and Iran are also influenced by the differences in 
disciplines of Islam, in which Arabs are Sunni Islam and Iran is Shia 
Islam. Saudi Arabia hosts the holiest city in Islam, Mecca, and is known 
as the standard-bearer for Sunni Islam. Significantly, Iran considers 
itself the patron of Shia discipline and wants to boost its regional 
influence (Brown, 2016). 
 
In the meantime, Iran does not trust other Arab states, in particular 
Saudi Arabia which supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, backing 
Sunni jihadist forces in Syria and good military alliances with the 
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western bloc such as the U.S., Britain and France. Iran still deeply 
distrusts the U.S. and the West, and firmly believes that Iran is under 
threat when it should be the leading power in the Gulf (Cordesman, 
2014).  
 
The struggle between Iran and other Arabs, in particular Saudi Arabia, is 
now more complex by the growing doubt among Saudis and other Arabs 
about their alliance with the U.S., and about U.S. policies in the region, 
with theories stating that the U.S. is preparing to abandon its alliances in 
the Arab world and turn to Iran. The U.S. firmly tries to clarify their 
stance that their interest is only related to the security of the region, and 
this is understood because the U.S. has a lot of interest in the region 
with regards to economy, trade and strategic partnerships. Therefore, 
the U.S. needs to protect their interest in the region by ensuring that the 
security of the region is guaranteed. This is supported by Secretary 
Hagel’s speech during the 9th Manama Dialogue in 2013 that was held 
in Bahrain, “Questions have been raised about America's intentions, 
America's strategy, and America's commitment to this region. The U.S. 
has enduring interests in this critical region of the world, and we will 
remain fully committed to the security of our allies and our partners in 
the region (Cordesman, 2014:2).” 
 
However, in view of the danger of misused nuclear programmes and 
conflicts in the region, the P5+1 Agreement seems to be the best 
alternative to reducing the chance for Iran to build nuclear weapon and 
may open doors for other cooperation specially to benefit a long-term oil 
and gas supply. 
 
Within this study, there are some observational factors that influence 
UAE’s and Iranian Nuclear Power Programme. First factor is through 
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economy cooperation / partnership with western countries. From this 
study, it supports the fact that the UAE has a good history in trade and 
economic partnership with the western countries, particularly Britain, 
France and the U.S. Meanwhile, Iran’s relationship with western 
countries was good only during the Shah’s reign. After the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, the relationship with the western bloc shattered and 
became worse when Iran announced their interest to develop capability 
in enrichment technology. The main effect from this decision was 
economic sanctions applied by the UN Security Council, then followed 
by the U.S. and its allies, which have imposed unilateral sanctions, 
leading to a catastrophic impact on the Iranian economy and society. 
Second factor is by developed Military Strategic Partnership with 
Western countries. The UEA has good strategic and military 
partnerships with the U.S. and its allies such as Britain and France. This 
is the opposite of Iran, which has never had strategic military 
partnerships with western countries since the fall of the Shah. The third 
factor is the initiative by newcomer states to establish transparency in 
nuclear power programmes. The UAE has formed an international 
advisory board that consists of international experts in the fields of 
nuclear regulation, safety, security, non-proliferation, the development of 
human resources in the nuclear sector, and waste management.  The 
international advisory board is responsible for providing guidance in the 
evaluation of nuclear power, as well as in the initial phases of eventual 
nuclear power plant acquisition, design, and construction, and the 
development of required human capital. However, Iran agreed to 
reconsider their nuclear programme only after the conclusion of the 
P5+1 Agreement. The agreement is blocking the four pathways that 
could be used by Iran to produce nuclear weapons. 
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Another factor that that influence UAE’s and Iranian Nuclear Power 
Programme is their national position on MNA. The UAE fully supports 
this initiative and the Government of the UAE demonstrated this through 
the donation of USD50 million to the fuel bank. On the other hand, Iran 
stood by their policy that every member state/NPT signatory has the 
right to build nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities. On this 
basis, negotiations of Iran Deals has took some times and this deal 
might change if involved states have change their nuclear policy or 
foreign policy, for example the U.S. President Donald Trump demanding 
European allies and Congress to alter Iran’s Deal, and said that U.S. 
agreed to waive sanctions on Iran, but it was temporary, unless new 
deal is set up that to follows U.S.’s mould. This decision was made 
despite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified 
Iran's compliance (Turak, 2018). Trump’s administration observed that 
the Iran Deal is not solving the primary problem with the Iran nuclear 
program. The deal it currently stands, only delays rather than stops 
Iran’s inspiration to develop nuclear weapons (Kroenig, 2018).  This 
study also supports that foreign / nuclear policy on enrichment and 
reprocessing technology also plays important roles. It is clearly stated in 
the Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential 
Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy that the UAE will not build 
nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This demonstrated that 
the option on nuclear weapon development was never a choice for the 
UAE, which was once an ambition for Iran. Conversely, in the case of 
Iran before the conclusion of the P5+1 Nuclear Deal, Iran was interested 
in constructing enrichment facilities, offering the reason that Iran would 
like to be less dependent on foreigners for fuel. (Katzman & Kerr, 2017). 
 
Based findings in this chapter, it has supports the hypothesis that 
country that clearly renounces their intention to develop domestic 
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reprocessing and enrichment facilities will find it easier to conclude 
nuclear energy agreements. This is reinforced by a history of good 
economic and military partnerships and cooperation with western 
countries such as the U.S. and Europe which is also de facto a major 
contributor to successful nuclear negotiations and cooperation. This 
study also supports the hypothesis that a good relationship with supplier 
states would help nuclear cooperation between supplier and recipient. 
Oil and gas have involved long-term partnerships between Middle 
Eastern and Western countries. These long-standing business 
relationships were based on trust. Hence, when nuclear energy 
becomes the next interest of Arab countries such as the UAE, western 
countries trust that the interest in nuclear programme is only for civilian 
uses. Vice versa, the Arabs also trust their business partners and any 
proposal from western countries apparently can be accepted and 
agreed, as long as their interest in security of nuclear fuel supply can be 
fulfilled by the supplier. Although surprisingly, the UAE accepted a 
USD20 billion bid from a South Korean consortium to build four 
commercial nuclear power reactors, total 5.6 GWe, by 2020 at Barakah 
(WNA UAE, 2014). However, this only happened after support from UAE 
allies namely, the U.S., after conclusion of a 123 Agreement with the 
U.S. In addition, South Korea accounts for 6.10% of UAE imports (WNA 
UAE, 2014). 
 
Also, supplier countries have a preference for newcomers including 
supplier countries through the process (during the early stage of 
planning), especially with regards to the planning, management and 
operation of their new nuclear power programme. This would increase 
the transparency of their nuclear power programme. As a newcomer in 
the industry, countries from the Middle East region realised that they 
needed assistance from countries with experience in nuclear safety, 
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security and non-proliferation. NPP business involves big capital 
spending and developing countries cannot afford any mistakes and 
faults in this process. So, any proposal such as MNAs is an advantage 
for these countries to ensure that their nuclear energy programme could 
be comprehended as planned to save time and cost; and to ensure the 
security of nuclear fuel supply. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the 
Arabs, the final decision on the MNA should not only lie in the hands of 
supplier countries where they can hamper or interrupt any nuclear 
supply or any cooperative venture in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, for political reasons (Shaker, 2010). The recipient’s interests 
also need to be protected, as they have shown their international 
commitments and obligations. Thus, every individual state that 
participated in MNA should feel that it has a say in the operation or the 
running of such an enterprise - a participatory aspect that is as important 
as the guarantee of supply. This way, the participating state will feel that 
their sovereignty is protected. This could be learned from the 
establishment of Euratom and the Steel and Coal Union that led to the 
Common Market, the European Community, and the EU (Shaker, 2010).  
 
Malaysia indeed would prefer to be like the UAE whereby there are no 
obstacles during the construction of it nuclear power programme or end 
up like Iran with additional conditions for its nuclear power program. 
However, at the same time Malaysia would like to develop national 
expertise in regard to nuclear power technology. This is to lessen 
national dependence on foreign expertise. Following in the steps of the 
UAE, which has arranged for foreign company/states to plan and 
manage nuclear power programmes by nearly 100%, is not preferable 
for Malaysia.  
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Malaysia may also draw a number of lessons from the Iranian case. A 
number of the activities and experiments Iran has undertaken, along 
with its ambitions to be proficient in the production of fissile material and 
its cover-up, suggest that Iran could be trying to make a nuclear device. 
This mistrustful view is fuelled by suspicions that Iran’s interest in a 
nuclear programme is due partly to nationalism, and partly to a quest for 
international status and respect. Thus, although the purpose of expertise 
development is for long-term knowledge sustainability, and it could 
represent transparency in nuclear activities by following all IAEA 
guidelines and frameworks, Malaysia still needs to be careful when 
choosing the specific technology, knowledge and expertise.  If not, 
Malaysia would risk finishing up like Iran, which has delayed its nuclear 
power programme, even though Iran is a Signatory State to the NPT 
and claims to follow all requirements set by the IAEA.  This illustrates 
that the history of trustworthiness is important, especially with the US 
and its allies. 
 
Research on the relationship of Iran and the UAE countries with the U.S. 
is important for Malaysia to. The U.S. is the point of reference because it 
influences nuclear politics and international relations more than any 
other single state. The study also includes observation on the history of 
nuclear activities and policies in the UAE and Iran. It is expected that 
these studies would provide knowledge about the state leader’s notion 
with regards to their state’s identity that drives their choices for nuclear 
technology; whether for energy or weapons. After recognising the 
lessons learned from previous MNA, understanding the notion of 
multilateralism and trust within it, and understand the factors that would 
establish trust with the supplier states such as the USA through a case 
study of the UAE and Iran, the next chapter - Chapter 5, explores the 
ASEAN perspective on the idea of multilateral institution/organisation 
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and Asian views on the implementation of MNA. This analysis offers 
insights into the state’s motivation for developing a nuclear program. 
The next chapter also closely focused on the idea of developing trust 
between supplier and consumer states. Then how this trust contributes 
towards possibility for a regional institution such Euratom in Asia – an 
ASIANTOM. 
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Part 2: Four Potential Pathways 
Chapter 5 
Prospects for ASEANTOM: A Focus on Indonesia 
and Vietnam 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite of the astonishing scale of the Fukushima accident in 2011, 
which caused many countries around the world to review their nuclear 
power program and reconsider their nuclear power expansion plans, 
nuclear power capacity continues to grow in Asia. In East through to 
South Asia there are 128 operable nuclear power reactors, 40 under 
construction and firm plans to build a further 90 and these number is 
expected to increase when many more are proposed. The greatest 
growth in nuclear generation is expected in China, South Korea and 
India (WNA, 2016). Asia’s hunger for energy has been stimulated by 
economic growth, particularly in the states of South East Asia (SEA). 
Although ASEAN countries are at various stages of economic 
development and have different energy resource and consumption 
patterns, but they share a common challenge in energy which is to meet 
rising demand in a secure, affordable and sustainable manner (IEA, 
2017). 
 
The trend in the Asia-Pacific is becoming a major emerging market for 
the nuclear energy industry, which would indicate that the management 
of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is likely to be a big concern for this region in 
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the coming decades (Lim, 2016). This emergent interest in nuclear 
power programmes includes states of SEA, also known as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Unlike in the Middle 
East, SEA’s main concern regarding the development of a nuclear 
power program is financial constraint. 
 
In general, SEA is the fastest growing economic region, which is 
predicted to grow at the rate of 4-6% in the next five years. 
Consequently, energy demands will be substantially increased to 
support the economic growth. Countries with the biggest energy 
demands include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Vietnam, which account for 88% of the energy consumption in the 
region (Vu, 2016). This development has inspired some countries such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to seek new energy resources, 
such as nuclear energy. 
 
Despite interest in nuclear energy, currently no ASEAN member state 
has established commercial nuclear power facilities, except for several 
research facilities. Subsequently, some ASEAN countries, namely 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia plan to integrate nuclear power into 
their long-term energy plans as an alternative energy source that can 
help address the dual objectives of energy security and mitigation of 
climate change effects. These objectives are to ensure that their energy 
supplies are secure, affordable, and environmentally sustainable, by 
moving toward diversifying their energy mix whilst reducing 
overdependence on fossil energy (Anthony & Trajano, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the government of Philippines is thinking about about re-
opening the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, however, it needs people’s 
approval before the controversial Bataan Nuclear Power Plant could be 
opened (Cepeda, 2016; see also Colinson, 2017). 
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5.1.1 ASEAN Perspectives on Nuclear Programmes 
 
The achievability of nuclear power programmes in these ASEAN 
countries is complex – it is about more than simply meeting energy 
requirements when nuclear security and non-proliferation concerns are 
taken into account. Other factors that may delay nuclear power 
programmes in this region are related to domestic politics, finance, 
safety, public opinion and discovery of new oil fields (CNS, CENESS & 
VCDNP 2012; Jaafar et al., 2017). For these reasons, Southeast Asia 
remains a significant region with regards to any global effort to manage 
nuclear security risks. 
 
Adherence to the principles of ASEAN, exemplified in participation in 
various multilateral agreement such as the NPT and the Treaty on 
South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), support the 
argument that the decision to pursue nuclear energy is based solely on 
economic reasons, and nuclear technology and activities are only for 
peaceful purposes. As discussed in Chapter 3, the decision by the 
European Union to establish Euratom, supported the development of the 
European nuclear market. If ASEAN is interested in establishing an 
institution similar to Euratom in Asia, it would need a high level of trust 
and cooperation among ASEAN Members as well other Asian states 
such as China, India, Japan and South Korea: all of which have the 
necessary experience, knowledge and facilities that could support 
ASEAN’s nuclear power programme. 
 
The minute a country decides to start a nuclear power programme, there 
is an urgent need, not only for the interested country, but also for the 
entire region to develop strategies and infrastructure for strengthening 
regional safety and security.  Thus, when a SEA country decides to 
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embark on a nuclear programme, it is essential to create a platform that 
engages all SEA states to discuss the region nuclear safety and security 
issues. This could be strategized through close cooperation with 
international organisations such as the IAEA, the Nuclear Supplier 
Group, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, dialogue partners with supplier 
states and many more. This cooperation includes activities such as 
exchange of experiences and lesson-learned with other nuclear power 
states, as well as acquiring assistance for national capacity and 
capability in infrastructure and legal frameworks to meet international 
standards on nuclear safety, and to strengthen capacity building in the 
region on nuclear safety, security and safeguards. 
 
Activities within ASEAN are within the scope of the ASEAN Charter. The 
ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation for the ASEAN Community 
by providing its legal status and institutional framework. It also codifies 
ASEAN norms, rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and 
ensures accountability and compliance. In effect, the ASEAN Charter is 
registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 
102, Paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). From the 15 
listed purposes of ASEAN as stipulated under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the 
ASEAN Charter, the first three identify ASEAN’s objectives of economic 
prosperity, security of the region and stability in politics (ASEAN Charter, 
2008). Adherence to these objectives, support the argument that 
ASEAN is only interested in activities that maintain and enhance peace, 
security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the 
region; to enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political, 
security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation; and to preserve 
Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and free of all other 
weapons of mass destruction. 
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Essentially, ASEAN civilian nuclear activity management could be 
perceived through three perspectives: politics and security; energy 
security; and science and technology policy. From the perspective of 
politics and security, it is important for ASEAN to maintain and 
strengthen peace, security and stability in the region. This also would 
help the region to gain trust from the supplier group. The key instrument 
is the Treaty on SEANWFZ or Bangkok Treaty, which is coordinated by 
the SEANWFZ Commission, established by the Treaty. All ten ASEAN 
Member States are party to the SEANWFZ Treaty. ASEAN has 
established the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy 
(ASEANTOM) in 2013 which has contributed to the work of the 
SEANWFZ Commission (ASEANTOM, 2013). The establishment of 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) is in support of this effort. 
In relation to this, APSC has developed an APSC Blueprint that 
envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based Community of shared values and 
norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared 
responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and 
outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent 
world (ASEAN, 2018). 
 
ASEAN civilian nuclear activities also could be managed from the 
perspective of energy demand. ASEAN has involved high-level officials 
in policy formulation, to demonstrate that ASEAN is serious about 
developing a nuclear energy programme in the region. For example, the 
establishment of the Nuclear Energy Safety Sub-Sector Network (NES-
SSN), in 2008, that reports to the Senior Officials Meetings on Energy 
(SOME) of the ASEAN Ministers of Energy Meetings (AMEM), which is 
coordinated by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE). The NES-SSN is 
responsible to propel cooperation and facilitate information sharing and 
exchange, technical assistance, networking and training on the use of 
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nuclear energy for power generation purposes (ASEAN Centre for 
Energy, 2017a). Regional cooperation under AMEM-SOME is supported 
by the Republic of Korea and other countries as ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners.  
 
The ACE centre, established in 1999, is an independent 
intergovernmental organisation within ASEAN, and represents the 10 
ASEAN Member States’ (AMS) interests in the energy sector. The 
purpose of this Centre is to accelerate the integration of energy 
strategies within ASEAN by providing relevant information and expertise 
to ensure the necessary energy policies and programmes are in 
harmony with the economic growth and the environmental sustainability 
of the region. The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of 
Indonesia host the ACE, and the ACE’s office is located in Jakarta. ACE 
works closely with energy authorities/ministries in the 10 AMS, called 
the Sub-sector Networks (SSN) and the Specialised Energy Bodies 
(SEB), as well as with the ASEAN Secretariat, which acts as the 
custodian and administrator of the Endowment fund. Together, they 
implement the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation, which 
serves as a blueprint for better cooperation towards enhancing energy. 
Keeping the region’s development sustainable and environmentally 
friendly is an important concern of ASEAN’s energy sector. This concern 
is shared as a common theme of each Sub-sector Network in 
implementing its programmes (ASEAN Centre for Energy, 2017b). 
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Diagram 4: ACE in the ASEAN Energy Sector (ASEAN Centre for 
Energy, 2017c) 
 
The third perspectives of ASEAN civilian nuclear activities are through 
Science and Technology. Through these activities, ASEAN focuses on 
nuclear energy technology through the Technical Working Group on 
Nuclear Power Plants (TWG-NPP), under the ASEAN Committee on 
Science and Technology (ASEAN COST) of the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meetings on Science and Technology (AMMST) (Ibrahim, 2014).  
 
Technological development has already transformed SEA into industrial 
economies from post-colonial commodity-dominated economies (CSIS, 
2010). Accordingly, nuclear power can play a significant role in the 
ASEAN’s economy. The International Energy Association (IEA) reported 
that ASEAN represent one of the most dynamic parts of the global 
energy system, with their energy demand growing by 60% in the past 15 
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years (IEA, 2017). Currently, there is no operational nuclear power plant 
in ASEAN. However, five ASEAN states are planning to include nuclear 
power in their national energy mix. Among these countries, Vietnam 
seems to have the most aggressive nuclear power ambitions with plans 
to build eight plants by 2030, producing 15,000 to 16,000 megawatts 
(MW) of electricity (CSIS, 2010). Meanwhile, Indonesia plans to have 
four nuclear plants with a total capacity of 6,000 MW by 2025 and 
Thailand plans to develop two nuclear plants to generate 2,000 MW by 
2022. Malaysia and the Philippines are still studying the potential of 
nuclear power programmes (CSIS, 2010). 
 
5.1.2 ASEAN’s Multilateral Institutions for Nuclear Governance 
 
ASEAN is fully supportive of any multilateral nuclear cooperation which 
brings benefits to it members. Most of this cooperation was initiated 
through the IAEA activities such as the IAEA Technical Assistance and 
Cooperation Programme (TACP), the IAEA Extra-Budgetary Programme 
(EBP), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, 
Development and Training relating to Nuclear Science and Technology 
in Asia and the Pacific (RCA), with 21 member states, including 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam, from among the ASEAN member states (the only 
exceptions being Brunei Darussalam and Lao PDR), and other states 
outside the region, viz. Australia, Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau 
and Sri Lanka. With regard to nuclear energy activities, beside IAEA, 
ASEAN also supports any activities that initiated under regional 
cooperation such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), the 
Asian Network for Nuclear Education and Training (ANENT) and the 
ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM). 
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The ASEAN is also involved in multilateral cooperation initiated by other 
cooperative frameworks outside the IAEA such as the Forum on Nuclear 
Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) initiated and led by Japan, outside the 
framework of the IAEA, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
and Vietnam as members among the 10 ASEAN Member States, and 
other members outside the region, viz. Australia, Bangladesh, China, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Japan, focussing on the 
Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project, including an activity on 
Nuclear Security Culture Development and many more. 
 
Upon reviewing the lists of multilateral institution and platforms for 
nuclear diplomacy, it appears that ASEAN has fragmented platforms, 
which may result in duplication of effort. ASEAN shares a common goal, 
which is to achieve high levels of nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards. Driven by this motivation, ASEAN needs a multilateral 
institution that would tailor all elements in nuclear governance, including 
managing the technology itself. The Euratom model discussed in 
Chapter 3 might provide such a model. This could be initiated by 
expanding existing institutes, such as ASEANTOM, which originally 
proposed to establish a network of regulatory bodies amongst ASEAN 
countries on primarily atomic energy. ASEANTOM was proposed during 
the 20th ASEAN Summit in 2011 and was received positively by other 
ASEAN Member States. The establishment of ASEANTOM could 
demonstrate that ASEAN countries are only interested in the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy (Phruksarojanakun, 2013). In 2012, the Terms of 
Reference of ASEANTOM were finalized with the objective of enhancing 
the growth of knowledge and resources to ensure the safety, security 
and safeguards for peaceful nuclear energy applications. Later, in 2013, 
during the first ASEANTOM meeting in Thailand, the Action Plan of 
ASEANTOM was developed (Thai Nuclear Information Service, 2014). 
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Even though there is a feeling that terrorism in the SEA is an isolated 
problem, ASEAN is taking serious measures to ensure that nuclear 
safety and security are of the highest priority, and this was reflected in 
the scope of ASEANTOM. ASEANTOM was established to gather all 
relevant regulatory bodies and authorities amongst the ASEAN Member 
States (AMS). This cooperation would be the best platform for them to 
share best practices and exchanging of experiences in regulating 
nuclear and radioactive materials and related activities, with regards to 
safety, security and safeguards. Through ASEANTOM all AMS could 
strengthen regional capacity building by focusing on human resources 
development through training courses and technical collaboration. 
Furthermore, platform such ASEANTOM could assists AMS to further 
implement and adhere to their relevant commitments of the IAEA 
standards and guidelines.  
 
For this reason, ASEANTOM encourages mutual exchange of 
information as confidence building measures on nuclear activities in 
each country to promote transparency in safe, secure and peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy within the region. In relation to this, ASEANTOM 
would forging regional cooperation in the areas of, but not limited to, 
nuclear emergency preparedness and response, environmental 
radiation monitoring, and nuclear security, including nuclear forensics, 
and measures to combat illicit trafficking, unauthorized transfer of 
nuclear and radioactive materials, and the return of recovered materials 
to the country of origin. Furthermore, ASEANTOM would drawing on 
expertise and resources from ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, other 
external parties, regional and international organisations, as well as 
other relevant bodies and networks (Phruksarojanakun, 2013). 
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In view of the regional approaches and multilateral cooperation in the 
SEA region, ASEANTOM function could be expanded and serve as a 
regional coordinating body similar to Euratom in Europe, and not only in 
nuclear regulation matters. The advantage of this sort of institution is 
that ASEAN could pool available resources and activities among its 
members. As discussed in Chapter 3, a multilateral institution like 
Euratom has brought many advantages to EU in nuclear business by 
increasing the nuclear market in Europe. Therefore, it is an advantage 
for ASEAN to create a similar institution. Furthermore, an existing body 
such as ASEANTOM could conceivably create a partnership with other 
advanced states or with other multilateral organisations from outside the 
region, such as Euratom, which have more experience and capabilities 
in nuclear power programmes. This new multilateral institution for 
nuclear matters in ASEAN could also help them to merge technical 
resources and obtain support from other international organisations to 
enhance nuclear power capability and capacity. This expansion could be 
initiated through a cooperation with Northeast Asia, a region consisting 
of states with nuclear power programmes, such as China, Japan and 
South Korea by creating ASIANTOM. 
 
Negotiations and dialogue in nuclear energy with Northeast Asia were in 
fact started many years ago. The first Asia Energy Ministers' Working 
Group Meeting was held in Sydney in 1996 and has been held annually 
since that time. In this year, the Asian Pacific Energy Research Centre 
(APERC) was established in Tokyo with the main objectives of fostering 
understanding about global, regional and domestic energy demand and 
supply, infrastructure development and regulatory reform. Following this, 
in 2002, ASEAN invited Energy Ministers from China, Japan and Korea 
for an inaugural ASEAN + 3 Senior Officials Meeting on Energy (SOME) 
that was held in Bali, Indonesia. As a result, this SOME + 3 meeting was 
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the first Energy Policy Governing Group meeting and was held in 2003. 
Then in 2004, the first official ASEAN+3 Energy Ministers Meeting was 
held in Manila and a declaration, "Forging Closer ASEAN+3 Energy 
Partnership" was signed. Since then, ASEAN+3 Energy Ministers 
meetings have been held in Siem Reap and Vientiane (Thomson, 2006). 
5.2 Methodology and Research Framework 
Similar to the Chapter 4, which two countries were selected, namely the 
UAE and Iran, this chapter will use same methodology and research 
framework, with the purpose of identifying factors for trust and 
trustworthiness in nuclear cooperation. With different security and 
economic backgrounds, this chapter will discuss two neighbours of 
Malaysia: Indonesia and Vietnam. The main objective of these case 
studies is to ascertain factors for trust and trustworthiness in nuclear 
matters between nuclear supplier states and Asian countries that have 
different scenarios in comparison to the Middle East. These two 
countries were significant for the case study in view of several factors. 
First, these two countries were chosen because both have announced 
their readiness to build nuclear power programmes as indicated in their 
national development policies. Both have also concluded major nuclear 
agreements with nuclear supply countries including the U.S., Russia, 
and Japan. Hence, Indonesia and Vietnam were said to be among the 
first countries in SEA with nuclear power programmes. Secondly, 
Malaysia, together with Indonesia and Vietnam are moving towards 
diversifying their energy mix through nuclear power program, reducing 
their over-dependence on fossil fuels, and to ensure that their energy 
supplies are secure, affordable and environmentally sustainable 
(Anthony, Cook, Trajano & Sembiring, 2014). Sharing these similar 
economic motivation, Indonesia and Vietnam are the nearest cases that 
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Malaysia could compare with in terms of developing trust and 
trustworthiness with nuclear supply. In addition, by studying Indonesia 
and Vietnam as well ASEAN in general, an effort to have similar 
multilateral institution like Euratom for Asia could be further studied.  
 
Beside economic motivation, strategic motivation is also a good cause 
for selecting Indonesia in this study. Indonesia and Malaysia have a 
history of conflict – the ‘Confrontation’ or Konfrontasi from 1963 to 1966 
(Hindley, 1964; see also Leifer, M. 1966; Ghani & Paidi 2013). If 
Indonesia successfully develops its first nuclear power programme, this 
might represent a challenge to Malaysia. Indonesia and Vietnam are 
already ahead of Malaysia with regards to nuclear energy planning. 
Having signed relevant agreements with supplier states, such as the 
U.S., Russia and Japan, Malaysia certainly does not intend to be left 
behind. However, the country is still looking for the best strategy to 
ensure that its nuclear power programme is well planned. This is crucial, 
especially given the political and economic uncertainties Nayan Chanda 
stated in his 1986 book entitled ‘Brother Enemy: The War After the War’, 
that Asia’s future is shaped by history and nationalism, not ideology 
(Feigenbaum & Manning, 2012). This is also grounded by the claim 
made by Indonesia that nuclear energy is not only strategic way to fulfil 
national growing energy demand but also symbol of national pride (Amir, 
2010). 
 
Another factor for selecting Vietnam as case study is to understand 
ASEAN position with regard to border disputes with China. Border 
disputes between Vietnam and China also occur between Malaysia and 
China. These numerous disputes between some ASEAN Members with 
China might affect the possibility for an Asian nuclear multilateral 
institution that functions like Euratom. 
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The research framework for this case study was developed based on 
the state’s nuclear policies, foreign policies and previous cooperation 
with nuclear supplier groups, in particular the US and other western 
countries. Foreign policies are reflected by the state through three 
patterns of actions: (1) maintaining the balance of power, (2) 
domination, and (3) politics of prestige, which refers to impressing other 
states with the extent of one’s own power (Griffiths, 1999). This 
explained Sukarno’s nuclear weapon aspiration, before it ended in 1966 
(Cornejo, 2008). 
5.3 Research Hypothesis 
As a developing region that depends on agriculture and manufacturing, 
ASEAN is more interested in developing the society and economic 
conditions of member nations. This is supported by the argument made 
by Satoh Yukio who observed that during the cold war, Europe was 
preoccupied with nuclear war, while Asia's main concern was with 
economic development (Acharya, 1997). Although Indonesia formerly 
announced its interest in the development of nuclear weapons, it later 
shifted its position to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Its 
declared interest is focused only on economic and social development.  
Similarly, following the suffering endured in the Vietnam War, Vietnam is 
also more interested in social and economic development rather than 
the development of weapon mass destruction. Thus, the primary aim of 
regional cooperation has been economic, and not for political or military 
gain. Hence, in general, developing countries are not interested in 
getting involved in issues that might delay their nuclear power 
programmes and the foremost consideration is an instrument that could 
guarantee the long-term supply of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, the cost of 
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building enrichment or reprocessing facilities is high besides additional 
costs for personnel, nuclear security and safeguards infrastructures. 
Hence, any mechanism or proposal that could guarantee fuel supply 
without any disruption is highly desirable.  
5.4 Research Questions 
The following research questions are addressed as guidelines for the 
study framework: 
i. What are the factors that ASEAN will consider before they 
volunteer to join MNA?  
ii. Does ASEAN trust Supplier States to ensure long-term 
sustainability for their future nuclear energy and fuel resources by 
joining the MNA?  
 
In order to answer these research questions, we need to explore 
general knowledge of nuclear security and non-proliferation in ASEAN. 
By understanding these, we are able to understand motivation and 
incentives by ASEAN towards their interest in nuclear power program.  
5.5  Nuclear Security and Non-Proliferation in ASEAN 
The Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh 
on April 2012 under the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) 
stated that, 
 
We welcome the idea to develop a network amongst nuclear 
regulatory bodies in Southeast Asia which would enable 
regulators to exchange nuclear related information and 
experiences on best practice, enhance cooperation and develop 
capacities on nuclear safety, security and safeguards 
(ASEANTOM, 2013). 
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Contemplation of nuclear energy for ASEAN countries is not new, but 
with growing demand for imported fossil fuels and concerns over the 
environment, it is much more serious today. ASEAN nations are bound 
by the Treaty on the SEANWFZ signed in Bangkok, which opened for 
signature on December 15, 1995, and entered into force on March 28, 
1997. The treaty states that there will be no prejudice against the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy (Article 4). It also states that prior to 
embarking on nuclear programmes, political buy-in is needed from the 
IAEA and from other ASEAN nations. 
 
Nuclear non-proliferation concerns and safeguards will be very 
important as ASEAN proceeds in developing its nuclear power 
capabilities. Only one ASEAN country, namely Burma/Myanmar, was 
alleged to have any plan for developing nuclear weapons (Bower, 2010; 
see also Albright & Christina, 2011). Those allegations are being 
investigated by the IAEA and are denied by Myanmar’s leaders (Albright 
& Christina, 2011). When a country decides to start a nuclear power 
programme, there is an urgent need, not only for the particular country 
but also for the region, to develop strategies to strengthen regional 
safety and security. It is not necessary to create new a regional system 
of nuclear governance that may duplicate the existing international 
system, especially new regional treaty-based systems that impose 
overlapping regional and international obligations in nuclear power 
programme implementation on states. Thus, it is important to engage 
with all states in SEA to ensure the safety and security of the region. 
This region should not be the platform or transit for any party that is 
interested in illegal activities, where this whole region may have to pay 
for the crime collectively. Thus, there is an urgent need for regional 
cooperation to facilitate nuclear energy development within ASEAN in a 
safe and secure manner if ASEAN is serious about having nuclear 
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power programmes within this region. Strong safety and security will 
boost the economy of this region. 
 
In developing ASEAN nuclear safety regime, it can strategize and seek 
cooperation with international entities such as the IAEA, other 
international and regional bodies, to establish other regional networks 
for early notification of nuclear accidents, develop a regional emergency 
preparedness and response plan, and strengthen capacity building in 
the region on nuclear safety issues. In view of these significant factors, 
there is a need for ASEAN to comply with the international systems of 
nuclear governance. However, the possibility of the denial of technology, 
for political reasons, is also a factor that needs to be considered. Given 
the sensitivity of nuclear power technology, especially its symbiotic 
relation with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, almost the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle is subject to international control under the relevant 
treaties and agreements.  
 
ASEAN is often criticized by western for not doing enough with regards 
to nuclear security. ASEAN members claim that it is a regional structure 
enabling economic cooperation with the goal of improving economic 
standards in the region and is not designed to deal with sensitive 
security issues (ICSA, 2012). However, ASEAN has always associated 
itself with international efforts to strengthen nuclear security. The 
creation of ASIANTOM represents a major effort by them to strengthen 
nuclear security in the region. Various efforts have also been taken by 
individual states, particularly by those who have shown an interest in 
nuclear power programmes. 
 
Indonesia has lent both political and diplomatic support to proposals for 
a nuclear security regime within a UN structure and has shown strong 
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commitment. So far, the country has demonstrated good tangible 
progress in legal, regulatory and verification on nuclear security. 
Indonesia faces terrorism threats, especially after the Bali bombings, 
and the latest Jakarta attacks in January 2016 for which ISIS claimed 
responsibility. However, through research carried out by King’s College 
London in 2012, Indonesia considered the terrorist threat in the region 
as remote and not as serious as westerners alleged (ICSA, 2012). 
Indonesia is confident in the ability of existing legislation to deal with 
terrorism and suggests that the current counter-terrorism laws were 
perhaps too draconian. Indonesia believes that the perception of 
vulnerability to a nuclear terrorist threat was predominantly manipulated 
by Western countries, and certainly not universally felt (ICSA, 2012). 
Along with Indonesia, its fellow ASEAN country, Vietnam also feels that 
the nuclear terrorism threat is improbable and remote. The Vietnamese 
agree that since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, terrorism has become a 
global threat. However, although the terrorism threat is real, the 
Vietnamese sees this threat as low due to the political stability in the 
country (ICSA, 2012).    
 
After generally understand the security and proliferation of ASEAN, in 
the next section we will examined the case study of Indonesia and 
Vietnam to understand their efforts and inspiration for nuclear power 
program. 
 
5.6 Case Study 1: Indonesia 
5.6.1 Country Profile and Nuclear Power Programme 
 
As of 2014, the Indonesian population was 257.6 million (The World 
Bank, 2015), which makes Indonesia the World’s fourth most populous 
nation and the 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power 
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parity. Indonesia declared its independence shortly before Japan 
surrendered, but it took another four years before the Netherlands 
agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1949 (CIA Indonesia, 2015). Indonesia, 
similar to other developing countries, is facing poverty and 
unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, terrorism, 
consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, 
implementing economic and financial reforms and unequal resource 
distribution among regions (Bhasin & Venkataramany, 2010; see also 
CFE-DMHA, 2015). Finding solutions for these problems is the main 
intention behind the Government of Indonesia’s long-term plan for 
alleviating and improving its society, economy and national security 
(Indonesia Investments, n.d). The plan, which is known as the National 
Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) for 2005-2025, was established 
under the Law Number 17 of 2007. It is being implemented through four 
separate medium-term plans with a period of five years for each term. 
The Government of Indonesia has also introduced The Master plan for 
Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development 
(MP3EI) with a function as a complementary working document for the 
RPJPN (Ministry For Economic Affairs, 2011). Amongst the strategies 
planned by Indonesia is an emphasis on the development of its 
infrastructure, especially with the increase of electric power capacity 
(CIA Indonesia, 2015). 
 
Indonesia started to review its energy plan that developed in the 1990s 
and explored the potential of nuclear energy after electricity demand 
became one of the major issues for Indonesia after oil output started 
falling. Indonesia’s oil production has fallen from 1.4 million barrels per 
day in 2000 to less than 900,000 barrels per day in mid-2006. This is the 
lowest level in 35 years, and has left Indonesia, which is Asia’s only 
member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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(OPEC) and a net importer of oil since 2003, unable to fill its OPEC 
quota of 1.45 million barrels per day (Malley, 2006). In the National 
Energy Policy, the Government of Indonesia has projected that energy 
demand for Indonesia by 2050 will be primarily contributed by new and 
renewable energy (31%) and oil contribution will decrease from 49% in 
2010 to only 20% by 2050. This projection is based on economic 
growth, population growth, industrial and transportation growth, and 
electricity energy demand growth (Santoso, 2017). During Indonesia’s 
Third Plenary Session of National Energy Council in June 2016, 
Indonesia President, Joko Widodo emphasized the need for an energy 
roadmap to explore the potential of nuclear power for development of 
Indonesia’s social and economy development. In this regard, the nuclear 
power program as stated in the National Energy Policy (KEN), has been 
defined in the Action Plan / General Planning of Nuclear Energy (RUEN) 
as follows (Santoso, 2017): to construct an experimental power reactor 
and reactor laboratory for nuclear experts to conduct research in nuclear 
fields in order to preserve knowledge already gained; and to encourage 
international cooperation with the purpose of up-to-date advancements 
of relevant technology. 
 
In 2006 the Government of Indonesia called for the first reactor to be 
completed by 2016, but the timeline was pushed back due to political 
and bureaucratic infighting. Later, according to Indonesia’s 2007 
National Long-term Development Plan 2005-2025 Year, Act No. 17, it 
was planned that Indonesia’s first power plant would start operating 
between 2015 and 2019. In February 2014, Jakarta announced plans to 
begin construction on a 30MW nuclear power plant located at Serpong 
Banten in western Java. However, in August 2015, the Energy and 
Mineral Resources Ministry recommended that the country’s first nuclear 
power plant be completed in 2024 (NTI Indonesia, 2015). It remains to 
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be seen whether this plan will go ahead on time. According to research 
carried out by the King’s College London in 2011, the Fukushima 
disaster has delayed Indonesia’s nuclear energy plans by at least three 
to four years (ICSA, 2012). Indonesian officials said that the plan will 
continue as it is already under the Law 7/2007 but is slowing down due 
to human resource issues and negative public perceptions, which have 
become more serious after the Fukushima incident (Amir 2010; Anthony 
et.al, 2014). Overall, Indonesia is clear that the construction of a nuclear 
energy infrastructure is still very likely in the long-term, and the 
Fukushima crisis had not removed either the economic argument or 
legislative basis underlying its development (ICSA, 2012; see also CNS, 
CENESS & VCDNP 2012). 
 
5.6.2  Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and Policy on Multilateral 
Cooperation 
 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy was designed with the mandate and 
strategies to guarantee its national interests and sovereignty are 
protected. These strategies indeed will benefit Indonesia by building 
confidence among international communities for its nuclear power 
programme. This could be seen from the direction and strategies of 
Indonesian foreign policy, such as taking on a more significant role in 
preserving national security and creating world peace which is aligned 
with Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy and consistently 
asserted by Indonesia in international forums in addressing issues on 
world peace and security, including Middle East peace efforts. This is to 
support Indonesia’s efforts in handling terrorism issues. In term of 
economy, Indonesia’s foreign policy is focusing on strengthening 
strategic partnerships in the regions of Asia Pacific and America-
Europe; and improving the quality of economic diplomacy in multilateral 
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forums through active participation in multilateral forums such as the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), APEC, G-20, and G-33 to further 
promote the interests of Indonesia and other developing countries. 
Indonesia also converging its economy strategic by increasing the 
South-South cooperation. This should be developed in order to mutually 
assist in creating independence, accelerating development and fostering 
solidarity among developing countries. For those countries, the South-
South Cooperation mechanism can provide a tool to create a better 
leverage in their relations with developed countries. Indonesia believes 
that developing countries should actively identify each of their own 
advantages to be synergised in order to create a collective power 
(MOFA Indonesia, 2009). 
 
Indonesian diplomacy has demonstrated a strengthened performance in 
bilateral, regional and multilateral relations. Indonesia’s efforts for the 
success of multilateral and regional diplomacy are intensified by strong 
bilateral diplomacy. As specified in the Decree of the Director General 
for Multilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
No.00148/PL/II/2010/46/06 on the Establishment of the Directorate 
General of Multilateral Affairs Strategic Plan Year 2010-2014, 
Indonesia’s foreign policy was aimed at improving its active role in the 
implementation of international peace and security, enhancing economic 
cooperation, society and culture, finance, environment, trade, industry 
etc., through stabilisation and enhancement of international cooperation 
in multilateral affairs (MOFA Indonesia, 2009; see also RSM, 2014). 
Consequently, a programme was established under the frame of 
“Improvement of Indonesia’s Role and Diplomacy in Multilateral Affairs” 
that comprised strategies: to improve Indonesia’s participation and 
initiative in multilateral forums, identify and conduct a critical review for 
the sake of efficiency on Indonesia’s participation in organisations of 
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multilateral cooperation by analysing the direct benefits for its national 
interest, and to boost cross-sectoral endorsement in the implementation 
of multilateral cooperation (MOFA Indonesia, 2009). 
 
5.6.3  Indonesia’s Policy on Nuclear Programme for Peaceful 
Purposes and MNA 
 
Based on its current nuclear activities and active participation in nuclear 
treaties and conventions, Indonesia is indicating an interest in nuclear 
technology that is genuinely for peaceful use only. Political observers 
and non-proliferation analysts agree that Indonesia is not interested in 
possessing a nuclear weapons programme, although Indonesia’s former 
President Sukarno had considered the option in the mid-1960s. This 
idea from Indonesia was announced in July 1965, soon after China 
tested its first nuclear device in October 1964 (Cornejo, 2000). Political 
and strategic analysts believe that Sukarno’s nuclear weapon aspiration 
was motivated by security threats that Indonesia felt from the West. This 
escalated when the Britain supported the establishment of the 
Federation of Malaysia which was opposed by Indonesia (Fitzpatrick, 
2009a). This aspiration could have also been driven by thoughts that it 
would benefit him to generate domestic support for his regime due to the 
unstable political climate of the country at that time (Fitzpatrick, 2009a). 
Moreover, Sukarno believed that nuclear weapons capability would 
enhance respect for Indonesia’s image among the great powers such as 
Britain, China, and the U.S. However, Indonesia's desires to become a 
nuclear weapon state ended when Sukarno was forced to transfer 
presidential power to General Suharto in 1966 (Cornejo, 2000). A year 
later, Indonesia committed to international safeguards on sensitive 
nuclear materials and equipment. Since then, Indonesia has been 
committed to the peaceful application of nuclear technology and no 
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political leaders have shown an interest in developing nuclear weapons 
(Fitzpatrick, 2009a). These commitments were further demonstrated 
when Indonesia signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1979. 
Indonesia became the first country in SEA to accede to the Additional 
Protocol in 1999. The country has also implemented the IAEA Integrated 
Safeguards, including the Additional Protocol in 2003.  
 
Indonesia’s decision on nuclear matters seems to be influenced by the 
people who are, in the majority, Muslims, and this could be due to its 
relations with Iran. Despite their difference in Islamic orientation, 
Indonesia has a good relationship with Iran. The majority of Muslims in 
Iran are Shiite while Indonesia is predominantly Sunni. In this 
connection, it is understandable why Iran is seeking Indonesian’s 
support for its nuclear power programme. During Indonesia’s economic 
crisis in the late 1990s, Iran promised to improve economic relations and 
to invest in Indonesia’s oil and gas sector, yet little has come of these 
initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 4, Iran’s nuclear programme became 
an international issue soon after the IAEA report in 2005 concluded that 
the Iranian government had failed to report several aspects of its 
uranium enrichment projects according to the Safeguard Agreements of 
the NPT. Iran was very optimistic of Indonesia’s support for its nuclear 
programme and more so when Indonesia was appointed as a non-
permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) in 
2007 for the period of two years. This appointment allowed Indonesia to 
get involved in the discussion of a draft resolution to address the Iranian 
nuclear issues for the first time. In principle, the Indonesian government 
supported Iran’s nuclear programme provided it was genuinely for 
peaceful purposes and carried it out in a transparent manner under 
IAEA supervision and verification. In the direction of moving towards a 
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, Indonesia put forward several 
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amendments to the initial draft sponsored by P5+1. The amendments 
included: (1) affirming that all parties to the NPT, including Iran, have the 
right to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes; (2) the 
inclusion of a reference regarding the need to establish a weapons-of-
mass-destruction free zone in the Middle East; (3) declaring that the 
negotiation process should be carried out in the spirit of “good will to 
reach immediate solutions that are mutually acceptable to all parties”; 
and (4) maintaining that all international sanctions would be removed if 
Iran complied with the provisions provided in the UNSC resolutions 
(Gindarsah, 2012). These proposed amendments to the Resolution 
1747 were then accepted and approved by the UNSC’s permanent and 
non-permanent members, including the Indonesian government. 
 
The decision not only disappointed the Iranian government, but also the 
Indonesian public. Although Resolution 1747 contained no clauses 
concerning the potential use of force against Iran, Indonesia’s approval 
of additional sanctions on Iran sparked criticisms in Indonesia. The 
majority of the public are Muslims and they disagreed with the 
government’s approval of Resolution 1747. They believed that the 
decision had neglected the aspirations of its Muslim population, which 
opposed Western intimidation of Iran. They also blamed the government 
for succumbing to the schemes of Western countries to secure the 
interests of their key ally in the Middle East — Israel - and accused the 
government of caving into US pressure, possibly as a result of a bilateral 
meeting between President Yudhoyono and President George W. Bush 
in Bogor, which had taken place several months prior to the UN vote 
(Malley, 2006). These conventional explanations of the domestic 
opposition to Indonesia’s support for Resolution 1747 tend to focus on 
religious affinities between Indonesia and Iran, or a clash of civilizations 
between the West and the Muslim world. People in Indonesia believed 
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that the UNSC’s suspicions regarding the military potential of Iran’s 
uranium enrichment activities were premature and unsubstantiated. 
Accordingly, they urged the government to support Iran’s peaceful 
nuclear programme (Gindarsah, 2012). Thus, given public opinion, 
Indonesia’s House of Representatives called for the Government of 
Indonesia to support and cooperate with Iran on its nuclear enrichment, 
as long it was designed with peaceful objectives (Malley, 2006).  
 
In March 2008, Iran was penalised again because of its stand on 
nuclear enrichment. The UNSC had voted on Resolution 1803, which 
was designed to impose additional sanctions on Iran. However, 
influenced by domestic politics, in contrast to its decision on the 
Resolution 1747, Indonesia’s representative at the UN abstained from 
the vote for the adoption of Resolution 1803. This decision was also 
based on a report by the IAEA in February 2008 which stated that the 
Iranian government had agreed to make its nuclear programme more 
transparent, and to undertake the necessary measures as required 
under Resolution 1737 and Resolution 1747. Thus, with this 
development, the Indonesian government viewed that further sanctions 
on Iran were unnecessary. At the domestic level, the government’s 
decision to abstain was welcomed by its public (Gindarsah, 2012).  
 
These scenarios have demonstrated that despite the technocratic nature 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy-making, domestic politics have gained new 
weight in the current democratic political atmosphere. Indonesia is most 
likely to exercise its influence upon foreign affairs if these affect 
ideological lines and political interests on a given international issue, 
particularly involving a Muslim country (Gindarsah, 2012). The 
foundation for the unity of Indonesia’s people is underpinned by the five 
principles of Pancasila: belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, 
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nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, 
and social justice (Morfit, 1981; see also Gindarsah, 2012; Martoredjo, 
2016). In the realm of Indonesia’s foreign affairs, Pancasila created the 
so-called dual-identity dilemma for Indonesian governments. On one 
hand, the Indonesian government has to maintain the non-theocratic 
nature of the country’s foreign policy for pragmatic national interests and 
priorities. On the other hand, it cannot ignore the aspirations of Muslims 
in the decision-making process due to the possibility of negative 
domestic repercussions. In practical terms, many Muslim communities 
look to the government to maintain or improve the country’s bilateral 
relations with Muslim countries and play a more active role in 
addressing issues in the Islamic world. In this context, the aspirations of 
Indonesia’s Muslims serve as a societal constraint, rather than a driving 
factor in the country’s foreign policy decision-making process and 
interstate relations. However, Indonesia maintained its position that 
nuclear technology is only for peaceful use and the benefits should be 
fairly obtained by all Members of the IAEA (Baharuddin, 2014c).  
 
5.6.4 The Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle from 
Indonesia’s Perspective  
 
Although Indonesia is a prominent member of ASEAN, and supports the 
SEANWFZ and ASEANTOM, Jakarta is doubtful about the initiatives on 
multilateral export control regimes including the NSG, the Australia 
Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). Indonesia has generally viewed them as 
supply cartels that will obstruct the transfer of nuclear technology to 
developing countries. Indonesia continues to advocate strongly for the 
protection of the rights of NNWS to peaceful uses for nuclear 
technology, as agreed by all NPT Signatory States. Indonesia worries 
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about the non-universal non-proliferation mechanisms limiting the 
access of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to technologies for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This supports by the position of 
Indonesia that consistently strongly defended the right of all NPT 
members to access peaceful nuclear technology (Lieggi, 2012) 
 
The same concern was raised by Indonesia with regards to the MNA 
during the 52nd IAEA General Conference in Vienna by the Head of 
Indonesian Delegation: “In the context of the development of a new 
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, Indonesia fully supports 
the inalienable rights of the State’s party to the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. We are of the view that 
the creation of a multilateral fuel cycle arrangement, which among 
others would guarantee the security of nuclear fuel supply, is a 
complementary mechanism for strengthening the existing non-
proliferation regime. The objectives and modalities to establish such 
arrangements should not terminate or restrict the right of each state to 
develop nuclear technology,” (Artauli Ratna, 2008).  
 
In a similar position with many other developing countries, Indonesia 
agrees that the MNA should not deny the inalienable rights of the States 
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the 
NPT (Tjiptosumirat, 2015). The approach should be a tool for fuel 
assurance and all relevant aspects such as technical, legal, economic 
and political are thoroughly addressed beforehand and the final decision 
has to be taken by consensus from all participating member states. 
Indonesia’s outlook on the MNA was clearly cited during the 53rd IAEA 
General Conference held in Vienna, 
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In our view, any proposal brought forward should not in any way 
hinder the rights of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear 
science and technology for peaceful purposes, including in the 
field of the nuclear fuel cycle. Indonesia appreciates the 
discussions and current proposals on the issue of assurance of 
nuclear fuel supply. However, Indonesia concurs with the view 
that this complex issue requires our cautious consideration to 
ensure all of the association technical, legal, economic and 
political aspects are thoroughly addressed and taken into account 
before the final decision is made. Any future decision in this 
regard has to be taken by consensus, taking into account the 
views and concerns of all Member States (Wibowo , 2009).  
 
This stance was repeatedly emphasized during the interview with one of 
the Indonesia’s senior officer, Totti Tjiptosumirat, who is a Head of 
Bureau for Legal, Public Relation and Cooperation, BATAN Indonesia. 
The interview was carried out in Vienna, Austria on the 14th September 
2015 (Baharuddin, 2014a). 
 
Even though actively promoting the NPT and other security and non-
proliferation treaties in the SEA region, Indonesia is less keen on any 
efforts to strengthen national nuclear security and proliferation that is 
proposed by other states, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) by the U.S. These trade control initiatives were proposed by 
individual states or a group of states; especially nuclear supplier states 
with a motive to impose new non-proliferation and counter-proliferation 
requirements outside universally negotiated agreements. Indonesia has 
expressed its scepticism, maintaining that the country does not produce 
sensitive dual-use materials. In contrast to its position on PSI, Jakarta 
has generally supported other international efforts to improve nuclear 
security such as the Nuclear Security Summit, which was established to 
create model nuclear security legislation. Based on its participation in 
the CTBT and Nuclear Security Summit, Indonesia is more likely to 
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accept and implement initiatives for which it enjoys some level of 
ownership (Lieggi, 2012). 
 
Adherence to Indonesia’s commitments in nuclear security and non-
proliferation, backings by its policy on nuclear programme for peaceful 
purposes, foreign policy and policy on multilateral cooperation, have 
defined Indonesia’s peaceful inspiration for nuclear power program. 
Though Indonesia once was inspired for nuclear weapon development 
during Sukarno era, but its involvement in various non-proliferation and 
disarmament initiatives has substantiated Indonesia’s genuine interest in 
peaceful use of nuclear power program. These factors that being 
discussed in this chapter, has heightened the trust of international and 
nuclear supplier group towards Indonesia. This account is support by 
declaration make by IAEA Director General Muhammad Elbaradei 
during his visit to Indonesia in December 1999. In his statement, 
Elbaradei noted that Indonesia has participated responsibly in the non-
proliferation treaty. He presented that Indonesia’s nuclear power 
program was not an international threat and indicated that nuclear-
producing countries could consider Indonesia as a new potential 
customer. Indeed, the bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and the 
U.S. on nuclear safeguards and security in November 2004 had already 
established a trust between international community and Indonesia. 
Consequently, since the Government of Indonesia announced in May 
2006 that government had firmly decided to go nuclear, many nuclear 
supplier states such as Japan, South Korea, France, the U.S., Russia, 
and Canada have conveyed their willingness to assist Indonesia in 
embarking its first nuclear power plant (Amir, 2010). The next section 
will discuss Vietnam’s inspiration towards nuclear power program and 
findings from this case study would portrayed ASEAN’s direction in 
multilateral institution for nuclear program – ASIANTOM. 
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5.7 Case Study 2: Vietnam 
5.7.1 Country Profile and Nuclear Power Programme 
 
Vietnam borders China to the north, and Laos and Cambodia to the 
west. The population of Vietnam is estimated at 96.3 million (Vietnam 
World Population Review, 2015). The country declared its independence 
on the same day as Japan’s surrender in World War II, but France 
continued to rule for another 10 years until defeated by communist 
forces under Ho Chi Minh (Odell & Castillo, 2008). Vietnam was then 
divided into two parts, namely, communist North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam under anti-communists, which lasted until reunification in 1975 
(Shackford,1992). After this, the country experienced a downturn in its 
economy for more than a decade because of conservative leadership 
policies, the tyranny and mass migration of individuals who included 
many of the most successful South Vietnamese merchants and growing 
international isolation (Vu-Thanh, 2015; see also Vuong, 2014; Van 
Arkadie & Mallon, 2004). The government began to introduce its reform 
"doi moi" (economic renovation) policies in 1986, and the government 
was committed to increasing economic liberalisation; it endorsed 
structural reforms to modernise the economy and to produce more 
competitive, export-driven industries. Since then, Vietnam has changed 
from the rigidities of a centrally planned economy to a market driven 
economy with socialist orientation (VIETRADE, 2014; see also Vu-
Thanh, 2015; Vuong, 2014). As a result, Vietnam has achieved 
remarkable results in socio-economic development with its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growing at an annual average rate of 7.6 
percent since 1990, with all sectors rapidly growing (Vu-Thanh, 2015). 
Though the communist leaders still maintain their control of political 
affairs, they have demonstrated some flexibility and made some modest 
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steps towards better protection of human rights (WNA, 2015; see also 
Vu-Thanh, 2015). 
 
Like other developing nations, Vietnam’s ambitious plan to introduce 
nuclear energy is mainly to help with its growing demand for electricity. 
Vietnam’s power demand has grown and continues to grow rapidly, 
reflecting the country’s economic development. Between 2000 and 
2015, electricity peak demand grew from 4.9 GW to 25.8 GW or by an 
average of 12% annually. Latest projections are for continuing near-
double digit increases with peak demand reaching 42 GW by 2020, 63.5 
GW by 2025 and over 90 GW by 2030 (Economic Consulting 
Associates, 2016:8).  
 
Vietnam’s interest in developing nuclear power began in the early 
1980s, but the rationale for a civil nuclear-energy programme was only 
assessed seriously after 1995, (Fitzpatrick, 2009b), and firmly decided in 
2006 by the produce of two official document, namely “Strategy for 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy up to 2020,” in 2006; and “Strategy 
Implementation Master Plan,” in 2007 (Ogilvie-White, 2014). Vietnam is 
actively pursuing a nuclear energy programme and expects to have a 
2,000 MWe Russian-built power plant at Phuoc Dinh in the southern 
Ninh Thuan province and operational by 2020 with more planned in the 
future. In this regard, Vietnam is expected to highlight the importance of 
nuclear security for the successful implementation of its nuclear energy 
programme. This would then be followed by another 2000 MWe, using 
Japanese technology at Vinh Hai in the same province, followed by a 
further 6000 MWe by 2030, subsequently increased to having a total of 
15,000 MWe by 2030 (WNA, 2016). However, in January 2015 Vietnam 
announced a further delay due to continuing negotiations on technology 
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and financing, predicting construction start around 2019 (Anthony et.al, 
2014; see also WNA Vietnam, 2017). 
 
Vietnam’s one-party political system brings fewer constraints with 
regards to popular opposition as compared with its neighbours, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. This benefitted the government of Vietnam in 
making the decision to embark on a nuclear power programme. Even 
though the decision has been made and is partially funded by two big 
countries with existing nuclear power programmes, financial and human 
resource limitations may delay these plans. Vietnam’s rapid economic 
growth has resulted in a corresponding rapid increase in energy needs. 
Most notable here is the considerable growth in energy demand in all 
sectors, but particularly in industry, transport, and the residential sector 
in the 1990s and in the service sector (WNA Vietnam, 2017). The 
development of nuclear power is expected to bring many beneﬁts to 
Vietnam’s economy, such as diversiﬁcation of energy sources, energy 
security, protection of the environment, and development of national 
science and technology (Toan, Nguyen & Nguyen, 2011; see also 
Thränert, 2015). Vietnam’s interest in developing nuclear power began 
in the early 1980s, coinciding with the upgrade of the Dalat reactor. A 
study that was carried out by the Vietnamese recommended the 
introduction of nuclear power by 2015, when electricity demand would 
exceed 100 billion kWh. Since then, several feasibility studies have 
been undertaken. Nuclear energy is specifically mentioned in the Master 
Plan for The Development of Power Sources in Vietnam’s Power 
Development Plan 2011-2020 (the Power Master Plan VII), 
“Development of nuclear power plants to ensure stable power supply in 
the future as the primary sources of domestic energy will be depleted: 
putting the first nuclear power plant into operation in Vietnam in 2020; by 
the year 2030 nuclear power capacity will be 10,700 MW, producing 
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about 70.5 billion kWh which will account for 10.1% of electricity 
production” (NTI Vietnam, 2011).  
 
Russia is Vietnam’s primary nuclear cooperation partner, and in October 
2010 an intergovernmental agreement was signed between Vietnam 
and Russia that awarded a Russian company, Atomstroyexport, the 
contract to construct two reactors at Phuoc Dinh with a capacity 1,000 
MWe each. The initial plant will be built predominantly (85%) by 
Atomstroyexport and financed by the Russian government. Russia has 
guaranteed its cooperation on Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant based 
on the previous bilateral nuclear cooperation in reconstructing the Dalat 
reactor in the 1980s. In the same year, Vietnam also signed an 
agreement with Japan that offered to build two reactors with a capacity 
of 1,000 MWe each (ICSA, 2012). In addition, Vietnam has signed 
agreements with Japan for cooperation in infrastructure development for 
safeguards and nuclear security with respect to nuclear non-proliferation 
(World Nuclear Association, 2015).  
 
Initially, construction of Vietnam’s nuclear power plant was planned to 
begin in 2014 on the Russian reactors and in 2015 on the Japanese 
reactors. Then, in October 2013, Vietnam signed a 123 Agreement with 
the U.S. Following this pact, the US Secretary of State John Kerry made 
a statement, which indicated the potential of Vietnam’s nuclear plans 
despite the delays, “Vietnam has the second-largest market, after China, 
for nuclear power in East Asia, and our companies can now compete. 
What is a USD10 billion market today is expected to grow into a USD50 
billion market by the year 2030,” (Platte, 2014). The trust showed by 
many supplier states to Vietnam is grounded on Vietnam’s good track 
record through its previous agreements with supplier states. Since 2006, 
many nuclear agreements were signed between Vietnam and Canada, 
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China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. However, the plan 
was abandon in 2016 after the Vietnam’s National Assembly voted to 
delay the plan to build-up two multi-billion-dollar nuclear power plants 
with Russia and Japan. This decision was made after officials cited 
lower demand forecasts, limitations in infrastructure and human 
resources, rising costs and safety concerns, but the decision was mainly 
due to economic reasons and not because of any technological 
considerations (CNS, CENESS & VCDNP 2012; see also Nguyen & 
Minh, 2016). 
 
5.7.2 Vietnam’s Foreign Policy and Policy on Multilateral Nuclear 
Cooperation 
 
During his interview with reporter from the World and Vietnam Report, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pham Binh Minh 
pointed out that the philosophy of Vietnam’s diplomacy in 2014 was 
designed for the robust development of international integration and 
multilateral diplomacy across all sectors, along with the transformation 
of multilateral diplomacy from “active participation” to “proactive 
contribution to shaping the rules of the game”. This indicated that 
multilateral diplomacy has made important contributions to further 
heightening Vietnam’s stature as an active and responsible member of 
the international community (MOFA Vietnam, 2015). Vietnam also 
applied its foreign policy with neighbouring countries on an equal and 
mutually beneficial basis and believes that this policy will have multi-
dimensional impacts on Vietnam’s peace and security. Thus, Vietnam is 
confident that if there are any differences, they can be settled through 
peaceful means, taking into account each other’s interests, and in 
conformity with the fundamental principles of international law. The good 
relations with other countries help to create a peaceful and stable 
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environment, contributing to national development and safeguarding 
national sovereignty (MOFA Vietnam, 2015). 
 
5.7.3 Vietnam’s Policy on Nuclear Programme for Peaceful 
Purposes and MNA 
 
When Vietnam decided to pursue nuclear energy as part of its strategies 
to enhance the economy, the Government formulated a policy on the 
use of atomic energy to ensure it was only for peaceful purposes. It has 
approved the policy on nuclear energy, which has included the Strategy 
on Atomic Energy Application until 2020 in 2006, the country’s Master 
Plan for applying atomic energy for peaceful purposes in 2007 and the 
Law on Atomic Energy which came into effect in 2009 (MOFA Vietnam, 
2010). During a press briefing in Washington on April 13, 2010 after the 
final session of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Minister of Science 
and Technology Hoang Van Phong clearly and firmly stated that 
Vietnam’s policy on the nuclear power programme was only for peaceful 
purposes. This position is supported by his statement, “To ensure 
security when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Vietnam has 
carried out the three main requirements: joining and implementing 
international treaties and participating in international institutions and 
multi and bilateral initiatives,” (MOFA Vietnam, 2010). 
 
In 2005, VAEC chairman Vuong Huu Tan stated that Vietnam had not 
considered studying uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing and 
this commitment was again pledged during the negotiations of the U.S.-
Vietnam 123 Agreement in October 2013. Vietnam made a commitment 
to depend on international fuel markets for nuclear fuel rather than 
acquiring enrichment or reprocessing technology (Malley & Ogilvie-
White, 2012).  
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Vietnam’s potential for nuclear proliferation could be studied through 
four perspectives: firstly within its relationship with China and other 
neighbouring countries in relation to disputes over the South China Sea, 
where Vietnam, China, and a number of other countries in SEA have 
competing claims over the oil and gas rich territory (Ogilvie-White, 
2014), secondly through the history of Vietnam’s ambitious plan to 
create an Indochinese federation known as sub-regional domination, 
thirdly by balancing the power of China and Russia in East Asia, and 
finally, through building up domestic political power, as Vietnam is 
currently ruled by a one-party system that is led by the Communist Party 
of Vietnam. These perspectives might be the proliferation drivers and 
may give Vietnam a reason to consider keeping a nuclear weapons 
option open. This undeniably will position Vietnam in a group of states 
that rationally attracts the attention of proliferation observers and 
analysts, regardless of its current non-proliferation and disarmament 
commitment and credentials. 
 
Vietnam’s relationship with its neighbour China, a nuclear weapon state, 
is obviously fragile. Vietnam and China established formal ties in 1950 
and the relationship was good when China supported Vietnam with aid, 
which was estimated at up to USD20 billion worth of assistance during 
the Vietnam War in 1950-1975 (Koo, 2010). However, Vietnam and 
China started to have border differences when China seized the Paracel 
Islands, which led to protests by Vietnam (Khoo, 2010; see also Amir, 
2010; Ciorciari & Weiss, 2012). The situation become worse in 1978, 
when Vietnam and the Soviets signed an alliance, then invaded 
Chinese-backed Cambodia and attacked China border patrols. These 
actions provoked China and as a result, China brought up land and 
maritime disputes and stopped all aid to Vietnam. China also declared 
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war with Vietnam and this was the starting point of the Sino-Vietnam 
War with border clashes lasting for a decade. There were three major 
confrontations, but the third confrontation on March 13–14 1988, known 
as the Naval Battle, was the most violent (Koo, 2010). The relationship 
between Vietnam and China started to break down after the dispute 
over territorial issues in the South China Sea, which is rich in oil and gas 
(Khoo, 2010; see also Amir, 2010; Ciorciari & Weiss, 2012). The 
Vietnamese are concerned that China’s territorial ambitions, which are 
also shared by other Asian countries, could lead to a military conflict in 
the region (PewResearchCenter, 2014). Considering Vietnam’s uneasy 
relationship with a nuclear-weapon-state and increasingly militarily 
powerful China, the history of the Sino-Vietnamese War cannot be 
ignored as a factor that may spark proliferation decisions to reconsider 
the nuclear-weapons option. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the leadership 
of Vietnam had pursued an ambitious plan to create an Indochinese 
federation under its control. With the help of military and financial 
assistance from the Soviet Union, Vietnam established domination over 
Cambodia and Laos (Fitzpatrick, 2009b). 
 
Neighbouring countries with nuclear weapon capabilities (namely, China 
and Russia), along with their enormous military size and Vietnam’s 
experience of chemical warfare by the U.S. during the Vietnam War, 
could encourage Vietnam to strengthen its military personnel and 
infrastructure. Vietnam’s military personnel currently stand at 
approximately 412,000 with 5 million reserves, making it the country with 
the largest military manpower in the SEA (GFP, 2015). Having huge 
military strength along with its rapid economic expansion, might give 
Vietnam reason to seek dual-use nuclear capabilities either 
clandestinely or openly (Fitzpatrick, 2009b) with the view of balancing 
Chinese and Russian military power in East Asia.  
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Vietnam follows a one-party system and is led by the Communist Party 
of Vietnam. Despite pursuing economic reforms, the party shows little 
willingness to give up its monopoly on political power (BBC Asia, 
2015b). The one-party system also makes the Vietnam leadership quite 
authoritarian, where any decision by the government has to be fully 
supported by the people. Many Vietnamese, especially the younger 
generation, long for changes and the resulting economic opportunities, 
which would increase foreign investment and create, better job 
opportunities. However, Vietnam's leadership has been hesitant to open 
the economy to outsiders. It believes that too many foreign influences 
would discredit communism by supporting "Western" values such as 
capitalism, democracy, and human rights. Thus, Vietnam leaders are 
comfortable with its centrally controlled economy, one-party political 
system, and historic fear of foreign interaction despite the growing 
pressures for change in a rapidly globalising world (Pierre, 2000).  For 
this reason, Vietnam's foreign policy is formulated with reactive 
strategies to achieve maximum flexibility for the realization of its national 
interests without any pressure from outside. However, when national 
identity was at stake, Vietnam could defend its national interests in a 
more conventional diplomatic framework, such as participation in 
ASEAN (Elliott, 1983).  
 
Therefore, several factors such as Vietnam’s restraint against the 
foreign influences (such as distress on China’s threat), campaign on 
democracy, and human rights, as well as the leader’s endurance to 
maintain their political power are some factors that need to be 
considered as to whether they could be a start for Vietnam’s nuclear 
weapon aspiration. 
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However, there is no evidence or literature to indicate that Vietnam has 
ever publicly announced an interest in developing or pursuing sensitive 
nuclear technologies that would give it a weapons option, unlike 
Indonesia, which publicly announced its aspiration for nuclear weapons 
during Sukarno’s reign. Furthermore, there is no indication that Vietnam 
currently envisages any nuclear aspirations beyond the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy (Fitzpatrick, 2009b). Strategic experts believe that the 
lack of nuclear-weapons aspirations during the Cold War era Vietnam 
can be explained by the close alliance between the Soviets and 
Vietnam. This long-standing political, economic and military relationship 
has provided Vietnam with sophisticated conventional weaponry and 
equipment until the late 1980s (Baev & Tønnesson, 2015). Therefore, 
participation in the international order also appears to have played an 
important role in controlling proliferation dynamics in Vietnam during the 
Cold War. Political observers have suggested that Vietnamese leaders 
began to look to the evolving non-proliferation regimes to provide an 
enhanced-security alternative when Vietnam signed the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1980 and NPT (1982). Vietnam 
maintains its commendable non-proliferation record that includes signing 
the IAEA Additional Protocol and ratification of the CTBT. In 1976, the 
communist government of the newly unified Vietnam established the 
Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC), with their mission to 
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To date, however, the 
VAEC’s work has been largely limited to nuclear research and various 
non-energy-related nuclear applications, in addition to laying the plans 
for the eventual introduction of nuclear power. 
 
Vietnam is clear in its policy not to decide on nuclear weapons, which 
was firmly stated by their Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, who 
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delivered a statement at a meeting of the Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 26, 2013, 
 
Once victimized by wars and still struggling to overcome their 
consequences, Vietnam’s consistent policy is to uphold peace, 
oppose war and support all efforts for disarmament, especially 
the disarmament of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction, in accordance with the UN Charter and international 
law (MOFA Vietnam, 2013). 
 
Like other SEA countries, Vietnam’s policy is to promote disarmament 
and preserve peace and protest against war. This policy was cited by 
Vietnam State President, Nguyen Minh Triet during the UNSC summit in 
New York on 24 September 2009. In his speech, President Triet said 
that the Vietnamese nation has suffered from war, and that is why they 
are passionate for peace not only in Vietnam but for the rest of the 
world. During the summit, Vietnam emphasised, particularly to all 
countries that possess nuclear weapons, that they should carry out 
nuclear disarmament and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons 
altogether, for the prevention of nuclear war. President Triet’s speech 
during the summit strongly indicated to other world leaders Vietnam’s 
stance on nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear technology,  
 
Vietnam proposes that international negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament should begin as soon as possible and States 
recognised as having the biggest nuclear arsenals should be in 
the vanguard of nuclear disarmament. It is an urgent necessity in 
the interests of securing world peace (MOFA Vietnam, 2009). 
 
This policy also has been quoted during the 54th IAEA General 
Conference in Vienna by Vietnam Deputy Minister of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology,  
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As a responsible Member State, Vietnam has fully fulfilled its 
obligations and commitments to the Agency and at the same 
time, supported and participated in the international initiatives and 
efforts on the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
non-proliferation” (Tien, 2010) 
 
Demonstrating its commitment towards nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament together with most other NAM states, Vietnam condemned 
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and voted in favour of 
UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in 2008 (ICSA, 2012). In 2005, 
VAEC chairman Vuong Huu Tan said that Vietnam had not considered 
studying uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing. Furthermore, 
Vietnam’s advocacy of global non-proliferation and disarmament norms 
has been expressed in the context of its experience of toxic chemicals 
during the Vietnam War and its empathy for those who have suffered 
nuclear attacks. Do Thanh Hai of CSCAP Vietnam sums up this 
sentiment, 
 
Our country was nearly a target of a nuclear attack by the Nixon 
administration in 1972. Luckily, it did not happen. However, 30 
years after the end of the war, Vietnamese people and the world 
have witnessed hundreds of thousands of children affected by a 
chemical weapon known as Agent Orange massively sprayed 
onto Vietnam’s soils. So, from the historical perspective, we, the 
Vietnamese people, understand the spiritual and material loss of 
the Japanese people in August 1945, and how Iranians suffered 
from Iraqi forces’ chemical weapons in the 1980s (ICSA, 2012). 
 
Along with other SEA countries, Vietnam does not see terrorism as a 
threat to the SEA region and does not think that this region is at risk 
from nuclear terrorism. However, SEA states do not take it for granted 
and do not tolerate any activities that intend to use this region as a hub 
for illegal nuclear activities. Vietnam has engaged in its policy with 
placing a top priority on nuclear security, especially after the decision to 
pursue nuclear energy. During the high-level meeting on nuclear safety 
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and security convened by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in New 
York on 22 Sept 2011, Vietnamese Ambassador Bui The Giang, who is 
also Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, stated that nuclear 
weapons and the possibility of nuclear proliferation have posed a 
serious threat to humans and the environment (MOFA Vietnam, 2011). 
 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung again stressed this during the 2012 
Nuclear Security Summit, that Vietnam is consistently pursuing the 
policy of using nuclear power for peaceful purposes only. On these 
measures, Vietnam, like other developing countries, stands by the facts 
that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are 
the most important factors in developing the technology, however, 
countries still have the legitimate rights to use nuclear energy and 
technology as long as it is only for peaceful purposes. Hence, Vietnam 
has been actively constructing legal frameworks, safe infrastructure and 
nuclear security and participating in relevant international treaties and 
initiatives to demonstrate its commitments (MOFA Vietnam, 2012).  
 
As a developing country new in the nuclear arena, Vietnam understands 
that to implement and strengthen its nuclear security and safeguards 
infrastructures and frameworks, it needs assistance and support from 
other countries. Thus, Vietnam is active in bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, including regional cooperation, to accelerate the 
construction of a peaceful, and stable Vietnam and its region. The 
country has signed six cooperative agreements on the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes with Russia, China, France, India, the 
Republic of Korea and Argentina. Then, in 2014 Vietnam signed an 
agreement with the U.S. on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Nikitin et al., 2014) and has declared their support for the 
global initiative on anti-nuclear terrorism initiated by Russia and the U.S. 
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when they signed the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism (GICNT) in 2010 (Erästö & Herbach, 2016). In additional, 
Vietnam has taken part in a number of international initiatives, including 
changing nuclear fuel from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low level-
enriched uranium (LEU) (MOFA Vietnam, 2010).   
  
Vietnam has carried out the three main requirements to ensure security 
when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which include joining 
and implementing international treaties and participating in international 
institutions and cooperation through multi and bilateral initiatives. 
Vietnam has signed in 13 out of 16 international treaties relating to 
nuclear safety, security and anti-terrorism. The country abides by and 
implements all treaties and major international legal documents in 
nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security, 
including the NPT, CTBT and UNSC Resolution 1540 (Vietnam, 2011). 
Vietnam validated its commitment towards the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology, by passing the Law on Atomic Energy in 2008, which forbids 
any development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear 
proliferation (Nikitin et al, 2014).  
 
Concerning relationships with its neighbouring countries, Vietnam has 
reacted through wider foreign policy with the aim of ensuring that 
Vietnam is ‘friends with all countries’. These efforts were carried out 
since the late 1980s and consequently Vietnam has been increasingly 
embedded in regional institutions, including APEC, ASEAN and 
SEANWFZ to establish non-proliferation norms with other SEA States. 
This policy and participation has enabled Vietnam to engage in a more 
intense security collaboration with other major powers, notably the U.S., 
in counter-terrorism cooperation, military-to-military ties, and peaceful 
nuclear energy cooperation. These regional network and bilateral ties 
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have indeed alleviated the concerns regarding Vietnam’s security, 
especially with regards to the tenser relationship with China (ICSA, 
2012).  
 
With regards to the MNA, there is no clear source that mentions whether 
Vietnam supports or abstains from the approach. However, after signing 
the 2010 agreement with the U.S., this undoubtedly expressed 
Vietnam’s intent to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel supplies 
and not to pursue domestic enrichment capabilities. This includes the 
supply of all fuel and return of used fuel, which will then be reprocessed 
in Russia and the separated wastes returned to the client country 
eventually. This process will continue for the life of the nuclear plant 
(WNA, 2015). Of course, the MNA is an additional alternative to 
consider for Vietnam’s security with regards to nuclear fuel supply if 
Russia fails to deliver in the future. 
5.8 Conclusion 
Based on their nuclear activities and foreign policies, both Indonesia and 
Vietnam have demonstrated that their intention for nuclear power 
programmes is genuinely for energy and economic development. The 
main concern of supplier states is the level of security in the region of 
countries that are interested in nuclear power programmes and the 
situation of the country itself; whether the country has any interest in 
nuclear weapons.  
 
We can conclude from these case studies that the main 
agenda/motivator for developing countries such as Indonesia and 
Vietnam are the economic advantage and social status gained from the 
nuclear power program. Although Indonesia has a history of strong 
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nationalism with Sukarno’s nuclear weapon aspiration in 1965, the 
decision for peaceful use of nuclear technology has shielded today’s 
nuclear activities. Thus, any mechanism or proposal that could help 
these countries to achieve their agenda is utterly welcomed. Indonesia 
and Vietnam also viewed that the engagement with the nuclear security 
agenda as an opportunity to expand and improve their relations with the 
US, the West and more widely with international institutions. Thus, 
factors that would attract ASEAN to join MNA are the economic benefits 
promised by the MNA and political mileage that could be gained from 
the international nuclear community. 
 
This view is also shared by Malaysia and it is important, particularly for 
ASEAN, as previously discussed through neo-realist perspectives; 
ASEAN needs to rely on its relationship with other major players, such 
as the U.S. and its allies. Therefore, participation in several proposed 
instruments by supplier states such as MNAs seems to be an 
opportunity for Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to develop good 
relationships with the U.S. and its allies. This is because the U.S. is a 
major player in nuclear cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 4. This 
relationship also would be backing Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to 
achieve goals for its foreign policy and international political and, most 
importantly, to gain trust from the international community. These 
opportunities would assist these countries because of the complexities 
of developing a nuclear power programme. Therefore, ASEAN trusts 
supplier states to ensure long-term sustainability for their future nuclear 
energy and fuel resource. 
 
In the regard of interests in nuclear energy, the main concerns are 
whether ASEAN is ready to have nuclear energy in light of the nuclear 
accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima. ASEAN needs to examine 
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all the aspects of nuclear energy, not only its benefits, to fulfil energy 
demands and environmental factors, but more importantly, ASEAN 
needs to examine the management of its life cycle such as the 
hazardous nature of spent nuclear fuel material. Moreover, the potential 
environmental impacts of a nuclear meltdown due to intentional attacks 
from terrorism or cyberattacks must be planned for (Vu, 2016). 
Therefore, besides economic and political mileage, MNA seems to be 
the wise option for ASEAN in regard to ensuring nuclear safety and 
security, which at the same time would secure its future’s nuclear fuel 
cycle. In terms of trustworthiness, ASEAN is a region with less turmoil 
compared with the region of Middle East and Africa, whereby, many 
supplier states are willing to invest such as Russia, Japan and South 
Korea. 
 
In this connection, sharing similar views and principles in regard to 
nuclear safety, security and peaceful use of nuclear technology among 
ASEAN Members, it is conceivable to inspire ASEAN to create a 
regional institution, like Euratom, for sharing experiences and resources 
in nuclear power programmes. Therefore, for ASEAN to create an 
institute like Euratom, it needs to be firmer in making decisions, and in 
acting upon them. Thus, it is suggested that several principles in 
ASEAN, such as not interfering in domestic affairs, should be revised if 
dealing with nuclear programmes. A treaty that binds all participating 
parties should also be created to ensure the safety, security and 
safeguard of nuclear activities in ASEAN or Asia. This stems from the 
nature of nuclear matters that need a high level of responsibility and 
accountability in regard to security and safety, which is different from 
handling other disputes such as haze and country borders. If this level of 
awareness and responsibility could be achieved, there is a potential for 
ASEANTOM to extend its functions into an institute like Euratom in the 
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future and perhaps namely as ASIANTOM. Such regional institution 
would assist Asia in nuclear-related issues such as capacity building, 
nuclear market, nuclear safety, security and safeguards, nuclear science 
and technology, nuclear proliferation and disarmament.  ASEAN also 
need to take advantages on the experiences and expertise of other Asia 
countries such as China, Japan, South Korea and India.  
 
Main factors before ASEAN considering joining the MNA, are economic 
and strategic motivation. This is illustrated in the principles of ASEAN 
and participation in various nuclear-related multilateral agreement. 
Country like Indonesia and Vietnam also trust that Supplier States will 
ensure long-term sustainability for their future nuclear energy and fuel 
resources by joining the MNA. This adherence by the fact that both 
countries have long history of relationship with nuclear supplier such as 
Australia, Britain and USA. Participation in the MNA also would portray 
good image of ASEAN in the eyes of international community. The 
following chapter will discuss MNA from Malaysia’s perspective which 
has similar approach with the previous chapter. It will focus on the 
country’s foreign policy and policy on multilateral cooperation, country’s 
policy on Nuclear Programme for Peaceful Purposes and the MNA. 
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Part 2: Four Potential Pathways 
Chapter 6 
Malaysia’s Best Option: A Multilateral Approach to 
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
6.1 Introduction 
Malaysia’s primary goal is to boost its economy and diversify its 
economic by avoiding overdependence on natural resources. This has 
been demonstrated through its four policies for its economic 
development strategy: the new economic policy (NEP) 1970 to 1990, the 
National Development Policy (NDP) 1990 to 2000, the National Vision 
Policy (NVP) from 2001 to 2010 and the New Economic Model (NEM) 
from 2010 to 2020. In connection to the NEM, Malaysia later launched 
the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), which was formulated 
to transform Malaysia into a developed nation by 2020. Twelve National 
Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) were identified, including the oil, gas and 
energy industry. This industry is central to Malaysia’s economic growth, 
contributing up to one fifth of the national GDP over the past decade. 
This NKEA was set up to achieve an annual growth rate of 5% in the 
sector before 2020 with the target to transform Malaysia into a regional 
oil trading and storage hub, whilst also ensuring long-term energy 
supply security for the domestic market (PEMANDU, n.d). Facing the 
problems of oil price fluctuation, depleting national oil and gas resources 
and to reduce the dependence on imported coal, nuclear energy is 
being promoted to support the government’s mandate as stated in the 
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ETP. The government decided in September 2008 to carry out further 
study on the potential of nuclear energy.   
 
Malaysia began studying the potential of nuclear energy since the 
1970s, looking to ensure the country’s national energy security. In the 
mid-1980s to early 1990’s, there were a series of studies into the 
possible introduction of nuclear power generation in Peninsular 
Malaysia. These studies established base information on nuclear power 
programmes and assessed the actual needs and national state-of-
preparedness of Malaysia. These studies were conducted with technical 
assistance from the IAEA. However, when new oil fields were 
discovered, the government decided not to pursue nuclear energy at 
that time. Nonetheless, in view of its significant potential contribution to 
economic development, Malaysia has showed an ongoing interest in the 
nuclear energy option. This interest is also due to the significant 
improvements in nuclear power plant technology, from the viewpoint 
both of economic competitiveness and technological advancement. 
These have collectively made modern nuclear power plants more 
attractive to interested electric utilities, investors, policy-makers and 
other relevant parties. The rationale for Malaysia to consider nuclear 
energy are motivated by the facts that Malaysia needs (1) to ensure 
continuous availability of adequate electricity supply at competitive costs 
in the Peninsula for 2021 and beyond; (2) to ensure energy security in 
case of unavailability of High Density Voltage Cable (HVDC) power 
transmission from Sarawak, gas depletion and shutdown of IPP’s; (3) to 
develop competitive advantage for Malaysian industries to participate in 
nuclear projects in regional countries by commissioning the first nuclear 
plant based on best practices; diversification of energy resources; 
depletion of indigenous energy resources; reduce heavy reliance on 
imports of coal; and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emission (Ibrahim, 
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2010; Jamal, 2015; Khattak et.al, 2016). Malaysia’s interests are also 
driven by the fact that the country needs to diversify and balance its 
energy sources for economic, environmental and energy security 
reasons (Markandu, 2013). 
  
The Malaysia Nuclear Power Corporation (MNPC) was established in 
2011 as the Nuclear Energy Programme Implementing Organization 
(NEPIO) (Jaafar et al, 2017). The MNPC was established based on the 
recommendations of the IAEA as given in the document titled 
Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear 
Power (Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1). The function of the 
MNPC is to plan, spearhead and coordinate the implementation of the 
nuclear energy development programme, as well as to ensure the 
development of the nuclear infrastructure for the country is in line with 
the IAEA guidelines (Malaysia, 2012; see also Jaafar et al., 2017). 
Although the decision for Malaysia to develop nuclear power program is 
not yet conclusive, but Malaysia has started all necessary works in 
relation to nuclear power planning and has identified four enablers to 
ensure a successful deployment of nuclear energy for power generation, 
namely: public acceptance, ratification of relevant international treaties 
by Malaysia, regulatory framework in place and approval of the NPP 
sites including from local (Jaafar, Nazaruddin, & Lye 2017). 
 
6.1.1 The Significance of the Study for the National Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Policy 
 
This chapter will discuss Malaysia’s perspective on a multilateral 
approach to the nuclear fuel cycle and how it will contribute to 
Malaysia’s energy economy. It will also demonstrate that adopting a 
Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) has made it 
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easier for Malaysia to govern its nuclear power program and to face new 
challenges under globalisation. This is because the nuclear industry is 
drew in two directions; toward globalization of the supply chain and 
toward consolidation of the major suppliers because of a long gap in 
growth (Hartigen et.al, 2015). Both globalization and proliferation were 
emerged after World War II. Globalization connected the world through 
trade. Meanwhile proliferation is when a country acquires weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. There is a question whether 
globalization and proliferation have a symbiotic relationship and as a 
result of each other. This question raised because in the process of 
globalization, technology, education, and other aspects of modern life 
will be available to more countries without boundaries. However, country 
that showed their aggressive in nuclear proliferation is the North Korea, 
which is the least globalized countries in the world (Gaffney 2006). 
Spectators observed that results of globalization have contributed to 
mixed results, but has certainty contributed to the destabilisation of 
international peace and security (Davis, 2003; see also Gobbicchi, 2004; 
Smith, 2009). Arguably, these factors undermine international peace 
and security and may in turn promote nuclear proliferation whilst 
derailing nuclear disarmament. This could be seen in the case of North 
Korea, in which several statements were made suggesting that the 
nuclear weapons would help North Korea to guarantee its security and 
to gain respect and prestige in the international arena (Lankov, 2016; 
see also Hodes & Bonnema, 2018).  
 
Secondly, this thesis argues that Malaysia would be best served by 
adopting the MNA mechanism to its nuclear fuel development, in terms 
of operational cost and nuclear diplomacy engagement. In light of 
Malaysia’s preparation to embark on a nuclear power programme, there 
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are several subsidiary questions that Malaysia needs to consider. 
Amongst them is whether to opt for a national nuclear fuel cycle: a 
closed or open nuclear fuel cycle. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
nuclear fuel cycle starts with the mining of uranium and ends with the 
management of nuclear waste. If the cycle includes the reprocessing of 
used fuel or spent fuel, it is referred to as a closed fuel cycle. Given the 
current circumstances, it is nearly impossible for Malaysia to decide on 
the closed fuel cycle, since the technology is deemed to be sensitive 
from the perspective of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, this is what has happened to the Iranian nuclear 
power programme, which was only approved by the international 
community after Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, 
and to keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67%, which is 
significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb. Iran is 
also required to reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years 
and is only allowed to use its old or least efficient models of centrifuges. 
Accordingly, pursuing a closed fuel cycle, which also needs substantial 
investment, might delay Malaysia’s development of a nuclear power 
programme. 
 
Malaysia, indeed, as a newcomer in nuclear power technology could opt 
for an open nuclear fuel cycle so as not to risk facing the same 
consequences as Iran. Nevertheless, at this point, nearly none of the 
technology holders are willing to transfer the technology to new entrants. 
As for financial costs, Malaysia could start its nuclear programme by 
focussing on relevant stages such as nuclear plants, and operational 
waste management facilities. Meanwhile other facilities and stages of 
the fuel cycle, including the supply of uranium, could be sourced from 
other supplier countries. In relation to this, Malaysia might look at the 
possibility of the MNA arrangement. Hence, as part of the planning for a 
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nuclear power programme, it is essential for Malaysia to include the 
study of its Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. This would help Malaysia to 
guarantee the security of nuclear fuel supply and sustainability of its 
environment when Malaysia is ready to develop a nuclear power 
programme. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy would strategize and 
position Malaysia among nuclear elites and help keep ‘up-to-date’ in the 
development of the nuclear fuel cycle, either in nuclear technology or 
nuclear management.  
 
6.1.2 Research Framework and Methodology 
 
The study on Malaysian perspectives towards MNA was carried out 
similarly to Indonesia and Vietnam - by scrutinising Malaysia’s Foreign 
Policy and its previous cooperation with nuclear supplier groups, in 
particular the US and other western countries. The study will also 
analyse Malaysian policy in multilateral cooperation and its position 
regarding the rights for reprocessing and enrichment technology 
procurement. Information for the analyses were obtained from policy 
documents, archives, country’s statements and reports. In addition, the 
data was gathered from interviews with senior Malaysian officials who 
are involved directly with nuclear activities and decision-making on the 
nuclear policy of the country.  
6.2  Country Profile and Nuclear Power Programme 
Malaysia is situated in South East Asia bordering Brunei, Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand. Malaysia is separated by the South China Sea 
into Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, located on the north west 
of Borneo. Malaysia follows a constitutional monarchy; nominally 
headed by a paramount ruler and a bicameral Parliament. It gained 
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independence from the Britain on 31 August 1957. Together thirteen 
states and two federal territories make up the Federation of Malaysia. 
 
Besides facing challenges maintaining its economy during the Post-
2008 downturn, Malaysia also faces the diplomatic challenge of 
promoting regional trade integration and maintaining security and 
stability in the light of the concern over Beijing’s increasing 
assertiveness in regional affairs. Malaysia must also seek to create an 
attractive climate for foreign investment in the context of Chinese 
competition (Rinehart, 2015). 
Since gaining independence in 1957, Malaysia’s economy has been 
transformed from a producer of primary commodities, such as natural 
rubber and tin, into one of the world’s largest producers of electronic and 
electrical products. Therefore, energy has played a critical role in the 
rapid growth of the Malaysian economy, and as Malaysia moves 
towards becoming a developed country, energy consumption will 
definitely increase. For that reason, it needs to be accompanied and 
supported by a stable and reliable energy system. In the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan (9thMP) which formulated the nation’s development agenda for 
2006-2010, the Government of Malaysia has taken rigorous efforts to 
ensure sustainability of energy resource development and utilisation. 
This includes efforts to reduce dependency on fossil fuels due to 
escalating oil prices and promoting the use of alternative fuels. There 
are other concerns within the country over the future continued 
availability of oil and natural gas resources for power generation. This is 
because Malaysia senses a need to preserve some of these oil and gas 
resources for future generations, especially when there is competing 
national demand for natural gas for petrochemical industries. At present, 
Malaysia does not have a nuclear power programme. However, there is 
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a longstanding and increasing interest in including nuclear energy as 
part of a national energy mix. This interest also coupled with Prime 
Minister’s commitment to reduce Malaysia’s carbon intensity by up to 
40% in 2020 as compared to 2005 levels (Jaafar et al., 2017). 
 
A need for a nuclear power programme in Malaysia is mainly as a 
catalyst in the economy and environment and has no grounds for 
concern regarding aspirations for nuclear weapons. This is despite the 
revelations of the A.Q. Khan Proliferation network, which has given a 
bad reputation to Malaysia’s record with regards to nuclear matters. The 
uncovering of the Khan network in 2004 revealed weaknesses in the 
Malaysian export-control system as well as industry’s owner, who 
seemed unaware of the network’s activities (Albright & Hinderstein, 
2005). However, this was quickly tackled by the Government of 
Malaysia, when in 2010, Malaysia announced that the country had 
enacted the Strategic Trade Act 2010 [Act 708] to strengthen Malaysia’s 
ability to curtail the export and trans-shipment of WMD related materials. 
This highlights its interest in pursuing a genuinely commercial nuclear 
power programme. The act is also part of Malaysia’s efforts to ensure 
that its industrial sector will not be exploited to support nuclear 
proliferation elsewhere or use Malaysia as a hub for such activities.  
As a trading country with increasing energy demands, Malaysia is 
looking for alternative energy resources to fulfil its energy demands, 
even though there is – as yet – no definite policy on the decision to 
develop nuclear power programme. Malaysia’s main interest is the cost 
competitiveness in comparison to other modes of electricity generation; 
although the up-front costs to build a nuclear power plant are higher 
than coal-fired plants and gas-fired plants. So, it is important to have a 
prudent plan to avoid any mistakes that would cause additional cost 
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during the early construction of a power plant. One of the features in 
planning the nuclear power programme is to develop the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Policy.  
6.3  Malaysia’s Policy on the Development of a Nuclear Power 
Programme for Peaceful Purposes  
Aware of the benefits of nuclear technology, Malaysia started to get 
involved in nuclear science and technology applications with the 
installation of the first X-ray equipment in Taiping Hospital, Perak in 
1897 (Wastie, 1994), which was also the first X-Ray machine in 
Southeast Asia (SEA). And upon realising the potential benefits of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear technology, Malaysia acceded to the Statute of 
the IAEA on 15th January 1969 to become the 101st Member State of 
the Agency. In relation to this and to safeguard its sovereign rights of 
access to nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, 
Malaysia signed the NPT on 1st July 1968, and ratified it on the 3rd May 
1970. Pursuant to its obligations under the NPT, Malaysia concluded an 
agreement with the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in 
Connection with the NPT, on 29th February 1972. Following this, 
Malaysia established the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) 
as the Tun Dr.Ismail Atomic Research Centre (PUSPATI) in September 
1972. The primary roles of PUSPATI were to prepare for the utilisation 
of nuclear energy and to introduce and promote the peaceful utilisation 
of nuclear technology in various fields, including industry, medicine, 
agriculture, environmental protection and education (Ali, 1983). Among 
the major facilities at Nuclear Malaysia is a 1 Megawatt-thermal (MWth) 
TRIGA-type nuclear research reactor, procured from the U.S. and 
commissioned in 1982. Other facilities include radioisotope production 
facilities, gamma and electron irradiation facilities, a national dosimetry 
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standards laboratory for the calibration of radiation equipment, radiation 
health and safety facilities and various research and development 
facilities (Malaysian Nuclear Agency, 2018). 
 
Subsequently, as one of the founding members of ASEAN, a signatory 
to the Treaty of the Treaty on South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ) and vocal member of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in the IAEA, Malaysia has been an active participant during non-
proliferation and disarmament negotiations. This suggests that the 
country is committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the spirit 
and words of the NPT and the Treaty of SEANWFZ. This is confirmed 
by the consistent advocacy for the formulation of a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention (NWC) which an initiative to move towards the complete, 
universal and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. This proposal 
was submitted to the UN by Malaysia and Costa Rica in 2008 (United 
Nations, 2008) and open for signature in 2017. 
 
The establishment of the Malaysia nuclear safety and security 
architecture has further created a strong network that provides clear 
channels of communications in gathering strategic information related to 
nuclear security. This is portrayed in Malaysia’s foreign policy, which is 
aimed at persuading other nations to sign and ratify relevant 
international conventions such as the NPT and the CTBT. Through 
membership of the IAEA, Malaysia is safeguarding its sovereign rights 
of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Proving its 
commitment to ban nuclear tests, Malaysia has hosted one of the 321 
stations under the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is being 
established around the world for the verification of CTBT compliance.  
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Malaysia is in the process of drafting a new comprehensive nuclear law 
on safety, security and safeguards; which will repeal the old act, the 
Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304) of 1984 (Ibrahim, 2015). This 
new law is expected to include all major provisions on nuclear safety 
security and safeguards elements, which reflects Malaysia international 
obligations.  
 
In common with Indonesia, Malaysia sees the threat of nuclear terrorism 
as implausible and remote. Research by the King’s College London in 
2012 demonstrated that the primary motive for Malaysia to engage with 
the international nuclear security agenda appears to sustain its 
compliance with international norms and standards in order to access 
nuclear technology in the future (ICSA, 2012). One of the factors that led 
to the convergence of the threat of WMD proliferation with that of 
transnational terrorism, especially with regard to the use of nuclear 
weapons, was the discovery of the fairly well organised international 
nuclear black market, in 2004, which was headed by A.Q Khan. Khan 
was alleged to be supplying uranium-enrichment centrifuges, nuclear 
warhead designs, missiles, and expertise that could be used to develop 
nuclear weapons program to a number of proliferation-sensitive states 
such Iran and Libya (Albright & Hinderstein, 2005; Futter, 2015; Corera, 
2006; Tertrais, 2006). The embargo was discovered to have been 
broken by an Italian navy vessel under the PSI on a German freighter 
bound for Libya, which was carrying uranium components that had been 
fabricated by a Malaysian company. This scandal has impacted 
Malaysia’s image when it was found that a Malaysian precision 
engineering company had, unknowingly, been contracted to fabricate 
certain gas centrifuge components for use in uranium enrichment in 
Libya. Following the discovery of this involvement, although 
unintentional, it immediately led to more intense international pressure 
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on Malaysia and created a WMD non-proliferation export control in its 
national laws and regulations. After the revelation of A.Q. Khan’s illicit 
procurement network, Malaysia was concerned with its international 
image. Pertinent to this scandal, Malaysia instantaneously formulated a 
comprehensive export control law to protect Malaysian companies and 
manufacturers from being used by the black market. Then, in order to 
fulfil its international obligations under the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) (Stinnett et.al, 2011) and 
economic goals, Malaysia developed The Strategic Trade Act 2010 (Act 
708), which came into effect on 1 January 2011. This Act aimed to 
strengthen the country’s ability to curb exports and transhipment of 
WMD and related materials (Law of Malaysia, 2011).  
 
The discovery also led to pressure by Western States for Malaysia to 
join the PSI, which was only signed by Malaysia on 27 April 2014. The 
PSI was specifically established to impede and interdict the trafficking or 
shipment of material, equipment and technology that could be used for 
the development or production of WMD, including their delivery systems 
by States or non-State actors of proliferation concern. Related to the 
emergence of these new export control enforcement regimes are two 
other initiatives: the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Megaports 
Initiative, which were also initiated by the U.S., but implemented on a 
bilateral basis. These initiatives were imposed on its trading partners, in 
order to pre-screen containers bound for the U.S. at their ports of origin. 
Malaysia signed the CSI in 2004 with both Port Kelang and the Port of 
Tanjung Pelepas (PTP) participating in the CSI. Meanwhile, the 
Megaport Initiative was signed by Malaysia on 27 February 2008. 
 
As of today, Malaysia has not signed a number of key nuclear security 
related instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection 
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of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, nor 
the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological Sources 
(CCSSRS). Malaysia also does not formally endorse the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) because this voluntary 
partnership was initiated by individual states, the U.S. and Russia, 
during the George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin administrations’ in 2006. 
Although this initiative consists of observers from five international 
organisations including the IAEA, Malaysia’s policy is to sign only 
partnerships or agreements that are initiated by international 
organisations joined by Malaysia such as IAEA and UN. Malaysia feels 
that the GICNT duplicates the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (CSANT) under the UN that 
was open for signature in 2005 and Malaysia has signed the CSANT in 
September 2005, but not yet ratified it. This is because Malaysia has not 
yet embarked on a nuclear power programme (ICSA, 2012).    
6.4 Malaysia and Multilateralism 
Before gaining independence, Malaysia was sceptical about both 
multilateralism and alliances. For instance, Malaysia had refused to join 
the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). This was because 
some of the country’s leaders believe that the treaty would jeopardise 
their independence from British colonisation. However, Malaysia 
realised that it lacked a strong army to protect its territories, defeat the 
(then) communist insurrection and protect its economic interests, which 
led to it recognising the importance of allies through multilateral 
cooperation (Saravanamuttu, 2010). 
 
In its early days, Malaysia was pushed to protect its economic interests 
and defend the country from a ‘security threat’ from the communist 
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insurrection spreading from China and Russia (Saravanamuttu, 2010). 
Following this, Malaysia came up with the proposal to align with Western 
powers and not associate with communist states. This was signed in the 
Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact in 1957 and supported by U.S. policy. 
Malaysia, which was under the influence of the British at the time, was 
also part of the non-communist group and part of the western bloc. 
Thus, the most important external factor that shaped Malaysia was the 
Cold War that characterised the post-World War II international system 
(Saravanamuttu, 2010; Sundararaman, 2011).  
 
Since gaining its independence in 1957, Malaysia realised that 
multilateral diplomacy is not just an important tool for the country’s 
development, but also engrained in the conduct of Malaysia’s foreign 
policy. Apprehending this fact, ‘Malaysia has been working actively 
towards a global political and socio-economy stability and security within 
the multilateral system’ (MOFA Malaysia, 2014). This was demonstrated 
when Malaysia played prominent roles through its leadership in the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) and The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC). Malaysia is positive that regional cooperation and engagements 
promote the cohesion and development of interdependence among 
developing countries in identifying common social and economic 
challenges. Another key aspect is the cooperation in technical, scientific 
and trade fields (MOFA Malaysia, 2014). 
 
The history of Malaysia’s foreign policy on multilateral cooperation could 
serve as a foundation for this study, in understanding Malaysia’s 
position in maintaining the state’s defence and security, developmental 
and economy concerns, and Malaysia’s international relations in order to 
distinguish the degree of trust. The next section will illustrate the link 
between trust and relationship with multilateralism. 
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6.5  Malaysia’s Foreign Policy and Policy on Multilateral 
Cooperation 
Malaysia's foreign policy is developed from an extension of Malaysia’s 
domestic policy. It is designed to protect, defend and promote the 
country's national, political, security, economic and other vital interests. 
It is geared towards promoting a peaceful regional and international 
environment, which would give Malaysia space to achieve all its national 
objectives without disruption from external threats. Malaysia's foreign 
policy is also reflected by considering its function in a dynamic 
environment, such as various geographical, historical, social and 
political determinants, which shape the conduct of the country's 
international relations. Malaysia’s foreign policy seeks to promote 
mutual tolerance and cooperation amongst all countries and for this 
reason Malaysia pursues an independent, principled and pragmatic 
foreign policy, which rests on the values of peace, humanity, justice, and 
equality. It is also based on the principles of respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in 
the affairs of other nations, peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful co-
existence and mutual benefit in relations (MOFA Malaysia, 2016).  
 
Malaysia’s foreign policy under Mahathir (1981-2003) was described as 
independent, active and pragmatic. Two decades of Mahathir’s 
leadership have resulted in Malaysia being recognised as a model of 
stable, multicultural and developing country with a comparatively 
remarkable economy development. Malaysia too was regarded as a 
model of progressive and moderate Islamic country. However, foreign 
policy under Abdullah Badawi was rather monotonous due to 
preoccupation with domestic politic challenges and the growing 
influence of the Opposition coalition led by Anwar Ibrahim. 
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Nevertheless, despite the lack of focus, Abdullah succeeded in 
improving relationship with Singapore, and Malaysia attracted the 
attention of the U.S. as a progressive Islamic nation with the Islam 
Hadhari brand (Khalid, 2010). Compared with the Mahathir era, regional 
and international discussers found Malaysia much easier to deal with 
under Abdullah Badawi, who largely soft than the government’s previous 
nationalist and anti-Western rhetoric (IISS Strategic Survey, 2008). 
 
Meanwhile, under the leadership of current Prime Minister Mohammad 
Najib, Malaysia’s foreign policy priorities are to highlight Malaysia as a 
modern, dynamic and progressive Muslim state (MOFA Malaysia, 2016). 
To achieve this, Malaysia’s foreign policy focussing on maintaining 
peaceful relations with all countries regardless of political ideology and 
system, continue to adopt an independent, non-aligned and principled 
stance in regional and international diplomatic affairs, promote peace 
and stability through capacity building measures and conflict resolution. 
Also, as part of Malaysia’s strategy international relations, Malaysia’s 
foreign policy directing towards develop relations and economic 
partnership as well as close cooperation with all countries, especially 
with ASEAN and regional partners, as well participate actively in the UN. 
Malaysia also will play a leadership role in international organizations 
such as ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the OIC 
(MOFA Malaysia, 2016). 
 
During the 7th Heads of Mission Conference held in Putrajaya in June 
2009, he announced that the government would give priority to its public 
service as he stressed the importance of Malaysia to move in tandem 
with the '1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now' theme. He 
expressed his hope that these principles can be inculcated in all 
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Malaysians, as it is the basis of the formulation of Malaysia's foreign 
policy. 
 
Thus, Malaysia’s current foreign policy is guided by three criteria, first is 
the credibility of Malaysia to display trust and confidence internationally 
but still serve Malaysia’s best interest and remain a responsible member 
of the international community. Criteria of Malaysia’s foreign policy also 
institute by the rationality which taking care of the interest of its citizens 
above all else and bring international recognition and respect for 
Malaysians as good citizens of the world. The third criteria is the 
consistency and coherent so that Malaysia is accepted and recognised 
as a reliable partner in interstate affairs in a hope that this would make 
Malaysia a preferred brand name in international relations 
 
Malaysia also sees especial importance in adhering to the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs as echoes in the principle of ASEAN 
Way, particularly in the context of regional relations. The principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs is applied because Malaysia 
considers that so-called "constructive intervention" which involves loud 
criticism, confrontational posturing and grand standing would only bring 
more destruction to the promotion of good relations with neighbouring 
countries (MOFA Malaysia, 2016). However, there are some exceptions 
to the policy of non-interference; in particular if in cases of bloody 
cruelty, massacre and atrocities were perpetrated that flagrantly violate 
morality, such what happen in Myanmar. That is why some critics 
highlight that the ASEAN Way” has encapsulated their thinking to the 
point where it has been regarded as more of a hindrance than an 
enabler for ASEAN unity and cooperation. 
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Another criterion in Malaysian diplomacy is to protect its interests in a 
fair and equitable manner, which is very important to a country like 
Malaysia. This could be achieved through multilateral cooperation that 
helps Malaysia move towards global stability and security for its 
interests in international relations, the economy, strategic partnerships, 
environment, culture, etc. Malaysia's foreign policy goals in multilateral 
cooperation are shaped within the framework of defence and security, 
development and trade, international cooperation and diplomacy, which 
determine the pattern of Malaysia’s relations with other countries. These 
include structures associated within the framework of ASEAN, APEC, 
South-South Co-operation, the OIC, the Commonwealth, NAM, the UN 
and other regional and international organisations (MOFA Malaysia, 
2014). 
6.6  Malaysia’s Relationship with Big Nuclear Supplier States: 
China and the United States 
An observation of the relationship between Malaysia and China is 
pertinent to the possibility for a regional MNA in Asia, such as Euratom 
in Europe. China, which is among the leading countries in terms of 
nuclear technology and economy, could be Malaysia’s ally in nuclear 
technology, irrespective of the fact that they have disputes related to the 
South China Sea. Meanwhile, a study of the relationship between 
Malaysia and the U.S. is necessary to determine whether the pathway 
for Malaysia’s nuclear power programme would be easy or not. Similar 
to the UAE and other newcomers in nuclear power programmes, 
Malaysia needs to sign a 123 Agreement with the U.S., which would 
allow other nuclear suppliers to transfer relevant nuclear technology to 
Malaysia.  
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Some time ago, Malaysia had security issues over China’s role in 
supporting the Communist Party of Malaya, which involved in a politico-
military struggle in the country (Fitzpatrick, 2009c). However, by the end 
of the Cold War, Malaysia’s relationship with China had improved. In 
1974, Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, signed a joint 
communique with former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during a visit to 
China, and launched a new era for bilateral ties with his statement that 
Malaysia would facilitate exchanges and cooperation with China in all 
areas, to jointly safeguard regional peace and stability and promote 
common prosperity (Xinhua, 2014). Currently, China has become one of 
Malaysia’s largest trading partners with an annual bilateral trade value of 
around USD60 billion (Chang, 2014). With the bilateral economic ties, 
Malaysia no longer views China as a security threat, despite Malaysia’s 
claim on part of the Spratly Islands, which China claims as theirs 
entirely. In September 2005, the two countries signed a memorandum of 
understanding on defence cooperation to engage in military activities 
such as training, the exchange of personnel and dialogue (Fitzpatrick, 
2009c). Then, in May 2014, in a joint communiqué forty year after the 
initial communique, both countries expressed their respect for each 
other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This also 
includes the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC), and ensures that the progress of 
consultations for the conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea (COC) is based on consensus (Xinhua, 2014).  
 
It has been some time since Malaysia started to make its territorial 
claims less of a priority.  However, Malaysia’s long-established non-
confrontational approach was put to test because of China’s growing 
aggressiveness in Southeast Asia. In 2007, Malaysia built a naval base 
at Sepanggar Bay and stationed its two submarines as a response to 
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China’s array of anti-surface weaponry capability equipped with anti-ship 
cruise missiles. Malaysia’s submarines were successfully tested during 
the its first naval exercise in the SEA in August 2010 (Chang, 2012).  
With these circumstances, Malaysia started to propose a closer defence 
industry and military training collaboration within ASEAN members 
(Chang, 2014). Malaysia was tested again in March 2013, when four 
Chinese warships held an amphibious exercise in the waters near the 
Malaysia-claimed James Shoal, and this undeniably startled Malaysia, 
which sent an official protest to China. Following this, Malaysia declared 
that it would establish a marine force and build a naval base at Bintulu, 
near the disputed shoal. China responded by sending another three 
navy warships for an exercise at the same shoal in February 2014. A 
Malaysian government advisor suggested that the Chinese exercises off 
James Shoal were “a wake-up call” for Malaysia, despite Malaysia-
China good ties because when it comes to China protecting its 
sovereignty and national interest it’s a different ball game (Chang, 
2014).  
 
Meanwhile, in terms of the relationship between the U.S. and Malaysia, 
from the U.S.’s perspective, the relationship is complex because the ties 
between these two countries are considerably close. However, political 
sensitivities and mistrust have led to obstacles for the U.S. in 
establishing a deeper strategic partnership with Malaysia. This might be 
caused by the fact that Malaysia, as a moderate Islamic country, has 
criticised US military interventions in the Middle East and U.S. support 
for Israel. These have resulted in a negative perception towards the US 
as an “anti-Islamic” country. Malaysia’s policy towards the U.S. and its 
allies has been marked by two aspects. First, developing countries 
viewed the U.S. as a key economic and security partner but 
simultaneously as a source of political irritation. Second, despite the 
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random political friction, developing countries has long maintained close 
military cooperation with the U.S. and its allies, but this cooperation has 
deliberately been kept low profile and persistently maintained as a 
security partnership and not a military alliance (Kuik, 2013). However, in 
recent years, these policies have moderated especially under the 
current Prime Minister, Najib Razak (Kuik, 2013). 
 
Malaysia and the U.S. enjoy a decent and productive relationship, 
especially in trade. In 2014, Malaysia was the 24th largest market for 
U.S. exports and the 17th largest supplier of U.S. imports. Associated 
with this, the U.S. was Malaysia’s 4th largest export market (after 
Singapore, China, and Japan) and the 4th largest supplier of imports 
(after China, Singapore, and Japan). Besides being a partner in trade, 
Malaysia has also extended collaboration in security cooperation which 
includes counter-terrorism activities, military exercises, ship visits, 
military education exchanges, and maritime domain awareness.  
Malaysia’s military ties with the U.S. are far more extensive than with 
China. Malaysia is regarded as an effective regional partner on counter-
terrorism by the U.S. (Rinehart, 2015).  
 
The relations of Malaysia-U.S. have been unpredictable and was 
defined as “combination of criticism and cooperation” events, especially 
during Mahathir era (Bakar, 2013). However, the common security 
threat after the September 11 incident has now forced them to trade 
some of their cultural egocentric interests for the sake of their states’ 
national interest. September 11 left Malaysia and U.S. with a common 
enemy (Bakar, 2013). In May 2002, President George W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad signed a memorandum of 
understanding on counter-terrorism. Back in 1994, Malaysia and the 
U.S. concluded a Cross Servicing and Acquisitions Agreement, an 
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agreement that allowed U.S. Navy ships and aircraft to undergo 
maintenance and resupply in Malaysia and was renewed for another 10 
years in 2005 (Agreement between the United States of America and 
Malaysia, 2005; see also Fitzpatrick, 2009c). Military cooperation 
between the two countries also includes annual joint exercises involving 
the Malaysian and U.S. navies, and U.S. military personnel undertaking 
jungle-warfare training in Malaysia (Fitzpatrick, 2009c; see also Bakar 
2013). 
 
Cooperation in trade and strategic military partnerships with the U.S. 
and other countries in ASEAN are very important to Malaysia, especially 
in balancing China’s strengthening military and economy. China has 
shown that it is clearly willing to come a long way and overcome its 
geographic disadvantage in the South China Sea by investing in 
technology at a faster pace than Southeast Asia (Chang, 2012). Since 
the episodes at James Shoal, Malaysia has begun dialogues with the 
Philippines and Vietnam over the disputes in the South China Sea.  
Malaysia also took an opportunity to strengthen relationships with the 
U.S. during President Barack Obama’s visit to Malaysia in April 2014.  
Malaysia and the U.S. have signed an agreement on “comprehensive 
strategic partnership,” which is putting the U.S. back on a similar 
agreement with Malaysia in 2013 (Chang, 2014). 
 
The relationship with the U.S. also has been expanded to nuclear 
activities.  In 1980 Malaysia signed a trilateral agreement between the 
Governments of Malaysia and the U.S., and the IAEA, concerning the 
transfer of a research reactor and enriched uranium, or otherwise known 
as the IAEA Supply and Project Agreement. This agreement was 
concluded for Malaysia to procure its first and only nuclear research 
reactor, the 1 Megawatt-thermal (MWth) TRIGA-type that has been in 
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operation at Nuclear Malaysia since 1982. As mentioned above, 
Malaysia is also participating in both the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) and Megaport Initiative that were initiated by the U.S.  
6.7  Malaysia’s Perspective  
Multilateral diplomacy is important because developing countries have 
many common problems, thus, they need to collaborate to face the 
challenges of globalisation. Hence, Malaysia has been working actively 
for global, political and socio-economic stability and security within the 
multilateral system. In fact, multilateral diplomacy has played an 
important role in the conduct of Malaysia’s foreign policy since its 
independence. In this regard, Malaysia’s policy is designed to promote 
security, international law and development through its active 
participation in the multilateral platforms, especially the UN system. In 
correlation with this, it supports that Malaysia seems to have no issues 
on the proposal of MNA (Mohamad, 2008; see also Baharuddin, 2014b). 
Connection to this, Malaysia firmly views that any initiative to develop 
MNA initiatives should focus on finding an optimum arrangement that 
would satisfy both objectives of assurance of supply and services, and 
supporting the implementation of assurances on non-proliferation, as an 
auxiliary to the existing non-proliferation and disarmament international 
regime (Mohamad, 2008). Most importantly, there should not be any 
attempts to capitalize on the initiative to develop these multilateral 
approaches as an avenue in introducing new or additional non-
proliferation commitments that are beyond those already enshrined 
under the existing regime. If this happens, the obligations would most 
likely lead to the same result as numerous past efforts to enhance 
supply assurances. Thus, Malaysia views the MNA as a 
multidimensional concept that requires extensive study with respect to 
284 
 
its technical, economic, legal and political implications. This has been 
stressed by Malaysia during the 52nd IAEA General Conference where 
the former Director General of Malaysia Nuclear Agency stated, 
 
Malaysia believes that any notion of a Global Nuclear Order 
should not worsen the dichotomy between developing and 
developed Member States by endorsing an emerging regime of 
nuclear technology suppliers and recipients on top of an existing 
regime of nuclear weapon States and non-weapon States. This is 
especially important in the current period where more developing 
States need to develop legitimate peaceful nuclear power 
programmes to ensure their energy security and long-term 
sustainable development. 
 
Malaysia further believes that any initiative to develop any 
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle and fuel supply 
assurance should not create such a new regime of nuclear 
technology haves and have-nots. Malaysia firmly believes that the 
establishment of any such multilateral approach of regime should 
be based on extensive, comprehensive and transparent 
consultation between all interested parties and Member States, 
and that all the decisions should be taken by consensus. 
(Mohamad, 2008). 
 
Comparable to other countries such as Iran, Indonesia and Vietnam, 
Malaysia’s clear position is that every Member State of the NPT has the 
inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes and this right must be preserved and respected by all 
countries, especially developed countries, though any member state 
could decide to temporarily suspend these rights in accordance with 
their national position and/or interests. Malaysia is vocal in expressing 
its position that no member state or group of member states should 
have additional suspensions imposed as a precondition for assurances 
of fuel supply. Conversely, initiatives should be developed in such a way 
as to help newcomers to ensure their fuel supply, which could lessen the 
risk of nuclear proliferation and strengthen nuclear safety and security. 
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These indeed would make any proposed initiatives mainly assist 
newcomer states, instead of them being controlled or denying their right.  
Thus, for Malaysia, as long as the above criteria could be achieved by 
participating in the MNA, it does not have any reason for non-
participation in the initiative, because as a developing country that is still 
new with regards to a nuclear energy programme, Malaysia needs all 
the assistance and support that supplier states could offer.   
 
We are not interested in developing nuclear weapons. But we 
must make sure that, if we want to sign any agreement, they can 
supply what we want. That is most important, because some 
countries, when there is a geo-political issue, tend to stop 
supplying what was originally agreed before. For example issues 
with human right, trade practices and many more.  We just do not 
want them to tie us up with something that does not have 
connection or relevant to our nuclear business matters. 
 
MNA objectives are aligned with our policy, which is total 
disarmament……. I don’t think that MNA is a problem to us 
because it can give us more benefits and allow us to involve in 
international nuclear politics because they trust us…. In terms of 
economy, MNA can generate new business, whether in fuel 
supply, or fuel storage, or waste management because the aim of 
MNA is non-proliferation... Most important is that people trust us. 
If MNA can be the solution for our waste management, then it will 
be an advantage to us. (Baharuddin, 2014b) 
 
Nevertheless, Malaysia needs to be tolerant in opening its door for such 
assistance. Malaysia should start to trust other countries that have a big 
impact in nuclear cooperation such as the U.S., as long it brings benefits 
to Malaysia without jeopardising its sovereignty. Malaysia does not have 
to be like the UAE or surrender its chances to learn and gain knowledge 
in nuclear power technology. Malaysia could still handle its planning, 
management and the operation of its nuclear power programme at early 
stages, as long as it is transparent and follows all the requirements set 
by the IAEA. In general, Malaysia is in the same position as Indonesia 
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and Vietnam, whose decision for a nuclear power programme is only for 
peaceful purposes.  
6.8  Malaysia’s Position to the Multilateral Approach to the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle (MNA) 
When Malaysia announced its interest to embark on an NPP, no state 
expressed their concern with regards to the country pursuing nuclear 
power. In fact, the IAEA and other Supplier States support the decision 
and are assisting Malaysia towards the realisation of the nuclear power 
programme. The international community is also certain that Malaysia 
has shown no indication of any interest in acquiring any sensitive 
nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment or spent fuel 
reprocessing. Whether Malaysia will choose to join one or more of the 
multilateral fuel assurance schemes is still far from clear, because it will 
still be influenced by how the MNA would be implemented and what the 
country could gain from it. However, it is indisputable that the decision 
could reveal something of its attitude towards the matters on acquiring 
sensitive technology for its fuel supply sustainability. Thus, 
hypothetically, based on the current scenario and transparency in its 
nuclear activities, there would be no rationale for Malaysia to begin a 
weapons programme (Fitzpatrick, 2009c). The country has taken 
preliminary steps by considering designing the National Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Policy, even though the decision on a nuclear power programme 
is yet to be confirmed. This is part of its strategy to ensure that high-
level waste from nuclear power activities is managed prudently and 
follows all standards and regulations established by the international 
bodies. The policy is also expected to ensure that nuclear fuel supply is 
uninterrupted and guaranteed by the current market or any future 
market.  
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Following the current geo-political and techno-political situation in the 
nuclear fuel cycle, Malaysia would make sure that it follows all 
developments in the nuclear fuel cycle that may impact its desire for a 
nuclear power programme. When the international bodies 
recommended MNA, at first Malaysia, along with other countries, was 
not so content with the proposal. This is because, as a developing 
country that is moving towards industrialisation, technology transfer is 
an asset for Malaysia’s technology sustainability. This is also 
considering the fact that Malaysia is disinterested in developing nuclear 
weapons, but only attentive in the economic and nuclear technology 
spin-offs. Malaysia is solely interested in the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology and thus, hypothetically not an ‘aggressive country’ based 
on the following accounts: 
 
a) Malaysia has no history of invading or attacking neighbouring 
states, providing no motivation to develop nuclear weapons. 
Instead, Malaysia adheres to the principle that a balanced economic 
development among neighbouring states will lead to the 
development and expansion of new markets for the region. Thus, 
Malaysia’s interest lies only in the socio-economic development and 
technology spin-off (Ibrahim, 2006); 
b)  Malaysia does not believe that cruel or brutish efforts will bring any 
good or peace to the region as demonstrated by Malaysia’s 
consultations and negotiations with the British for its independence 
in 1957;  
c) Malaysia is not located in a region with a long history of war or 
turmoil, at least not since the Vietnam War, and this would suggest 
any motivation to develop nuclear weapons. This is unlike the North 
Korea or the Indian sub-continent. Malaysia also does not view the 
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other state in the region that is a nuclear-armed superpower, for 
example China, as a threat. This is supported by the “Good 
Neighbour Policy” arising after the PRC government moved from a 
position of loyally advocating country sovereignty, non-interference, 
and bilateral relationships with powerful states to an increasing 
interest to embrace multilateral cooperation, particularly in the 
regions surrounding China (Chung, 2010). This is the opposite of 
what has happened in the Indian sub-continent, where Pakistan and 
India are still plagued by hatred and distrust, even though they 
share similar historic, cultural, geographic, and economic links; 
d)  Malaysia is one of the founding members of ASEAN, a signatory to 
the SEANWFZ, an active member of the NAM, and a very active 
advocate of non-proliferation and disarmament issues at 
international platform. This shows that Malaysia is against the 
possession of nuclear weapons by any country or party in the world 
and has been spearheading efforts to ban nuclear weapons. This is 
clear through Malaysia’s policies and activities with regards to 
nuclear security, safety and non-proliferation (Ibrahim, 2000). 
 
Therefore, Malaysia is not an ‘aggressive country’ that may pose a 
threat to the international community since it is not interested in 
developing weapons of mass destruction and their only main interest is 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. However, these statements 
might not be adequate for a country to gain total trust from the 
international community, especially NSG to access nuclear fuel cycle 
technology. According to the conventional Westphalian model, threats to 
international security come primarily from recalcitrant or aggressive 
states. However, in the twenty-first century, threats are equally likely to 
come from failing or weak states, or even non-country actors (Newman, 
2007). Nevertheless, it is important to identify what the real threats are 
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and not just unrealistically assume and predict something, which might 
inconveniently cause challenges for developing states such Malaysia to 
gain profit from the nuclear power economy. In this case, Malaysia 
needs to build trust among the international community, especially the 
NSG to prove that Malaysia is a trustworthy country and nuclear 
technology is genuinely for economic purposes, or Malaysia might 
access nuclear fuel cycle technology with more strict rules. This is 
challenging, especially after the discovery of the fairly well organised 
international nuclear black market, which was led by A.Q Khan, in 2004. 
In addition, the recent claims that North Korea tested a hydrogen bomb 
in January 2016 and a nuclear test in 2013, further add to the challenge. 
Another factor that may influence the decision by NSG towards 
Malaysia’s involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle arena is the potential for 
South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, especially as 
threats were made by North Korea, through its numerous nuclear tests 
as well as a medium-range missile (the Rodong) test, which can strike 
western Japan anytime (Simon, 1993).   
 
Consequently, Malaysia does not have any objection with the proposal 
of the MNA, but with the condition that the proposal is created with 
systems and organisation structure that would assist the participating 
country in boosting its national nuclear economy which the main reason 
for developing country such Malaysia when they decided to develop 
nuclear power program. The proposed MNA also would assist the 
participating country by strengthening and firming up their national 
nuclear safety and security infrastructures. Sovereignty is always priority 
when a country decided to join any cooperation agreement or treaty 
because it involves a transfer of a certain amount of decision-making 
authority away from states and towards some international institution 
(Sutherland et.al, 2004). Hence, the proposed MNA should be 
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approached in good faith and not as a mechanism to pressure 
newcomers to sign unnecessary arrangements or treaties which may 
jeopardise the country’s sovereignty. It is also would not be used as a 
mechanism to ‘squeeze’ newcomers and creating nuclear fuel cartels. 
 
In the meantime, Malaysia could use the MNA as part of its strategy in a 
nuclear power programme by creating opportunities that would be 
gained through this proposal. This is because the MNA as a guarantee 
for nuclear fuel without additional cost to build reprocessing or 
enrichment facilities, as well security and safeguard infrastructures; and 
for build-up trust and good relationships with nuclear supplier states. 
This is important because as a developing country, in a region 
neighbouring with countries that are advanced in nuclear technology 
such as China, India, Pakistan, South Korea, North Korea and Japan; 
like other Asia-Pacific countries, Malaysia needs to rely on good 
relations with the major actors, such as the U.S. or Russia to balance 
the power of these countries in the Asia region. 
 
From the Malaysian perspective, the MNA is a multidimensional concept 
that requires extensive study with respect to its technical, economic, 
legal and political implications. It needs to focus on finding an optimum 
arrangement that would satisfy both objectives of assurance of supply 
and services. In terms of non-proliferation assurances, the existing 
international regimes based on the NPT and the IAEA Safeguards 
System should be strengthened and equally reinforced by all, especially 
NWSs. As such, the focus in developing multilateral approaches to the 
nuclear fuel cycle should be on developing innovative approaches to 
enhance supply assurances, consistent with the existing non-
proliferation safeguards regime.  
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6.9 Conclusion 
When deciding to embark nuclear power program, the MNA is no doubt 
an option if Malaysia would like to secure its nuclear fuel supply and 
sustainability of its nuclear program. The MNA also demonstrated 
national genuine interest in nuclear program. Not only will it gain trust 
and a positive image from the international perspective, but also could 
be benefitted by the multilateral cooperation with other states that have 
many experiences and expertise. This answered the first research 
question of this study; ‘what the best option for Malaysia is to guarantee 
the security of nuclear fuel supply and sustainability of its environment 
when Malaysia is ready to develop nuclear power programme?’ The 
MNA would also help Malaysia to reduce the operational cost, by 
sharing relevant facilities without the need to build it. 
 
This study has agreed what have been observed by scholars that 
motivations for a country that has decided to acquire nuclear weapons 
share a combination of military, economic, political, and leadership 
concerns. These factors were categorised into three group – systemic, 
state and individual actors (Khan, 2017). 
 Systemic is a group that believe nuclear weapons are the solution 
for security, seeking regional hegemony, gaining international 
prestige and obtaining bargaining advantages; 
 State factors include domestic turmoil, economic motivations, 
public opinion, scientific/technological momentum and 
bureaucratic politics; and 
 Individual actor involves the attitudes and beliefs of individual 
leader. 
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These supported the model of Sagan, 1996/1997, who has developed 
three models to explain why state inspired to develop nuclear weapon. 
He argued that nuclear weapons are more than tools of national 
security, but they are political objects and also serve as international 
normative symbols of modernity and identity. Based on the above, he 
developed three models that explain why states decide to build or refrain 
from developing nuclear weapons.  Firstly "the security model," whereby 
states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against 
foreign threats, especially nuclear threats. Secondly "the domestic 
politics model," which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used 
to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests. Finally, the 
“the norms model," under which nuclear weapons decisions are made 
because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, 
provides an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and 
identity (Sagan, 1996/1997:55). 
 
National security has been the basic driver of the decisions pertaining to 
nuclear weapons and they have agreed that the realm of proliferation is 
security, primarily because states facing security threats require nuclear 
weapons for deterrent purposes and deterrence has been the only 
function of nuclear weapons since the first two detonations in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in 1945 by the US (Khan, 2009). Although some countries 
believe that possession of nuclear weapons could guarantee national 
security gain respect and prestige in the international arena as well 
enhances a state’s international influence (Gartzke & Kroenig, 2009), 
Malaysia never shows its interest in developing such mass weapon 
destruction. 
 
Interest in peaceful use of nuclear technology is also shared by other 
ASEAN Members, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, as discussed in 
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Chapter 5. Sharing the same philosophy of nuclear technology is only 
for peaceful uses, a creation of ASIANTOM might be a reality if ASEAN 
think and discuss it more deeply and comprehensively. This includes 
revisit its Charter if it wishes to be really effective in maintaining and 
enhancing “peace, security and stability” in the region, particularly if 
creating ASIANTOM. Many Asia political observers see that the 
Charters blunting the effectiveness of ASEAN. The Charter should be 
reserved (applied) only to matters which have obvious implications for 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic autonomy of a member 
state, not when the issues concern the security of ASEAN as a region 
(Karim, 2016; see also Buang, 2017). 
 
As highlighted in this chapter, Malaysia, a country that revolutionized 
from an agriculture-based country into a manufacturing country, desires 
a promising technology for energy resource such as nuclear energy 
because it could help the country to diversify and balance its energy 
sources for economic, environmental and energy security reasons. 
Thus, respects and prestige in the international arena through military 
and weaponisation of nuclear technology is not in Malaysia’s agenda. In 
fact, this could be learnt from Malaysia’s history, which gained its 
Independence Day through negotiation and not war. In addition, if 
Malaysia decided to embark on nuclear power in future and would like to 
secure its fuel supply, the MNA could be one of best alternatives for 
Malaysia to join. Even more, by joining this kind of multilateral approach, 
Malaysia could benefit from the potential to facilitate the continued use 
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and enhance the prospects for 
the safe and environmentally sound storage and disposal of spent fuel 
and radioactive waste (Hwang, n.d.). Later, based on outcomes and 
findings from four pathways of this thesis that were discussed in Chapter 
3, 4, 5 and 6, the next chapter, Chapter 7 discussing factors to be 
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considered for the Malaysian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy which then used 
as basis for formulating strategies for the policy, by considering adopting 
elements of the MNA, specially for a possibility of regional institution - 
ASIANTOM. Regionalism is not a new effort for Malaysia for value-
added its international cooperation. In the 1990s, Malaysia under 
Mahathir also took a leading role in building a wider, East Asian 
regionalism. Mahathir believed that East Asians ought to be able to work 
together on the basis of their East Asian identity, just as Europeans 
were cooperating on the basis of European identity on the other side of 
the world. In 2005, ASEAN initiated the East Asia Summit (EAS) and 
during the summit, which bringing together China, Japan and South 
Korea, Abdullah Badawi said that there is “so much we can do together”. 
From the 1980s, a key development in Malaysian policy was the 
growing determination to ‘Look East’, towards Japan, China and South 
Korea — and this development certainly reflected the changing balance 
of global economic power. However, Mahathir pledge that it was not a 
“lopsided policy” and would not mean exclusion of the U.S. and Europe 
(Milner, 2014). 
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Part 3: Conclusion 
Chapter 7 
Malaysian Nuclear Policy and the Multilateral 
Nuclear Approach 
 
7.1 Southeast Asia and the MNA 
Some scholars have thoroughly examined why states are inspired to 
have nuclear weapons and the effect of nuclear proliferation on the 
stability of the international system (Waltz, 1995; see also Sagan, 1997; 
Khan, 2009). However, some states also use civilian nuclear 
cooperation agreements as a means of strengthening friends and allies 
and pursuing strategic objectives (Stinnett et al., 2011). This is how 
developing country such Malaysia would fit in and could convince 
nuclear supplier that nuclear weapons development is never in the 
agenda but and only interested in the economy of nuclear technology. 
Political stability is very important to secure support from the 
international community, which could attract investors and initiate 
international cooperation. This has been confirmed by the French 
nuclear company, AREVA, which states that before cooperating with 
any potential nuclear newcomer State, it would first evaluate a country’s 
political stability and potential proliferation risk. In addition, AREVA may 
even take into account regional stability before selling nuclear materials 
to a country (Jewell, 2011). 
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In supporting these factors, the central element for the MNA to ensure is 
that a civilian nuclear programme is not misused for the purposes of 
weapon proliferation, especially in regions that are believed to have 
terrorist activities. The establishment of ASEAN is mainly to satisfy this 
requirement, and the stability of SEA region. From the perspective of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, terrorist activities in this region are 
very improbable, remote and beliefs there is no presents of major 
nuclear security or proliferation risks (ICSA, 2012; see also Malley & 
Ogilvie-White, 2012). Therefore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam fear 
that any multilateral approach proposed by a developed country will be 
used as a tool of power, especially the U.S. and its allies, which could 
become unequal, and therefore express discrimination. They worry 
about differential treatment between states, for example in the case 
between Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) and Non-nuclear Weapon 
States (NNWSs), where NWSs requested NNWSs to sign or accede to 
various types of agreements or initiatives for the sake of nuclear security 
and non-proliferation. However, some developing countries believe it 
was NWSs that had broken the treaty and not NNWSs. Whilst NNWSs 
have shown their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, NWSs have 
not demonstrated serious efforts to disarm their nuclear stockpiles 
(Krisnamurthi, 2017) 
 
Developing countries feel that discrimination and inequality are bundled 
into a wider sense of disappointment towards the NPT. As firmly 
reiterated by the Indonesian Ambassador Gusti Agung Wesaka Pujaj, 
during the plenary of the 2009 Conference on Disarmament, “For 
Indonesia, the issue of disarmament is not only an issue that stems from 
negotiations, but it is a promise long delayed, a dream long awaited, and 
a commitment long overdue.” Aligned with the statement, during the 
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2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, the Indonesian Vice 
President Boediono cited,  
 
Indonesia is to see to it that the Nuclear security summit in 
Washington… will not limit the sovereign right of participating 
countries to use nuclear power for peaceful purpose,” then later 
ending with a statement that converged with the views of most 
NNWSs, “Do not let reasons to prevent nuclear materials from 
reaching irresponsible persons be used deliberately or not 
deliberately for preventing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (ICSA, 2012). 
 
Consequently, there is an issue of trust between developing and 
developed countries. The SEA countries believe that any attempt to 
develop these multilateral approaches is an opportunity to introduce new 
or additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the existing non-
proliferation regime and would only likely lead to the same result as 
numerous past efforts (ICSA, 2012; see also Yew, 2011). Instead of 
building trust, Supplier States have demanded further commitments 
from non-nuclear weapon states despite the slow progress of 
disarmament commitments from the five nuclear weapon states 
(Sokolski, 2010; see also United Nations, 2016).  
 
Historically, motivations for nuclear power programmes are associated 
with nuclear weapons considerations and high growth in electricity 
consumption. However, in the modern period, energy demand, energy 
security and environment are the motivations for pursuing nuclear power 
(Jewell, 2011; see also Khattak et.al, 2016). As a developing region, 
SEA countries are more focused on social and economic development. 
Along with a rapid improvement in economy and expansion in 
population, the need for energy also escalates. The potential for nuclear 
energy is promising and therefore, many developing countries are 
looking for an opportunity to embark on a nuclear power programme. 
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This scenario is good news for nuclear suppliers to find new prospects 
and opportunity to expand their business. This is after taking into 
account the decision made by many developed countries to stop or 
reduce their nuclear power programmes due to the Fukushima accident. 
 
With the increasing demands for nuclear power programmes, many 
countries have voiced their concern and uneasiness that newcomers 
may misuse this technology for weapon proliferation and worry whether 
new nuclear-weapon states will be born. As a result, several 
mechanisms and approaches were proposed by nuclear supplier 
countries to ensure that all countries can have the benefit of civilian 
nuclear technology while controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
or dirty bombs. Among the most campaigned approaches is the MNA, 
which had mixed responses and feedback from newcomers: mostly 
developing countries who are members to the NPT. Newcomer 
countries consistently stress that no proposals should deny the existing 
right of any country in the use of nuclear technology as stipulated in the 
text of the NPT (Tauscher, 2010). Multilateral approaches to the nuclear 
fuel cycle should be created to assist developing countries for 
strengthening safety and security and need to be approached in good 
faith and not as a tool to control, or to ‘blackmail’ the newcomer, that 
may jeopardise the country’s sovereignty.   
 
As developing countries that are interested in a nuclear power 
programme, neither Indonesia nor Vietnam are interested in issues that 
may delay their nuclear power programmes. This is also because this 
programme involves a high cost upfront and any delays may lead to 
higher budgets. As developing countries, Indonesia and Vietnam, as 
well as other SEA States, recognise the influence of multilateral 
cooperation in heightening their economy and security. Multilateral 
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relationships have been an important constituent in designing foreign 
policy in these countries and have brought participation in various 
multilateral institutions, including those related to nuclear security and 
non-proliferation. From the experiences and observations of this 
researcher, SEA States always make efforts to present a good image to 
other countries, especially in the western bloc and particularly the US. 
Participation in various nuclear security and non-proliferation 
conventions and treaties will help these countries as a profile-raising 
aspect of their disarmament diplomacy. In fact, participation in these 
instruments seems to be an opportunity for Indonesia and Vietnam to 
achieve goals for their foreign policy and international politics and most 
importantly, trust from the international community. 
 
In common with Indonesia, Vietnam views the engagement with the 
nuclear security agenda as an opportunity to expand and improve its 
relations with the US, the West and more widely with international 
institutions. The latter were described above as being particularly 
important for the small and medium powers that compose ASEAN. This 
has been discussed previously through the neo-realist perspectives on 
ASEAN, which needs to rely on relations with the major actors such as 
the U.S. 
 
Even though SEA countries claim that this region has no issue with 
security or terrorism activities, it needs proof and a robust system or 
institution that could demonstrate that this region is stable and secure. 
Perhaps ASEAN and other states from Asia Pacific could take the EU as 
an example, which has established Euratom for specifically handling 
and managing their nuclear business, not only for non-proliferation but 
also nuclear trade and market development. Through multilateral 
cooperation, such as in a regional institution, the involved countries 
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would operate their nuclear programmes more transparently and this 
would indeed gain trust from the nuclear supplier group.  When trust 
between supplier and consumer is secured, the implementation of the 
MNA, which involves bigger networking, would be much easier.  This 
may still be distant for ASEAN because none have a running nuclear 
power programme, but at least interested countries could start by 
sharing their interest and ideas on how to strengthen the legal, security 
and non-proliferation framework in the region. ASEAN also needs to 
revise its principles accordingly, especially the concept of ‘non-
interference’, to ensure that when it comes to nuclear matters, it is a 
regional matter and not an individual or domestic state matter.    
7.2 Multilateralism: An Advantage for Malaysia’s Nuclear Program 
Since the end of the Cold War, many approaches to strengthen nuclear 
security and proliferation have been presented in the Asia region in a 
variety of forms including bilateral, multilateral and regional. These soft 
approaches were intended to enhance understanding of policies among 
states in a hope that this would prevent conflict. In contrast, realists 
believe that only power can maintain and secure peace (Singh, 2000). In 
modern definition, the concept of security is not only limited to military 
security, but has also touched upon broader issues, such as the 
economy, environmental threats, drugs, transnational crime, immigration 
and many more. Many East Asian countries, especially ASEAN 
countries, choose to regard the concept of security as more 
comprehensive than military security. For example, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) accepted that “the concept of security includes 
not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other 
issues (Singh, 2000). Today, Asian leaders do not consider nuclear 
power as a guarantee for national and regional security or in other 
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words, as a military power. On the contrary, they have started to widen 
their interest and strategies by strengthening the state’s economy. This 
is known as economic security, which is a key component in 
comprehensive security - a holistic package that includes social, 
political, economy and military (Rosenberger, 2001). 
Based on these factors, multilateral cooperation is in favour of ensuring 
that there is a balance between the economic and security aspects of 
nuclear technology. Meckoni in his report, has suggested that decisions 
on multilateral cooperation depend on the state’s policy on waste 
management (Meckoni, 1976). If the interest is to store the spent fuel, 
the decision will be associated with long term storage of such fuel, which 
is relatively simple. However, if the interest is to recycle the fuel, through 
reprocessing and enrichment, the problems will be more complex. This 
will involve assimilation of new technologies, training of local staff, 
maintaining plant safety, safeguarding of fissile materials, financing of 
various facilities and other related matters associated with the setting up 
of the fuel cycle facilities. Thus, multilateral cooperation appears to be 
the best way to solve these complex interrelated problems and could be 
an effective way to coordinate strategy and management of the fuel 
cycle. Based on his analysis, Meckoni stressed that multilateralism is 
not only an IR tool that has economic benefits but also could improve 
the cost and utilisation of manpower, the efficiency of technological 
operations, reliable radioactive waste management and disposal, 
strengthening the security of materials and more effective international 
safeguards (Meckoni, 1976; see also United Nation, 2003). 
Realising the potential for multilateral cooperation in nuclear business, 
but displaying high concern over non-proliferation, many schemes were 
introduced as discussed in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, many failed or did 
not proceed. Besides considering technological and environmental 
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factors, trust between suppliers and consumer states also plays an 
important role in multilateral cooperation. The most significant supplier 
state that has a big influence in nuclear cooperation is the U.S. Chapter 
6 discussed the relationship between Malaysia and U.S, which could be 
described as somewhat of a roller coaster. During Mahathir’s 
administration, nuclear cooperation between Malaysia and the U.S was 
very limited. At that time, Malaysia took an approach of ‘wait and see’ 
when the U.S. approached with potential agreements or cooperation. 
This is because during that time Malaysia was less interested to work 
too closely with the U.S., due to fear that Malaysia would be controlled 
by the U.S. Malaysia voiced its concern over U.S. interference in Iraq’s 
sovereignty and the lack of support over the Palestinian issues, although 
this started to dilute during Abdullah’s and Najib’s administration. This 
might be stimulated by the foreign policy of Obama’s administration, 
which was designed to accelerate economic development through 
partnerships.     
Malaysia and other ASEAN countries stand by the ASEAN Charter and 
principles that multilateral relationships should be shaped by its culture 
and society. This is supported by the primary motivations behind the 
establishment of ASEAN: to prevent external powers from exploiting the 
power vacuum left after the rapid decolonisation of the region; to foster 
cooperation among countries with common interests in the same 
geographic region; to have a stronger voice in addressing major global 
powers if they could speak together; that cooperation and ultimately 
integration would serve the interests of all countries, which is something 
that can never be achieved by an individual country (Mahbubani & 
Severino, 2014).  
This study suggests that multilateral cooperation such the MNA could be 
an advantage to Malaysia’s nuclear power program. The MNA not only 
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ensures the security and sustainability of fuel supply, but also helps to 
lessen cost in terms of building relevant facilities such as reprocessing 
facilities, workforces training and security infrastructures. In fact, 
Malaysia will be benefitted from the MNA through shared facilities that 
could guarantee fuel supply and lessen the volume of nuclear waste 
without a need to have the facility. This means Malaysia does not have 
to worry about finding a suitable site to build the facility. Most 
importantly, it confirms that Malaysia’s interest in nuclear power is 
genuinely for civil application. Malaysia indeed does not want to 
experience the same problem as South Korea that cannot reprocess its 
waste due to its 123 Agreement and is now facing problems to secure 
additional sites for SNF storage. This became crucial when the current 
storage nearly reached its limit (Lim, 2016). Through the MNA, the 
volume of waste will be lessened, and this could give more time for 
states to find a solution for SNF storage. 
Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle have been debated 
among scholars and policymakers for many years now. Initiatives such 
as Russia's IUEC are currently operating although the value of front-end 
proposals is a controversial issue. Meanwhile, on the back-end, there 
are not yet any proposals. The UAE, a growing nuclear energy state, for 
example has opened bids for a contract for a commercial supplier to 
both supply fuel and take back the spent nuclear fuel. However, 
permanent spent fuel management is a politically difficult issue, and 
some argue that a multilateral back-end proposal could draw wide 
participation (Harvey, 2011). 
 
So far, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved the creation of two 
separate fuel banks. The first, formally established by the IAEA and the 
Russian government in March 2010, is owned, operated, and paid for by 
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the Russian Federation (Harvey, 2011). This International Uranium 
Enrichment Center (IUEC) is set up as a joint stock company, with 
Russia's Rosatom Corporation holding 80% of the shares, and the rest 
held by Armenian, Kazakhstani and Ukrainian corporations 
(International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC, 2018). The IUEC 
differs from the two fuel banks because it is a for-profit entity owned by 
state-backed companies. As a result, unlike the fuel banks, it is 
privileged and exclusive in its provision of enrichment services. The 
IUEC gives special treatment to its shareholders when selling 
enrichment services and is only available to states that do not have 
domestic enrichment capabilities. Unlike the fuel banks, it provides a 
further financial incentive to its shareholders in the form of dividends 
(Harvey, 2011). 
 
Then, the Board of Governors approved a second fuel reserve in 
December 2010, located at Kazakhstan. The start-up costs and initial 
operational expenses of the IAEA reserve will be paid out of 
approximately USD100 million in donations from a number of states and 
organisation such as Nuclear Threat Initiative. This reserve is roughly 
half the size of the Russian reserve and has enough uranium to provide 
one full load for a typical 1000 MWe reactor. The IAEA plans to start 
buying uranium and shipping it to the bank in 2018 (Uatkhanov, 2017). 
Through this fuel bank, if an IAEA Member State is unable to obtain LEU 
from the commercial market, it can make a request to the IAEA for a 
supply, meaning that the LEU Bank is a mechanism of a last resort. The 
IAEA Director General will determine whether the request meets the 
criteria approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and is satisfied that 
there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material in that state, 
and no issues with the implementation of safeguards of the states.  
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These two fuel banks share several important characteristics that 
provide an example for future IAEA-endorsed multilateral approaches to 
the fuel cycle. Apart from the safeguards requirement, the fuel banks are 
non-exclusive and available to all IAEA member states with the 
condition they are in compliance with the IAEA comprehensive 
safeguards agreement (Harvey, 2011).  
 
During the 2010 Review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2010, Members of 
the Non-Aligned Movements (NAM) whose statement was read by the 
H.E Dr. R.M Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Indonesia, firmly stated that unrestricted and non-
discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all 
NPT State Parties must be ensured. This was reflected in the Final 
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which clearly reported 
that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy should be valued. The NAM States Parties also do not 
see a need for setting additional conditions for the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. They believe that any excessive and additional 
restrictions currently applied to many developing countries that are also 
parties to the NPT is regrettable and should be removed and it is not in 
the spirit of Article IV of the Treaty (Natalegawa, 2010).    
This Thesis has suggested that, in one aspect, a modern MNA could be 
seen as one of methods through which non-proliferation could be 
achieved in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. As a newcomer 
in nuclear technology for energy, Malaysia could use the MNA as an 
advantage to keep its nuclear power program on track. Through the 
MNA, being based on the security of fuel supply and proliferation-
resistant technology, Malaysia could create a proliferation firewall as 
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suggested by Malley and Ogilvie-White (2009). Both researchers 
suggested that through the implementation of the MNA, Southeast 
countries like Malaysia would benefit from the MNA as it would provide 
stronger safety, security, and non-proliferation assurances than regional 
proposals developed by the Pacific Atomic Energy Community that 
focused on Northeast Asia and concentrated exclusively on 
reprocessing. In Southeast Asia, nuclear development is still in its early 
stages, where a nuclear-weapon-free zone exists, the strategic 
environment is relatively nonthreatening and surrounded by a unique 
regional environment where long-term economic and security interests 
align (Malley & Ogilvie-White, 2009). 
7.3  Factors to Be Considered For the Malaysian Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Policy  
As argued throughout this thesis, amongst the main factors that 
Malaysia needs to consider when deliberating its idea to formulate a 
National Fuel Cycle Policy are (i) the management of high level waste; 
and (ii) the assurance and sustainability of nuclear fuel supply. Key 
elements to strategize these factors include identifying to what extent 
the country intends to acquire fuel cycle technologies: the full fuel cycle, 
or only the critical stages. But, in view of the extensive ventures that are 
needed to acquire such technologies, in addition to the strict 
requirements exposed by nuclear suppliers, particularly enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies that are deemed to be sensitive from the 
perspective of weapon proliferation, Malaysia has no choice but to opt 
out of these technologies as part of its strategy in National Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Policy. Instead, Malaysia could opt for an open nuclear fuel cycle, 
which only acquires certain stages of a nuclear fuel cycle. Meanwhile, 
for some stages that are costly or problematic to manage, including the 
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fuel supply, Malaysia could out-source these to other states or by joining 
some multilateral consortia. Besides assurance of supply, this could 
help Malaysia reduce the cost, and pose a lesser risk of proliferation 
from the view of nuclear supplier states, for not acquiring reprocessing 
or enrichment capability. 
 
Given the nexus between the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapon 
proliferation that arises from the possibility of diversion of nuclear 
material commencing from the uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
stages of the cycle, the MNA seems like a good deal for Malaysia. 
However, the proposal needs in-depth study, so that it would offers the 
most effective platform to realise states’ common goals and resolve 
common threats through multilateral cooperation (Powel 2003). To 
conclude this study, four broad research questions were established to 
address research problem, as detailed in Chapter 1. These questions 
can be translated into strategies for Malaysia to benefit from 
participation in the MNA. 
 
7.3.1 Key 1: Security of nuclear fuel supply 
 
How can the MNA ensure that the nuclear fuel and its services are 
accessible at competitive market prices on an equitable and non-
discriminatory basis? 
- Identify Initiatives that would guarantee the nuclear fuel supply is 
continuous and be sustained without disruption and interference 
from supplier states or other countries  
 
This question emerges because newcomer states are worried that the 
MNA could be used as a cartel in the nuclear fuel supply market, which 
is dominated and controlled by nuclear suppliers. Concerns were also 
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raised as to what happens if the MNA is controlled by power states such 
as Russia and the U.S., especially if unexpected political conflicts 
happen between supplier and recipient or due to interference from 
another country. The fuel supply should only discontinue if the 
participating country is breaching a contract and if it is proven that the 
recipient county has jeopardised safety and security through illegal 
nuclear activities. Thus, the MNA would receive wide participation if it 
can guarantee that the nuclear fuel supply is undisrupted and sustained. 
If the supplier fails to provide fuel, it is the responsibility of the supplier to 
get the back-up supply from the Fuel Bank without interruption of the 
recipient’s nuclear power plant operation. Lessons learnt from previous 
inter-governmental efforts should be considered when initiating the 
MNA. For instance, many developing countries experience a sense of 
ineffectiveness and uselessness when encountering unauthorised 
interventions by ad hoc coalitions of the willing, or domination by 
wealthy and industrialised countries. Forman and Segaar advocated that 
rule-based multilateral institutions are supposed to protect against this 
‘bilateral bullying’ (Forman & Segaar, 2014). 
 
Participating states should also have the freedom to choose the country 
for fuel supply, especially if the original supplier fails to provide nuclear 
fuel. Another approach would be by creating a common market for 
nuclear fuel supply as has been implemented by Euratom: 
 Free trade among the Member States by elimination of all import 
and export duties or charges with equivalent effect, and all 
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports of nuclear fuel; and 
 Ensure the tariff for Member States is cheaper than for non-
members, which would attract more participation. 
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 A common market would also give advantages by harmonising 
legal frameworks and infrastructure, eliminate non-trade barriers, 
and ensure a free market for capital, labour and services. 
 
7.3.2 Key 2: Identify the impacts of the MNA to Malaysia 
 
What are the issues and impact of the MNA that should be addressed 
before Malaysia designs its national nuclear fuel cycle policy?   
- Identify impacts of MNA in terms of cost; access to the 
technology and fuel services within the context of tightening 
international nuclear governance 
 
Assurance of Supply: 
Malaysia realised the fact that it does not have natural resources such 
as uranium or thorium means that it would be fully dependent on 
international supplies of nuclear fuel for its nuclear power programme. 
Thus, assurance of supply is very important for a potential newcomer 
country like Malaysia. A country that joins the MNA will be guaranteed 
the supply of goods and services provided, through several mechanisms 
such as supply in current markets, collective guarantees (between the 
government and the IAEA), virtual or physical Low Enriched Uranium 
(LEU), government stocks of enriched uranium, etc. It is important 
though, that this aspect is not influenced by any political view or 
pressure by another country that is not a party to the particular MNA 
agreement but is governed only by the contract previously agreed. This 
is where trust plays an important role. Any dispute should be settled 
among the members of the MNA with no dominant power among the 
members or autonomous decision-makers, which will weaken the 
functioning of the MNA. 
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Knowledge: No technology transfer: 
The MNA means that Malaysia has provisionally agreed to surrender its 
national right to have the technology as stipulated under Article IV of the 
NPT.  One of the principles in multilateralism is reciprocity. With regards 
to nuclear technology transfer, developing states pursue reciprocity, 
demanding better levels of technology transfer, guaranteeing that 
political criteria would not be the basis for technical assistance or 
nuclear supply, and the linkage of vertical arms control to limitation of 
horizontal proliferation (Schiff, 1984). In their recommendation during 
the 2005 NPT review Argentina stated that, “The importance of nuclear 
energy and its potential increase in the future is something generally 
recognized. All states have the right to benefit from it. In this respect, 
Argentina is convinced that the best method to strengthen and ensure 
nuclear non-proliferation is through the application of the existing 
elements in the international non-proliferation regime” (Argentina 
Working Document, 2005). This also means that in the future, Malaysia 
will agree to depend only on external resources of nuclear fuel. 
However, when the IAEA initiated the Fuel Bank, it gave hope for 
sustainability and security of fuel supply. However, this Fuel Bank can 
only be used when there is interruption to the nuclear fuel supply when 
suppliers fail to supply the fuel because of technical problems or issues 
regarding fuel resources.   
 
Economy: 
By joining the MNA, Malaysia can readily get fuel and does not have to 
concern itself with developing relevant facilities, which will cost millions 
of dollars in terms of capital, training of personnel, safety and security. 
As a newcomer country, Malaysia should seek an alternative 
arrangement that will give quick results and less risk, which also 
includes the risks in security and proliferation. This means that there is 
311 
 
no room for mistakes or experimentation as the NPP involves high 
capital outlays. Developing states are more concerned about economic 
welfare and sustaining national development (Schiff, 1984). Meanwhile, 
developed states are more preoccupied with nuclear security and non-
proliferation. The MNA possibly will be a good bargain linking economic 
benefits, nuclear security and non-proliferation. 
 
Security and non-proliferation: 
In general, all states agree that nuclear proliferation undermines 
security. And for this reason, the nuclear fuel cycle facilities involve high 
security and well-trained personnel. However, this should not prevent 
Malaysia from gaining benefits from technological development and 
economic spin-offs from nuclear activities as long it is exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. Through participation in the MNA, all issues with 
regards to security and non-proliferation will be in place and Malaysia 
will benefit in terms of the cost of ensuring security and non-proliferation 
as well training security personnel.   
 
Legal framework (safety, security and proliferation): 
The minute Malaysia joins the MNA, it has to comply with certain 
treaties / conventions which will impact its current national law. The 
MNA also means that Malaysia will have to comply with the MNA host 
country’s requirements and most probably their national law. This aspect 
should be considered in the national legal framework, in order to comply 
with international law, the general rules on non-proliferation and the 
need to eliminate threats to international peace and security. In this way, 
Malaysia could gain trust and confidence from the international 
community to operate and manage its nuclear power programme. 
 
Speed up Malaysia’s plan to embark on a Nuclear Power Programme: 
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The initiative to join the MNA will demonstrate that Malaysia is interested 
in developing mutual confidence between the host country and supplier. 
When there is trust between the two entities, it will speed up Malaysia’s 
plan to embark on a nuclear power programme. 
 
Political consequences: 
Gaining trust from the international community will contribute to better 
international relations and public acceptance of how Malaysia manages 
its national nuclear power programme. This will also demonstrate that 
Malaysia has no interest in developing nuclear weapons but is only 
concerned about the economic benefits to be gained from the nuclear 
power programme. By joining the multilateral approach, it would position 
Malaysia positively in nuclear networking. This would enable Malaysia to 
be more active in international nuclear forums, especially those dealing 
with nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation. With the 
development and continuing spread of interest in nuclear technology, 
access to nuclear materials, equipment and information that may 
possibly be misused for the development of a nuclear weapon 
programme has become more difficult. Thus, the developing states fear 
and are unhappy with what they perceive to be the continued “neo-
imperialistic” efforts in controlling nuclear technology through the 
manipulation of international regulatory institutions and unilateral 
restraints on technology transfers. They fear that these will hinder their 
efforts to maximise the economic development and modernisation that 
they can acquire through the nuclear technology. However, these 
developments were encouraged by their obstructionism in international 
forums and their reluctance to accede to some approaches proposed to 
strengthen nuclear security, safeguards and non-proliferation, for 
example the expansion of safeguards activities (Schiff, 1984; Choi & 
Hwang 2015; Volpe, 2016). These regimes still allow participating 
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countries to keep their sovereignty by understanding their rights. 
Besides, by being more transparent, the country is developing trust, not 
just from the international community but also from their public. 
 
Advantage on Managing Nuclear Waste: 
Participation in the MNA will benefit the country because, without a need 
to establish reprocessing facility which is expensive and would raise 
proliferation issues, country still has an opportunity to reduce the volume 
of high-level wastes. This might be realised through join multilaterally 
with other existing facilities through the MNA initiatives. Therefore, the 
country only needs to manage a smaller volume of high-level wastes, 
besides there is no additional cost involved in managing fissile materials 
that definitely need high security facilities as well as costs for 
safeguarding and training personnel.  
 
To move forward in nuclear technology and not be left behind in the 
technology: 
Nuclear technology, especially the nuclear energy field is evolving 
rapidly, and whatever is to be undertaken might prove in vain if begun 
too late. Thus, any issues that may delay the progress of a nuclear 
programme should be avoided. This is because, not only will it cost time 
and money, but it also would mean letting a new period of development 
pass by without taking part.  
 
7.3.3 Key 3: Good relationship with the technology holders 
 
What are the factors to accelerate and maintain the trust of international 
for the implementation and sustainability of multilateralism of nuclear 
fuel cycle cooperation? 
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- Identify the technology that will be used and initiate good 
relationships with the technology holders and other Supplier 
Group States 
 
From observations made during this study, the history of cooperation 
with superpower States such as the US, Russia and their allies played 
an important role during the negotiation of nuclear cooperation. In other 
words, newcomers not only depend on international organisations like 
the IAEA, but also their relationship with these countries, because they 
hold the original technology and have big influences in many 
international organisations due to the fact that they are the biggest 
donors. Analyses from this study show that the following factors have 
influenced nuclear cooperation between supplier states and recipient 
states: 
 
i. Economic Cooperation / Partnership with nuclear supplier states; 
ii. Military Strategic Partnership with nuclear supplier states; 
iii. Initiative to demonstrate transparency in nuclear power 
programmes such as the International Expert Committee in the 
organisation 
iv. National Position towards uranium enrichment and spent fuel 
reprocessing technology; 
v. Foreign Policy towards cooperation with other countries, terrorism 
issues, socio-economy and trade; 
vi. Domestic political stability;  
vii. Nuclear policy on peaceful use purposes; 
viii. Clearly announce to opt out of nuclear weapon development. A 
country with no history in nuclear weapon development and 
nuclear test would be at an advantage during negotiation;  
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ix. National efforts in non-proliferation. An additional initiative 
towards non-proliferation would be of benefit in negotiations over 
nuclear cooperation. For example, the initiative by the UAE 
Government announcing that they would contribute USD10 
million towards an IAEA fuel bank proposal launched by the NTI. 
The former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Sam Nunn has said, “The UAE’s decision to join the US and the 
European Union to fund a ‘fuel bank’ mechanism for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency demonstrates their 
commitment to non-proliferation principles.” (U.S.-U.A.E. 
Business Council, 2009). 
x. History and legal framework to counter any nuclear illegal 
activities, terrorism and non-proliferation. This could be seen in 
the nuclear agreement between the US and India that revealed 
the US’s trust towards India. This is due to India's history of 
imposing voluntary safeguards on its nuclear programme and 
India has a good record on proliferation. Although it is not a 
signatory to the NPT, India has maintained stringent controls and 
abides by the strict export controls on nuclear technology set by 
the NSG on its nuclear technology, and there is no record that 
India ever shared or transferred any of its nuclear knowledge or 
technology to any other country. In fact, in May 2005 India 
conceded a law which criminalises the trade and brokering of 
sensitive technology known as the WMD Act (Bajoria & Pan, 
2010).  
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7.3.4 Key 4: Trust and Trustworthiness 
 
What are the factors to accelerate the trust of developing country to 
participate in the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle 
cooperation? 
- Two-way trust and trustworthiness between newcomer and 
supplier  
 
This question was raised because many NPT Signatory Members, 
especially newcomer countries, that are trying to acquire nuclear 
technology and know-how, are disgruntled and feel that their rights are 
being squeezed, when the MNA was proposed by the supplier states. 
Based on this research, the following actions are significant to gain the 
trust of newcomers:  
i. The members’ right as stated in Article IV is preserved and 
respected and this should be confirmed in any agreement or treaty 
that might be designed in future, if the States accept the MNA.  
However, member states still have a choice of deciding whether to 
exercise or temporarily suspend those rights in accordance with 
their national position and/or interests; 
ii. Benefits on economic packages should be the main objective and 
are clearly discussed and acceptable. This is because developing 
countries would be more interested in economic benefits rather 
than highlighting the system to control non-proliferation; 
iii. The MNA should not be used as a precondition for assurances of 
fuel supply by any Supplier States or groups of Supplier States; 
iv. A country should be open for early involvement by all interested 
parties and member states, including potential newcomer 
countries throughout the MNA negotiations, including during 
decisions, to establish an institutional system; and 
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v. Another factor that needs to be considered so that a newcomer 
state is confident and trust to participate in MNA is to identify the 
entity that will be responsible for managing the MNA. 
Multilateralism has been defined as coordination of three or more 
actors, but the question is, which entity is trusted enough by all 
members to manage the MNA. This is either the NSG (because 
they have the technology) or a new international institution that 
consists of all participating members. If the MNA is coordinated by 
the NSG, how can they ensure that there will be no monopoly of 
the market, even if the IAEA will be appointed as an observer? Not 
because IAEA is not trusted but major donors in the IAEA are 
amongst NSG States. 
 
These are supported by Schiff’s suggestion that any proposed regime or 
arrangement with regards to nuclear technology such as the non-
proliferation regime, treaties, bilateral or unilateral arrangements and 
any tacit agreement related to technology transfer, should be based on 
the principles that (1) nuclear proliferation is bad, (2) nuclear technology 
is good, (3) the regime should be universal, (4) sovereignty should be 
maintained to the greatest extent possible, and (5) the benefit within the 
regime should be reciprocal among states (Schiff, 1984). 
 
Therefore, to increase and strengthen the trust and trustworthiness in 
the MNA, it is significant to study and develop a system that could 
protect constitutional rights of both supplier states and consumer states. 
The system could be executed through a legal dispute settlement 
system. Currently, most of the documents discuss the features and 
benefits of the proposed MNA regime and focus less on the dispute 
system. Tazaki and Kuno have identified 12 features in the MNA regime 
that are not always independent but are interdependent on each other 
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namely nuclear non-proliferation, assurance of supply, access to 
technology, multilateral involvement, siting choice of host national, legal 
aspects, political and public acceptance, economic, nuclear safety, 
nuclear liability, transportation and geopolitics (Tazaki & Kuno, 2012).  
From the list, another feature that needs to be further discussed is a 
model of dispute system for an MNA regime that is acceptable to all. 
This system should represent the implementation of the second principle 
of multilateralism, indivisibility. Indivisibility works as one whole system 
so one action by one party will affect others. An international legal 
dispute settlement is referring to the state practice of submitting disputes 
to a deliberative body that assesses the merits of rival state claims and 
issues a summary decision on how to settle the dispute. There are two 
features for the dispute settlement model- (1) determining the relative 
merits of state claims and in reaching settlement decisions; and (2) 
states agree to abide by the statute issued by the deliberative body 
(Allee & Huth 2006). 
7.4 Future Research: Euratom – An Example of a Regional Nuclear 
Organisation for ASEAN Asia or the Asia-Pacific Region 
This study has focused on the notion of multilateralism to identify what 
factors would bring success in multilateral cooperation. This was carried 
out by identifying the factors that influence trust and trustworthiness in 
the context of multilateral nuclear cooperation. This study also 
discussed the differences between the implementation of multilateral 
cooperation in the west and in Asia. Findings from this study were then 
used to identify key steps that could be considered by Malaysia in the 
development of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy. This policy would be 
designed to ensure the security and sustainability of Malaysian nuclear 
fuel supply, including strategies for participating in the MNA. As 
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described in Chapter 4, the establishment of Euratom has benefitted its 
members by giving an opportunity to expand their nuclear market. 
Malaysia and other ASEAN members could follow such an initiative, 
which is a good step to implement the concept of MNA at a regional 
level.  
 
Can ASEAN create an institution like Euratom? The answer is possibly 
yes, but it will not happen at present. This is because (1) no ASEAN 
members belong to the Nuclear Supplier Group; (2) no ASEAN 
Members have full access to nuclear fuel cycle technology such as 
reprocessing and enrichment facilities; and (3) currently, technology 
holders have no intention to transfer any nuclear technology (such as 
reprocessing and enrichment technology) that may lead to the 
development of nuclear weapons. Both technologies are desirable 
because they can guarantee a backup for fuel and also can reduce the 
volume of waste.  
 
So, if ASEAN decided to have one single organisation such as Euratom 
in Asia, this would mean taking into account the policies of other Asian 
countries such as China, Japan and South Korea, which have the 
capacity, capability and experiences in planning, managing and 
operating nuclear power programmes, and they would have to agree 
with the prospect. 
 
Conceivably, the MNA might attract more participation if it was 
implemented regionally, knowing that the principles of multilateralism in 
ASEAN are slightly different compared to the ones in the West as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Although no ASEAN country has a nuclear plant 
yet, the Euratom experiences are worth considering for Malaysia and 
other ASEAN members that are interested in a nuclear programme 
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especially in designing the plan and strategies for ASEAN’s nuclear 
industry. 
 
The current platform, ASEANTOM, could perhaps be expanded to 
initiate such cooperation and not just focus on the aspects of regulation. 
Thus, it is suggested that future studies should examine whether the 
concept and principles of Euratom could be applied in Asia and if this 
region could create an ASIANTOM – a regional multilateral institute that 
cater nuclear matters for Asia Pacific. It could start by sharing 
experiences and practices in planning and preparation. Such regional 
efforts could link activities with other international organisations or other 
Asian states with experiences, knowledge and facilities in nuclear 
programmes such as China, Japan or South Korea. This is supported by 
the suggestion of some experts that “East Asian countries should lead 
regional cooperation for nuclear waste management in the Asia-Pacific 
because they have more experience with civil nuclear power generation” 
(Lim, 2016:162). In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2 under the sub-
topic ‘to understand multilateralism of the ASEAN and the APEC’, neo-
realists suggest that developing countries such as SEA states should 
rely on relations with other major actors such as the U.S. or Russia if 
they are interested in balancing the power of China in the region. Whilst 
China was not described in an overtly hostile language, there was a 
‘natural’ concern, given their size and increasing economic 
preponderance, that China is dominating the region. However, this is a 
major concern to some SEA states because of the maritime disputes. 
The strategy being pursued to reduce the China influence was by 
maintaining the U.S. engagement in the region, and prudently balancing 
both powers against each other (ICSA, 2012). For example, a maritime 
dispute between Vietnam and China has brought a close relationship 
between Vietnam and the US. In December 2013, the U.S. announced 
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that it would funding Vietnam with USD18 million in assistance, including 
five fast patrol vessels, to strengthen Vietnam’s capacity in maritime 
security (Nikitin et al, 2014).  
 
Thus, future study would provide information and data on how Asia is 
benefitted by China’s booming economies and the US’s nuclear 
diplomatic influences to create a regional institution for the Asia, as 
Euratom has created for the EU. In addition, Asia consisting states that 
are among major producer of uranium such as Kazakhstan and 
Australia. A regional institute such as Euratom in Asia also would further 
initiatives in handling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The 
difference between ASEAN and the EU is that ASEAN holds a principle 
of ASEAN Way as discussed in Chapter 2. The ASEAN Way obliges its 
members to respect the fundamental importance of goodwill and 
cooperation, and holds the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity, as placed 
within the ASEAN Charter itself. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
the ASEAN Way need to be revisited. This is because these principles, 
specially the principle of non-interference, demonstrated ASEAN 
tendency to build consensus in the midst of conflict, which can cause 
confusion and frustration as the members have denied to condemn and 
criticize each other on major issues confronting its Members, for 
example from human rights conflicts in Myanmar and maritime disputes 
with China. How this would influence the effectiveness of the suggested 
nuclear regional institute in the SEA is yet to be uncovered, and perhaps 
further study, as suggested, could provide some answers.  
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